A Rad­i­cal Per­spec­tive on Juris­dic­tion

A Rad­i­cal Per­spec­tive on Jurisdiction

The sub­ject of this report is “Juris­dic­tion,” and how it is com­monly obtained by the var­i­ous courts.
Although this author does not claim to have exhausted that ques­tion, it is my prayer that enough infor­ma­tion is con­tained here to help the stu­dent to bet­ter under­stand the issue. The mate­r­ial found here is based on my study of law, and the Holy Scrip­tures, and is Chris­t­ian in per­spec­tive. My main premise is that we have the duty and the right, to set­tle our own dis­putes, and to stay out of the courts of the ungodly.
Juris­dic­tion has been a sub­ject of study and debate since long before I became involved in law reform, and seems to be most pop­u­lar among those who are sus­pi­cious of estab­lish­ment courts. Each year brings more numer­ous reports of judi­cial mis­con­duct, fraud and theft, on a scale rang­ing from minor traf­fic offenses, to multi-​million dol­lar inher­i­tance set­tle­ments. Many stu­dents of law have seen juris­dic­tion (or the absence of same) as a pos­si­ble answer to a seem­ingly impos­si­ble prob­lem: how to avoid per­sonal or finan­cial ruin at the hands of judges and attorneys?
Let’s begin with an under­stand­ing of the term.
What is Jurisdiction?
Black’s Law Dic­tio­nary, sixth edi­tion, defines juris­dic­tion as follows:
  • “A term of com­pre­hen­sive import embrac­ing every kind of judi­cial action. It is the power of the court to decide a mat­ter in con­tro­versy and pre­sup­poses the exis­tence of a duly con­sti­tuted court with con­trol over the sub­ject mat­ter and the par­ties. Juris­dic­tion defines the pow­ers of courts to inquire into facts, apply the law, make deci­sions, and declare judg­ment. The legal right by which judges exer­cise their author­ity. It exists when court has cog­nizance of class of cases involved, proper par­ties are present, and point to be decided is within pow­ers of court.”
This is expanded upon in Anderson’s “A Dic­tio­nary of Law, A.D. 1893″ as follows:
  • “Power to hear and deter­mine a cause. Power to hear and deter­mine the subject-​matter in con­tro­versy between par­ties to a suit, to adju­di­cate or exer­cise any judi­cial power over them. (Relates to the exer­cise of judi­cial pow­ers.) Refers to the power of the court over the par­ties, the subject-​matter, the res or prop­erty in con­test, and the author­ity of the court to ren­der the judg­ment or decree which it assumes to make. (By juris­dic­tion over the “subject-​matter” is meant the nature of the cause of action or relief sought; and this is con­ferred by the sov­er­eign author­ity which orga­nizes the court, and is to be sought for in the gen­eral nature of its pow­ers or in the author­ity spe­cially con­ferred. Juris­dic­tion of the “per­son” is obtained by the ser­vice of process, or by the vol­un­tary appear­ance of the party in the progress of the cause. Juris­dic­tion of the “res” is obtained by seizure under process of the court, whereby it is held to abide such order as the court may make con­cern­ing it. Hence want of juris­dic­tion may be shown as to the subject-​matter, the per­son, or, in pro­ceed­ings in rem, as to the thing.)
In a nut­shell, these def­i­n­i­tions tell us that juris­dic­tion is the power of a court to make bind­ing deci­sions with regard to peo­ple, and peo­ples’ rights in prop­erty; that in order for the court to secure that power, it must have con­trol (author­ity and/​or power) over:
  1. The peo­ple, or par­ties to the con­tro­versy. This is called “in per­sonam juris­dic­tion”; and
  2. The prop­erty in con­tro­versy. This is called “in rem” juris­dic­tion; and
  3. The spe­cific kind of con­tro­versy. This is known as “subject-​matter.” For instance, a traf­fic court can­not hear a divorce case. This is also known as the “nature” of a mat­ter, as in the phrase “nature and cause” found in the Sixth Arti­cle of the “Bill of Rights.”
A very impor­tant aspect not men­tioned in the dic­tio­nar­ies, is that juris­dic­tion never becomes a ques­tion for con­sid­er­a­tion until a dis­pute arises between people.
What is a Court?
We are led to under­stand that juris­dic­tion “pre­sup­poses the exis­tence of a duly con­sti­tuted court.” But there is no dis­cus­sion of how a court becomes duly con­sti­tuted. Black’s def­i­n­i­tion of court is lengthy, and leaves the reader more con­fused than when he started. Anderson’s has this to say about courts:
  • 1. Accord­ing to Cowel, the house where the king remains with his ret­inue; also, the place where jus­tice is admin­is­tered. (These two mean­ings, in the begin­ning, were closely con­nected. For, in early his­tory, when the king was actu­ally the foun­tain and dis­penser of jus­tice, noth­ing could be more nat­ural than that sub­jects who had com­plaints of ill-​treatment to make should use the expres­sion ‘the court,’ in speak­ing of the jour­ney to the place where the king was domi­ciled, and the appli­ca­tion to him pre­ferred, usu­ally in the court of the palace, for inter­fer­ence and redress. Anciently, then, the ‘court,’ for judi­cial pur­poses, was the king and his atten­dants; later, those who sojourned or trav­eled with him, to whom he del­e­gated author­ity to deter­mine con­tro­ver­sies and to dis­pense justice.)
  • A tri­bunal estab­lished for the pub­lic admin­is­tra­tion of jus­tice, and com­posed of one or more judges, who sit for that pur­pose at fixed times and places, attended by proper officers.
  • An orga­nized body, with defined pow­ers, meet­ing at cer­tain times and places for the hear­ing and deci­sion of causes and other mat­ters brought before it, and aided in this by its offi­cers, viz., attor­neys and coun­sel to present and man­age the busi­ness, clerks to record and attest its acts and deci­sions, and min­is­te­r­ial offi­cers to exe­cute its com­mands and secure order in its proceedings.”
Before we can under­stand the full scope of an issue, we must begin at its roots; ask the impor­tant ques­tions. Why are things the way they are, and how did they get this way? Who did these things, and who said that they could? In other words, “by what author­ity;” or in more ancient terms, “quo warranto.”
Am I a Radical?
By con­sis­tently exam­in­ing every issue through the looking-​glass of quo war­ranto, I have found a razor, which can cut to the heart of almost any issue. Try it for your­self, but don’t be sur­prised if peo­ple begin to call you a rad­i­cal. Did you know that “rad­i­cal” is defined as:
  • “Fun­da­men­tal; going to the roots of any­thing.” (Webster’s Unabridged Ency­clo­pe­dic Dic­tio­nary, A.D. 1957)
So what’s so bad about being radical?
In going to the roots of juris­dic­tion, the first ques­tions which come to my mind are, who is the “sov­er­eign,” and what is a “ret­inue;” how does a “tri­bunal” become “estab­lished;” who “orga­nized” the “body” of a given court, and by what author­ity; and how does a “judge” become “charged” with decid­ing anything?
I believe that the root def­i­n­i­tion of a law­ful “court” is as follows:
  • “A man, or group of men, law­fully del­e­gated the author­ity to set­tle a dis­pute aris­ing among two or more other men.”
Please note that the usage of the words “man” and “men” is inclu­sive of all peo­ple; men, women, and children.
Courts exist because peo­ple inevitably have dis­putes. “Juris­dic­tion,” in essence, is noth­ing more, or less, than the “law­fully del­e­gated author­ity” to set­tle dis­putes. There­fore, the study of juris­dic­tion must begin with the ques­tion of who has the right to set­tle dis­putes, and then fol­low through to how that right can be law­fully exer­cised, and del­e­gated to others.
Where do rights come from?
A lot of peo­ple claim to have Con­sti­tu­tional rights. Those peo­ple have obvi­ously never read the Con­sti­tu­tion. Read it your­self, and you will find that there is not a sin­gle arti­cle which grants rights to the peo­ple. Rather, the peo­ple are acknowl­edged to pos­sess cer­tain rights, which pre-​date the Con­sti­tu­tion, and to which offi­cers of the Union are required to take an Oath to pro­tect, and not to violate.
Any so-​called right, which is depen­dent upon a Con­sti­tu­tion, a con­tract, or any other piece of paper, is more accu­rately described as a “del­e­ga­tion of author­ity,” or “priv­i­lege.” If the paper is lost, destroyed, revoked, or amended, then the priv­i­lege which it cre­ated dis­ap­pears. In con­trast, the laws of our One True God can­not be lost or destroyed, and will never be revoked or amended. Those who tell you that the law changes con­stantly, have for­saken our One True God, and embraced the Beast. They would have you do the same.
In agree­ment with most of the founders of these united States of Amer­ica, I believe that all rights orig­i­nate from the Cre­ator of all things, the One True God. (Gen­e­sis 1:1)
How do we know what rights God gave us?
This ques­tion stumps most peo­ple who claim God-​given rights. When asked the ques­tion, “Do all peo­ple have the same rights?” most will answer “yes.” When asked, “how do you know which rights God gave you?” the most com­mon answer is a blank stare.
The Holy Scrip­tures do not talk much of rights, with the excep­tion on one: the right to choose, or free agency.
  • “Behold, I set before you this day a bless­ing and a curse; A bless­ing, if ye obey the com­mand­ments of the Lord your God, which I com­mand you this day; And a curse, if ye will not obey the com­mand­ments of the Lord your God, but turn aside out of the way which I com­mand you this day, to go after other gods, which ye have not known.” (Deuteron­omy 11: 2628)
  • “And if it seem evil unto you to serve the Lord, choose you this day whom ye will serve; whether the gods which your fathers served that were on the other side of the flood, or the gods of the Amor­ites, in whose land ye dwell: but as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord.” (Joshua 24:15)
Free agency is the one unalien­able right given to us by the One True God. We all have it, to a greater or lesser degree. Even slaves have this right. It is our right to choose. The right to con­tract, or not to con­tract. Unalien­able means that it can­not be taken away by any­one except God, and can­not even be per­ma­nently given away by its owner. This con­cept is even hon­ored and upheld by mod­ern statutes which allow any­one the right to revoke pow­ers of attorney.
When peo­ple turn away from God’s laws, He makes them slaves, thereby tak­ing away a large mea­sure of their free agency. He does this because He loves us. Only the mas­ter is respon­si­ble for the acts of a slave. Thus are many slaves saved from the bur­den of their sins.
All other rights are inalien­able, mean­ing that they can be con­tracted away. Any right, other than free agency, which could not be con­tracted away, would infringe our right to choose.
But which comes first, the rights, or the duties? Notice these other exam­ples of the right to choose:
  • “Now there­fore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a pecu­liar trea­sure unto me above all peo­ple: for all the earth is mine: And ye shall be unto me a king­dom of priests, and an holy nation.” (Exo­dus 19: 56)
  • “If ye walk in my statutes, and keep my com­mand­ments, and do them; Then I will give you rain in due sea­son, and the land shall yield her increase, and the trees of the field shall yield their fruit. And your thresh­ing shall reach unto the vin­tage, and the vin­tage shall reach unto the sow­ing time: and ye shall eat your bread to the full, and dwell in your land safely. And I will give peace in the land, and ye shall lie down, and none shall make you afraid: … But if ye will not hear­ken unto me, and will not do all these com­mand­ments; … I also will do this unto you; I will even appoint over you ter­ror, con­sump­tion, and the burn­ing ague, that shall con­sume the eyes, and cause sor­row of heart: and ye shall sow your seed in vain, for your ene­mies shall eat it.” (Leviti­cus 25: 316)
Clearly, the duty to fol­low God’s law pre­cedes any bless­ings (rights) which He might bestow. Just as clearly, those who fol­low God’s laws will be given more bless­ings (rights) than those who do not.
If you obey the com­mand­ment to not mur­der (Deuteron­omy 5:17), you are given the bless­ing of safety. If you vio­late that com­mand­ment, you are to be put to death (Leviti­cus 24:17). Many of these exam­ples can be enu­mer­ated. If you steal another man’s prop­erty (Exo­dus 20:15), are you secure in the right to your own (Exo­dus 22:1)? If you judge other men unright­eously, what right do you have to right­eous judg­ment (Matthew 7:2)? Stated another way, when we vio­late the law, we give up our rights to pro­tec­tion under the law.
What is law?
This was a big shocker for me. Who would think to look up the word “law,” even in a law dic­tio­nary? Black’s Sixth Edi­tion devotes more than a whole page to the def­i­n­i­tion of law, but this part is the most striking:
  • In old Eng­lish jurispru­dence, “law” is used to sig­nify an oath, or the priv­i­lege of being sworn; as in the phrases “to wage one’s law,” “to lose one’s law.”
So, the “rad­i­cal” def­i­n­i­tion of “law” is “oath.” Other words with a sim­i­lar mean­ing as “oath” include “con­tract,” “agree­ment,” “covenant,” “treaty,” “pledge.” You get the idea. So in essence, “law” is noth­ing more than a man’s agree­ment to behave in a cer­tain way. Even God’s law is rooted in His covenants with Abra­ham, Isaac, and Israel.
In the early days of this nation, most peo­ple fol­lowed God’s laws. As a result, each man was blessed with sov­er­eignty over his own affairs; a large mea­sure of free agency. Unlike slaves or sub­jects, we became respon­si­ble for our own judg­ments (Leviti­cus 18:4), and became oblig­ated to stay out of the courts of the ungodly.
If each one of us is sov­er­eign, then does not each of us have our own court? Don’t we all pos­sess the inher­ent right to set­tle our own dis­putes? Of course. Which brings us back to the ques­tion: “How does some­one else’s court gain juris­dic­tion over us, our prop­erty, and the oper­a­tion of our affairs?”
Prop­erty Ownership
Just because you have con­trol over some­thing doesn’t mean you nec­es­sar­ily own it. Con­versely, you may not nec­es­sar­ily have com­plete con­trol over every­thing you “own,” unless you hold the high­est title. For exam­ple, a man who sells a par­cel of land by way of a “land con­tract” holds legal title to the land until it is paid for, at which time he must then pass the title to the buyer. But while the land is being pur­chased over time, the buyer has pos­ses­sion of the land, and in most ways uses it as his own. He has what is called an “equi­table inter­est.” How­ever, if the buyer doesn’t make his pay­ments on sched­ule, then all rights in the land return to the seller, who has legal title, as well as a “rever­sion­ary” interest.
Do you own land? If you answered yes, here’s another ques­tion: Do you pay yearly prop­erty taxes on that land? What hap­pens if you don’t pay the taxes? How can you claim to own some­thing that you only have the right to use, as long as you pay a yearly rental?
We usu­ally think of “prop­erty” in terms of land, money, or other tan­gi­ble wealth, but prop­erty is always ulti­mately defined as “an aggre­gate of rights.” The One True God owns every­thing, but we have rights in some of those things. When we accept the duty of fol­low­ing God’s laws, and trust Him to help us pro­tect our own rights, He asks us to pay a tithe (tenth) of our increase. Note that He never asks for a por­tion of any­thing from which we have already paid a tithe, and He warns us that any gov­ern­ment which does this is not fol­low­ing His law; their author­ity is not legit­i­mate, because it is “not of God.” (See Romans 13:1)
The power to tax is the power to destroy; to con­fis­cate. This is what makes the so-​called “prop­erty tax” one of the most evil ideas pos­si­ble in a free soci­ety. The ulti­mate con­clu­sion is obvi­ous: Who­ever has the power to tax prop­erty will even­tu­ally own all prop­erty (all rights). The gov­ern­ments in Amer­ica today do not yet pos­sess all of our rights, but in most ways they behave as though they do. And most peo­ple, agents of gov­ern­ment and com­mon folk alike, have come to believe the lie.
These gov­ern­ments now behave in the same way as the lords of old Eng­land. All the land and the fruits thereof are pre­sumed to belong to the “king,” and at each level “down” toward the com­mon folk (serfs) is a lord, or group of lords to admin­is­ter the “fief­dom.” The serfs have a lim­ited priv­i­lege of sale or inher­i­tance in prop­erty, so long as they con­tinue to pay trib­ute (tax) to the king.
He who holds the high­est title to prop­erty has the final say as to what becomes of that prop­erty. This explains “in rem” jurisdiction.
Free agency in set­tling disputes
Per­sonam juris­dic­tion, as far as I under­stand it myself, is lim­ited to some very basic prin­ci­ples. Ini­tially, it is deter­mined as follows:
  1. Sov­er­eigns, or freemen are those men who are not bound by oath to serve other men.
  2. Sub­jects are those men who have given an oath of ser­vice to another man, or group of men.
  3. Every free­man who fol­lows God’s laws, is blessed with the right to set­tle his own dis­putes, i.e. he holds his own court at will.
  4. Freemen may bring suit against other freemen, though each has equal stand­ing, and is not bound by any other man’s court unless by oath, or vol­un­tary delegation.
  5. A free­man is gen­er­ally empow­ered to set­tle dis­putes between his sub­jects. This is depen­dent upon the oath between the free­man and the subject.
  6. A free­man may bring suit against his own subjects.
  7. Sub­jects have no stand­ing in any court, save that of their mas­ter. They may sue their mas­ter only at his plea­sure, unless the oath between the mas­ter and sub­ject specif­i­cally allows it, which is not com­mon. No sub­ject may directly sue another free­man, but must appeal to his mas­ter to sue for relief on his behalf.
Set­tling Disputes
In any dis­pute the par­ties have three choices:
  1. For­give­ness. This choice works well when the party who per­ceives him­self as dam­aged has not suf­fered too great a loss, and espe­cially where the cause of the dis­pute is not likely to re-​occur. Some­times if the other options are more costly than the expected relief, it is a choice which helps to pre­serve a man’s san­ity. How­ever, no man can bear unlim­ited tres­pass, and will even­tu­ally seek other options.
  2. Blood­shed. This is one of the old­est meth­ods of set­tling dis­putes. It is for­bid­den in the Holy Scrip­tures, except under very spe­cific cir­cum­stances. This method of dis­pute res­o­lu­tion almost always even­tu­ally destroys the man who uses it in any way con­trary to God’s law, which is why it is forbidden.
  3. Law­ful Process. This is the pre­ferred method of dis­pute res­o­lu­tion, with­out which we would have no need of dis­cussing juris­dic­tion. Law­ful process can be divided into three sub-​processes, which are listed in the Holy Scrip­tures, in the Book of Matthew, chap­ter eigh­teen, verses fif­teen through six­teen.
It is impor­tant that we under­stand law­ful process, because our only alter­na­tives are for­give­ness, or blood­shed. Between sov­er­eigns, war is nearly always the result of an inabil­ity to resolve a recur­ring dis­pute using law­ful process. Before law­ful process can begin, the par­ties in dis­pute must be nar­rowed to include only par­ties of equal stand­ing, as shown above. Then they can pro­ceed as follows:
  1. Nego­ti­a­tion. In other words, a con­tract, or treaty.
    • “More­over if thy brother shall tres­pass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother.”
Nego­ti­a­tion is the most com­mon form of set­tle­ment, which is an expres­sion of our most basic right of free agency. All con­tracts are exam­ples of nego­ti­a­tion. Most dis­putes which go beyond nego­ti­a­tion are a result of breach-​of-​contract. In other words, one or more par­ties to a con­tract either do some­thing which they had agreed not to do, or else fail to per­form an act they have promised. Even crim­i­nal acts come into courts as the result of a dis­pute. As an exam­ple, let’s say that a man has stolen a loaf of bread from you. First, you accuse him of the theft. He either admits, or denies. If he denies, you have a dis­pute. If he admits, then you demand resti­tu­tion (replace the bread). If he agrees, and then fol­lows through, then there is no dis­pute. If he does not agree, or if he agrees and then fails to fol­low through, then you have a dis­pute. This same prin­ci­ple applies to all crim­i­nal acts. Pros­e­cu­tions for mur­der were orig­i­nally civil dis­putes, pros­e­cuted by the fam­ily of the vic­tim. County pros­e­cu­tors came into exis­tence as a means to pro­tect the poor, who did not have the resources to pros­e­cute crim­i­nals who had dam­aged them.
  1. Medi­a­tion. An attempt to reach an agree­ment with the help of a third party.
    • “But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three wit­nesses every word may be established.”
We are to bring along one or two wit­nesses, prefer­ably peo­ple known to all par­ties, to aid in the nego­ti­a­tion, and try to bring about a peace­ful res­o­lu­tion. Medi­a­tion, like all nego­ti­a­tion, must result in a con­tract, or treaty between the par­ties. The medi­a­tor has no author­ity to com­pel the par­ties to agree, or to set­tle the dis­pute with­out agree­ment between the parties.
  1. Arbi­tra­tion. This is the del­e­ga­tion of author­ity to a third party to set­tle the dispute.
    • “And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: ”
Arbi­tra­tion, in its var­i­ous forms, is what we com­monly think of as a court. It is the heart of this dis­cus­sion on juris­dic­tion. The church, a body of men learned in God’s law, was Jesus’ choice of arbi­tra­tor when all other attempts to set­tle a dis­pute had failed. “Church,” in this sense, meant “eccle­sia,” or the body of law­ful elders. In any arbi­tra­tion, all par­ties in dis­pute choose to del­e­gate the author­ity of their own court, the right to make their own judg­ment, to a third-​party. This is, in itself, the begin­ning of a nego­ti­ated set­tle­ment, since all par­ties must agree to the third-​party arbi­tra­tor in order for him to have the power, i.e. juris­dic­tion, to set­tle the dispute.
The verse ends with these words:
  • “but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an hea­then man and a publican.”
In other words, if a man will not set­tle a dis­pute any other way, ignore him as long as you can, and then do what you must. A man must always have a rem­edy. Within the bound­aries of God’s law, of course.
We’ve learned that juris­dic­tion comes into play only in arbi­tra­tion. As near as I can tell, the sources of juris­dic­tion to set­tle a dis­pute can be nar­rowed to two: con­tract, and escheat.
Juris­dic­tion by Contract
Con­tract includes vol­un­tary par­tic­i­pa­tion, as well as any oath, agree­ment, or treaty which del­e­gates the author­ity to set­tle dis­putes to another party. Walk­ing into a court and giv­ing your name is an exam­ple of vol­un­tary par­tic­i­pa­tion. Accep­tance of ser­vice of process, even from a court with whom you have no con­tract, can become vol­un­tary par­tic­i­pa­tion if you fail to send timely notice to the court of its lack (known as “want”) of juris­dic­tion. Juris­dic­tional agree­ments often occur far in advance of a dis­pute. Con­tracts con­tain­ing clauses such as “this con­tract is made pur­suant to the laws of Delaware,” or which are acknowl­edged by a Notary Pub­lic, or other offi­cer of a body with an orga­nized court, del­e­gate juris­dic­tion as a part of the contract.
The record­ing of a con­tract with a clerk or “reg­is­ter,” for a body with an orga­nized court, gives that court “cog­nizance” of the con­tract. It begins with a con­tract when a man record­ing a doc­u­ment pays a fee to the reg­is­ter. Look back at Black’s def­i­n­i­tion of juris­dic­tion. “[Juris­dic­tion] exists when court has cog­nizance of [mat­ter in dis­pute].” Many law reform stu­dents believe that record­ing a deed for land with a county reg­is­ter gives the county either legal title or equi­table inter­est in the land. It appears from the evi­dence, that record­ing merely gives the county juris­dic­tion to set­tle dis­putes involv­ing the land, and the par­ties to the deed.
Many con­tracts con­tain clauses which specif­i­cally del­e­gate juris­dic­tion to an arbi­tra­tion council.
  • If any dis­pute shall arise between the par­ties to this con­tract with regard to the covenants con­tained herein, then juris­dic­tion over the set­tle­ment of said dis­pute shall be lim­ited to the XYZ Res­o­lu­tion Coun­cil, located at 321 Abi­cromby Place, Any­where, U.S.A, and the judg­ments and awards of said Coun­cil shall be bind­ing upon the par­ties hereto.
Juris­dic­tion by Escheat
Escheat is a dif­fer­ent mat­ter, and is widely mis­un­der­stood. Black’s Sixth Edi­tion defines it as:
  • A rever­sion of prop­erty to the state in con­se­quence of a want of any indi­vid­ual com­pe­tent to inherit.
Remem­ber that “prop­erty” is not land, money, or other wealth; it is an “aggre­gate of rights.” Is the “right to set­tle dis­putes” a prop­erty right? Of course it is. All rights are prop­erty. When we neglect to del­e­gate to a spe­cific party the right to set­tle dis­putes aris­ing from our con­tracts, there is no one who is com­pe­tent to inherit that right if a dis­pute does arise. This makes our “prop­erty” easy pick­ings for any “sov­er­eign” with an orga­nized court to step in and claim that right for his own. The bur­den of proof is then shifted to the par­ties, to prove that some­one else has that right. If no com­pe­tent party can come for­ward and claim that prop­erty right, then the par­ties are “escheated” out of it.
Escheat is also sig­nif­i­cant on a broader scale. By allow­ing a God­less body of men to orga­nize together and monop­o­lize our courts, Chris­tians have aban­doned the right to set­tle their own dis­putes, and barred them­selves from right­eous judg­ment. So long as no one is will­ing or able to fill that capac­ity, we will con­tinue to be “escheated” over and over again. Our only solu­tion is to reaf­firm our Chris­t­ian Duties, redis­cover our Rights, and exer­cise our God-​given Authority.
Com­mon law courts, eccle­si­as­ti­cal courts, and other types of peo­ples’ courts are cur­rently spring­ing up all over the coun­try. Although the main­stream media usu­ally maligns these courts, their for­ma­tion is a symp­tom of peo­ples’ deep-​seated impulse to return to God’s law. Unfor­tu­nately, too many of these groups are not edu­cated in the due-​process pro­ce­dures required of a law­ful court. Care­ful study is needed in the oper­a­tion of any court, for if due process is not afforded the par­ties in dis­pute, the rights of the court will be taken through escheat.
It is my prayer that this report will aid all peo­ple in achiev­ing peace in their lives, which is the aim of any law­ful court. I pray that all courts, and all peo­ple with dis­putes, will bet­ter under­stand the lim­ited author­ity with which a court oper­ates. May the One True God give us the Strength and Wis­dom to fol­low a True Course. Amen.
(Isa­iah 33:22) For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our law­giver, the Lord is our king; he will save us.
“The essen­tial ele­ments of due process of law are … Notice and The Oppor­tu­nity to defend.”
Simon vs. Craft, 182 US 427
Yet, not one indi­vid­ual has been given notice of the loss of his/​her Right, let alone before sign­ing the license (con­tract). Nor was the Cit­i­zen given any oppor­tu­nity to defend against the loss of his/​her right to travel, by auto­mo­bile, on the high­ways, in the ordi­nary course of life and busi­ness. This amounts to an arbi­trary depri­va­tion of Liberty.
“There should be no arbi­trary depri­va­tion of Life or Liberty …”
Bar­bour vs. Con­nolly, 113 US 27, 31;
Yick Wo vs. Hop­kins, 118 US 356
and …
“The right to travel is part of the Lib­erty of which a cit­i­zen can­not deprived with­out due process of law under the Fifth Amend­ment. This Right was emerg­ing as early as the Magna Carta.”
Kent vs. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958)
The focal point of this ques­tion of police power and due process must bal­ance upon the point of mak­ing the pub­lic high­ways a safe place for the pub­lic to travel. If a man trav­els in a man­ner that cre­ates actual dam­age, an action would lie (civilly) for recov­ery of dam­ages. The state could then also pro­ceed against the indi­vid­ual to deprive him of his Right to use the pub­lic high­ways, for cause. This process would ful­fill the due process require­ments of the Fifth Amend­ment while at the same time insur­ing that Rights guar­an­teed by the U.S. Con­sti­tu­tion and the state con­sti­tu­tions would be protected.
But unless or until harm or dam­age (a crime) is com­mit­ted, there is no cause for inter­fer­ence in the pri­vate affairs or actions of a Citizen.
One of the most famous and per­haps the most quoted def­i­n­i­tions of due process of law, is that of Daniel Web­ster in his Dart­mouth Col­lege Case (4 Wheat 518), in which he declared that by due process is meant:
“a law which hears before it con­demns, which pro­ceeds upon inquiry, and ren­ders judg­ment only after trial.”
See also State vs. Stras­burg, 110 P. 1020;
Den­nis vs. Moses, 52 P. 333
Some­what sim­i­lar is the state­ment that is a rule as old as the law that:
“no one shall be per­son­ally bound (restricted) until he has had his day in court,”
by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear and has been afforded an oppor­tu­nity to be heard. Judg­ment with­out such cita­tion and oppor­tu­nity lacks all the attrib­utes of a judi­cial deter­mi­na­tion; it is judi­cial usurpa­tion and it is oppres­sive and can never be upheld where it is fairly admin­is­tered. (12 Am.Jur. [1st] Const. Law, Sect. 573, Pg. 269)
Note: This sounds like the process used to deprive one of the “priv­i­lege” of oper­at­ing a motor vehi­cle “for hire.” It should be kept in mind, how­ever, that we are dis­cussing the arbi­trary depri­va­tion of the Right to use the road that all cit­i­zens have “in common.”
The futil­ity of the state’s posi­tion can be most eas­ily observed in the 1959 Wash­ing­ton Attor­ney General’s opin­ion on a sim­i­lar issue:
“The dis­tinc­tion between the Right of the Cit­i­zen to use the pub­lic high­ways for pri­vate, rather than com­mer­cial pur­poses is recognized …”
and …
“Under its power to reg­u­late pri­vate uses of our high­ways, our leg­is­la­ture has required that motor vehi­cle oper­a­tors be licensed (I.C. 49307). Undoubt­edly, the pri­mary pur­pose of this require­ment is to insure, as far as pos­si­ble, that all motor vehi­cle oper­a­tors will be com­pe­tent and qual­i­fied, thereby reduc­ing the poten­tial haz­ard or risk of harm, to which other users of the high­ways might oth­er­wise be sub­ject. But once hav­ing com­plied with this reg­u­la­tory pro­vi­sion, by obtain­ing the required license, a motorist enjoys the priv­i­lege of trav­el­ling freely upon the highways …”
Wash­ing­ton A.G.O. 5960 No. 88, Pg. 11
This alarm­ing opin­ion appears to be say­ing that every per­son using an auto­mo­bile as a mat­ter of Right, must give up the Right and con­vert the Right into a priv­i­lege. This is accom­plished under the guise of reg­u­la­tion. This state­ment is indica­tive of the insen­si­tiv­ity, even the igno­rance, of the gov­ern­ment to the lim­its placed upon gov­ern­ments by and through the sev­eral constitutions.
This legal the­ory may have been able to stand in 1959; how­ever, as of 1966, in the United States Supreme Court deci­sion in Miranda, even this weak defense of the state’s actions must fall.
“Where rights secured by the Con­sti­tu­tion are involved, there can be no rule mak­ing or leg­is­la­tion which would abro­gate them.”
Miranda vs. Ari­zona, 384 US 436, 491
Thus the leg­is­la­ture does not have the power to abro­gate the Citizen’s Right to travel upon the pub­lic roads, by pass­ing leg­is­la­tion forc­ing the cit­i­zen to waive his Right and con­vert that Right into a priv­i­lege. Fur­ther­more, we have pre­vi­ously estab­lished that this “priv­i­lege” has been defined as apply­ing only to those who are “con­duct­ing busi­ness in the streets” or “oper­at­ing for-​hire vehi­cles.”
The leg­is­la­ture has attempted (by leg­isla­tive fiat) to deprive the Cit­i­zen of his Right to use the roads in the ordi­nary course of life and busi­ness, with­out afford­ing the Cit­i­zen the safe­guard of due process of law. This has been accom­plished under sup­posed pow­ers of regulation.
A Cit­i­zen can­not be forced to give up his/​her Rights in the name of regulation.
“… the only lim­i­ta­tions found restrict­ing the right of the state to con­di­tion the use of the pub­lic high­ways as a means of vehic­u­lar trans­porta­tion for com­pen­sa­tion are (1) that the state must not exact of those it per­mits to use the high­ways for haul­ing for gain that they sur­ren­der any of their inher­ent U.S. Con­sti­tu­tional Rights as a con­di­tion prece­dent to obtain­ing per­mis­sion for such use …”
Riley vs. Lae­son, 142 So. 619;
Stephen­son vs. Bin­ford, supra.
If one can­not be placed in a posi­tion of being forced to sur­ren­der Rights in order to exer­cise a priv­i­lege, how much more must this maxim of law, then, apply when one is sim­ply exer­cis­ing (putting into use) a Right? <BLOCKQUOTE?“TO block­quote land.”< the of law be not would law, com­mon usage and course to accord­ing trial, reg­u­lar a with­out prop­erty, or per­son rights Cit­i­zen deprive which statute that>
Hoke vs. Hen­der­son, 15 NC 15
and …
“We find it intol­er­a­ble that one Con­sti­tu­tional Right should have to be sur­ren­dered in order to assert another.”
Simons vs. United States, 390 US 389
Since the state requires that one give up Rights in order to exer­cise the priv­i­lege of dri­ving, the reg­u­la­tion can­not stand under the police power, due process, or reg­u­la­tion, but must be exposed as a statute which is oppres­sive and one which has been mis­ap­plied to deprive the Cit­i­zen of Rights guar­an­teed by the United States Con­sti­tu­tion and the state constitutions.
“Any claim that this statute is a tax­ing statute would be imme­di­ately open to severe Con­sti­tu­tional objec­tions. If it could be said that the state had the power to tax a Right, this would enable the state to destroy Rights guar­an­teed by the con­sti­tu­tion through the use of oppres­sive tax­a­tion. The ques­tion herein, is one of the state tax­ing the Right to travel by the ordi­nary modes of the day, and whether this is a leg­isla­tive object of the state taxation.
The views advanced herein are nei­ther novel nor unsup­ported by author­ity. The ques­tion of tax­ing power of the states has been repeat­edly con­sid­ered by the Supreme Court. The Right of the state to impede or embar­rass the Con­sti­tu­tional oper­a­tion of the U.S. Gov­ern­ment or the Rights which the Cit­i­zen holds under it, has been uni­formly denied.”
McCul­loch vs. Mary­land, 4 Wheat 316
The power to tax is the power to destroy, and if the state is given the power to destroy Rights through tax­a­tion, the framers of the Con­sti­tu­tion wrote that doc­u­ment in vain.
“… It may be said that a tax of one dol­lar for pass­ing through the state can­not sen­si­bly affect any func­tion of gov­ern­ment or deprive a Cit­i­zen of any valu­able Right. But if a state can tax … a pas­sen­ger of one dol­lar, it can tax him a thou­sand dollars.”
Cran­dall vs. Nevada, 6 Wall 35, 46
and …
“If the Right of pass­ing through a state by a Cit­i­zen of the United States is one guar­an­teed by the Con­sti­tu­tion, it must be sacred from state taxation.”
Ibid., Pg. 47
There­fore, the Right of travel must be kept sacred from all forms of state tax­a­tion and if this argu­ment is used by the state as a defense of the enforce­ment of this statute, then this argu­ment also must fail.
As pre­vi­ously demon­strated, the Cit­i­zen has the Right to travel and to trans­port his prop­erty upon the pub­lic high­ways in the ordi­nary course of life and busi­ness. How­ever, if one exer­cises this Right to travel (with­out first giv­ing up the Right and con­vert­ing that Right into a priv­i­lege) the Cit­i­zen is by statute, guilty of a crime. This amounts to con­vert­ing the exer­cise of a Con­sti­tu­tional Right into a crime.
Recall the Miller vs. U.S. and Snerer vs. Cullen quotes from Pg. 5, and:
“The state can­not dimin­ish Rights of the people.”
Hur­tado vs. Cal­i­for­nia, 110 US 516
and …
“Where rights secured by the Con­sti­tu­tion are involved, there can be no rule mak­ing or leg­is­la­tion which would abro­gate them.”
Miranda, supra.
Indeed, the very pur­pose for cre­at­ing the state under the lim­i­ta­tions of the con­sti­tu­tion was to pro­tect the rights of the peo­ple from intru­sion, par­tic­u­larly by the forces of government.
So we can see that any attempt by the leg­is­la­ture to make the act of using the pub­lic high­ways as a mat­ter of Right into a crime, is void upon its face.
Any per­son who claims his Right to travel upon the high­ways, and so exer­cises that Right, can­not be tried for a crime of doing so. And yet, this Free­man stands before this court today to answer charges for the “crime” of exer­cis­ing his Right to Lib­erty. As we have already shown, the term “drive” can only apply to those who are employed in the busi­ness of trans­porta­tion for hire. It has been shown that free­dom includes the Citizen’s Right to use the pub­lic high­ways in the ordi­nary course of life and busi­ness with­out license or reg­u­la­tion by the police pow­ers of the state.
It is the duty of the court to rec­og­nize the sub­stance of things and not the mere form.
“The courts are not bound by mere form, nor are they to be mis­led by mere pre­tenses. They are at lib­erty — indeed they are under a solemn duty — to look at the sub­stance of things, when­ever they enter upon the inquiry whether the leg­is­la­ture has tran­scended the lim­its of its author­ity. If, there­fore, a statute pur­ported to have been enacted to pro­tect … the pub­lic safety, has no real or sub­stan­tial rela­tion to those objects or is a pal­pa­ble inva­sion of Rights secured by the fun­da­men­tal law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.”
Mul­ger vs. Kansas, 123 US 623, 661
and …
“It is the duty of the courts to be watch­ful for the Con­sti­tu­tional rights of the cit­i­zen and against any stealthy encroach­ments thereon.”
Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616
The courts are duty bound to rec­og­nize and stop the stealthy encroach­ments which have been made upon the Citizen’s Right to travel and to use the roads to trans­port his prop­erty in the “ordi­nary course of life and busi­ness.” (Had­field, supra.)
Fur­ther, the court must rec­og­nize that the Right to travel is part of the Lib­erty of which a Cit­i­zen can­not be deprived with­out spe­cific cause and with­out the due process of law guar­an­teed in the Fifth Amend­ment. (Kent, supra.)
The his­tory of this inva­sion of the Citizen’s Right to use the pub­lic high­ways shows clearly that the leg­is­la­ture sim­ply found a hereto­fore untapped source of rev­enue, got greedy, and attempted to enforce a statute in an uncon­sti­tu­tional man­ner upon those free and nat­ural indi­vid­u­als who have a Right to travel upon the high­ways. This was not attempted in an out­right action, but in a slow, metic­u­lous, cal­cu­lated encroach­ment upon the Citizen’s Right to travel.
This posi­tion must be accepted unless the pros­e­cu­tor can show his author­ity for the posi­tion that the “use of the road in the ordi­nary course of life and busi­ness” is a privilege.
To rule in any other man­ner, with­out clear author­ity for an adverse rul­ing, will infringe upon fun­da­men­tal and basic con­cepts of Con­sti­tu­tional law. This posi­tion, that a Right can­not be reg­u­lated under any guise, must be accepted with­out con­cern for the mon­e­tary loss of the state.
“Dis­obe­di­ence or eva­sion of a Con­sti­tu­tional Man­date can­not be tol­er­ated, even though such dis­obe­di­ence may, at least tem­porar­ily, pro­mote in some respects the best inter­ests of the public.”
Slote vs. Exam­i­na­tion, 112 ALR 660
and …
“Eco­nomic neces­sity can­not jus­tify a dis­re­gard of Con­sti­tu­tional guarantee.”
Riley vs. Carter, 79 ALR 1018;
16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect. 81
and …
“Con­sti­tu­tional Rights can­not be denied sim­ply because of hos­til­ity to their asser­tions and exer­cise; vin­di­ca­tion of con­ceded Con­sti­tu­tional Rights can­not be made depen­dent upon any the­ory that it is less expen­sive to deny them than to afford them.”
Wat­son vs. Mem­phis, 375 US 526
There­fore, the Court’s deci­sion in the instant case must be made with­out the issue of cost to the state being taken into con­sid­er­a­tion, as that issue is irrel­e­vant. The state can­not lose money that it never had a right to demand from the Sov­er­eign Peo­ple.
Finally, we come to the issue of pub­lic pol­icy. It could be argued that the licens­ing scheme of all per­sons is a mat­ter of pub­lic pol­icy. How­ever, if this argu­ment is used, it too must fail, as:
“No pub­lic pol­icy of a state can be allowed to over­ride the pos­i­tive guar­an­tees of the U.S. Constitution.”
16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect. 70
So even pub­lic pol­icy can­not abro­gate this Citizen’s Right to travel and to use the pub­lic high­ways in the ordi­nary course of life and busi­ness. There­fore, it must be con­cluded that:
“We have repeat­edly held that the leg­is­la­ture may reg­u­late the use of the high­ways for car­ry­ing on busi­ness for pri­vate gain and that such reg­u­la­tion is a valid exer­cise of the police power.”
North­ern Pacific R.R. Co., supra.
and …
“The act in ques­tion is a valid reg­u­la­tion, and as such is bind­ing upon all who use the high­way for the pur­pose of pri­vate gain.”
Any other con­struc­tion of this statute would ren­der it uncon­sti­tu­tional as applied to this Cit­i­zen or any Cit­i­zen. The Accused there­fore moves this court to dis­miss the charge against him, with prejudice.
June 10, 1986.
This ends the legal brief.

In addi­tion:
Since no notice is given to peo­ple apply­ing for driver’s (or other) licenses that they have a per­fect right to use the roads with­out any per­mis­sion, and that they sur­ren­der valu­able rights by tak­ing on the reg­u­la­tion sys­tem of licen­sure, the state has com­mit­ted a mas­sive con­struc­tion fraud. This occurs when any per­son is told that they must have a license in order to use the pub­lic roads and highways.
The license, being a legal con­tract under which the state is empow­ered with polic­ing pow­ers, is only valid when the licensee takes on the bur­dens of the con­tract and bar­gains away his or her rights know­ingly, inten­tion­ally, and voluntarily.
Few know that the driver’s license is a con­tract with­out which the police are pow­er­less to reg­u­late the people’s actions or activities.
Few (if any) licensees inten­tion­ally sur­ren­der valu­able rights. They are told that they must have the license. As we have seen, this is not the case.
No one in their right mind vol­un­tar­ily sur­ren­ders com­plete lib­erty and accepts in its place a set of regulations.
“The peo­ple never give up their lib­er­ties but under some delusion.”
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