masyhead

The Cur­rent Year is 6263

Gov. Abbott: Stop the exe­cu­tion of Rod­ney Reed
SIGN THE PETITION


ENU­MER­A­TION OF INALIEN­ABLE RIGHTS
Last revised: 8÷2÷2007
LIST OF TABLES .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 1
TABLE OF AUTHOR­I­TIES.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 1
1. ENU­MER­A­TION OF RIGHTS.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 7
2. OTHER RESTRAINTS UPON THE GOV­ERN­MENT .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 12


2.1
Restraints upon all branches of gov­ern­ment .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 12
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
2.1.5
2.2
Leg­is­la­ture may not pass and judi­ciary may not enforce any law that vio­lates
nat­ural law .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 12
Gov­ern­ment can­not do indi­rectly what it can­not do directly.….….….….….….….….….….….…. 13
Gov­ern­ment can­not use its tax­ing pow­ers to take from A and give to B .….….….….….….….. 13
Gov­ern­ment may not pun­ish cit­i­zens for inno­cent acts or turn inno­cense into guilt.….….…. 15
Gov­ern­ment can­not hold a man account­able to a law with­out giv­ing him
“rea­son­able notice” of what he will be held account­able for in advance of any
penal­ties.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 15
Restraints upon the Judi­ciary .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 16
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
No lit­i­gant may be deprived of “due process of law”.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 16
Men are pre­sumed inno­cent until proven guilty with evi­dence.….….….….….….….….….….…. 22
Courts may not enter­tain “polit­i­cal ques­tions”.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 22
A man can­not be judge in his own case.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 24
_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 7
TABLE OF AUTHOR­I­TIES
Con­sti­tu­tional Pro­vi­sions
24th Amend­ment .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 10
26th Amend­ment .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 10
Four­teenth Amend­ment.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 8, 9
Nine­teenth Amend­ment.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 10
Sev­enth Amend­ment .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 19
Thir­teenth Amend­ment.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 8
U.S. Con­sti­tu­tion, Arti­cle IV, Sec­tion 2.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 8
Statutes
18 U.S.C. §1589 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 8
42 U.S.C. §1981(a).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 8
42 U.S.C. §1994 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 8
44 U.S.C. §1505(a), (c )(2).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 10
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
1 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
5 U.S.C. §553(b) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 10
For­eign Sov­er­eign Immu­ni­ties Act, 28 U.S.C. §§16021611.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 11
Reg­u­la­tions
26 CFR § 601.106(f)(1).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 19
26 CFR §601.106(f)(1).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 18
26 CFR §601.702(a)(2)(ii) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 10
Cases
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 7
Abood v. Detroit Board of Edu­ca­tion, 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 7
Anti-​Fascist Com­mit­tee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 17
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 17
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 22
Beard v. U.S., 158 U.S. 550 (1895).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 7
Bell v. Bur­son, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 17
Board of edu­ca­tion of West­side Com­mu­nity Schools v. Mer­gens by and Through Mer­gens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) .….….…. 10
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 17
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 9
Bod­die v. Con­necti­cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 10
Buck­ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 11
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, (1798).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 14, 15, 24
Cal­i­for­nia v. Car­ney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 11
Cal­i­for­nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 20
Cal­i­for­nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 20
Cam­marano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 11
Car­roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 11
Cit­i­zens’ Sav­ings & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 14
Cly­att v. United States, 197 U.S. 207; 25 S.Ct. 429; 49 L.Ed. 726 (1905) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 8
Cof­fin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 22
Cole­man v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 452454 (1939).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 23
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 19
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 21
Cruzan v. Direc­tor, MDH, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 9
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 20
Delaware v. Fen­sterer, 474 U.S. 15, 1819 (1985) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 20
Delaware v. Van Ars­dall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 20
Demo­c­ra­tic Party of U.S. v. Wis­con­sin, ex re. LaFol­lette, 450 U.S. 107, 101 S.Ct. 1010, 67 L.Ed.2d 82 (1981).….….….…. 22
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 9
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 21
Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 91 (Me.1974).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 9
Dut­ton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 20
Eisen­stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 8
Farmer-​Labor State Cen­tral Com­mit­tee v. Holm, 227 Minn. 52, 33 N.W.2d 831 (1948).….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 22
Fitzger­ald v. Porter Memo­r­ial Hos­pi­tal, 523 F.2d 716, 719720 (CA7 1975).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 9
Fletcher v. Tut­tle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N.E. 683 (1894) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 22
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 9
Gen­tile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 10, 18
Gold­berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 20
Gran­nis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 17
Greene v. McEl­roy, 360 U.S. 474. 496497 (1959) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 19
Grif­fin v. Cal­i­for­nia, 380 U.S. 609, 613614 (1965).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 7
Grif­fin v. Illi­nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 10
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
2 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
Gris­wold v. Con­necti­cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 8
Gros­jean v. Amer­i­can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243244 (1936) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 9
Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 8
Hagar v. Recla­ma­tion Dist., No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 28 L.Ed. 569, 4 Sup.Ct.Rep. 663.….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 16
Har­ris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 at 317 (1980), n.19 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 11
Hill v. Col­orado, 530 U.S. 703, 751, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 2508 (2000).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 7
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 10, 17
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 7
In Re. Murchi­son, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 19
Ingra­ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673674 (1977).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 9
Jacob­son v. Mass­a­chu­setts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 9
Jay v. Boy, 351 U.S. 345 (1956) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 20
Kansas v. Hen­dricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 9
Kasti­gar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446447 (1972) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 7
Kazubowski v. Kazubowski, 45 Ill.2d 405, 259 N.E.2d 282, 290.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 17
Ken­tucky v. Stin­cer, 482 U.S. 730, 748 , 749750 (1987) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 21
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 21
Kulko v. Cal­i­for­nia Supe­rior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 21
Las­siter v. Depart­ment of Social Servs. Of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 10
Lefkowitz v. Cun­ning­ham, 431 U.S. 801, 804806 (1977) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 7
Lefkowitz v. Tur­ley, 414 U.S. 70, 7779 (1973) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 7
Lov­ing v. Vir­ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 7
Luther v. Bor­den, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 22, 23
Lynch v. House­hold Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 8
Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3rd Cir. 1965) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 22
Mac­in­tyre v. Ohio Elec­tions Com­mis­sion, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 7
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 11
Mal­loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 7
McCarthy v. Arnd­stein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 7
McCune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 7
McGee v. Inter­na­tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 21
McK­une v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35 (2002) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 7
McMann v. Richard­son, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 9
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 10
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 8
Mil­liken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 21
Mor­ris­sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 18, 19
Mul­lane v. Cen­tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 17
Mul­lane v. Cen­tral Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 18
NAACP v. But­ton, 371 U.S. 415, at 429430 (1963).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 7
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 22, 23
O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 22
Ochoa v. Her­nan­dez y Morales, 230 US 139, 57 L Ed 1427, 33 S Ct 1033.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 17
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 19
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 20
Olm­stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 7
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 7
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 8
Pen­noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732733 (1878).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 21
Pen­noyer v. Neff, 96 U.S. 733, 24 L.Ed. 565.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 16
Penn­syl­va­nia v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 21
Pierce v. Soci­ety of Sis­ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 8
Pierce v. Soci­ety of Sis­ters, 268 U.S. 510, 534535 (1925) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 8
Plessy v. Fer­gu­son, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 8
Pow­ell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 10
Pow­ell v. McCor­mack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 23
Quil­loin v. Wal­cott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 8
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
3 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
Regan v. Tax­a­tion with Rep­re­sen­ta­tion of Wash, 461 U.S. 540, at 549 (1983) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 11
Reno v. Flo­res, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 10
Rig­gins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 8
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 7
Rutan v. Repub­li­can Party of Illi­nois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 111 L. Ed. 2d 52, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 673 (1990) … 7
Rutan v. Repub­li­can Party of Illi­nois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 11
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 9
San­tosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 8
Schall v. Mar­tin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 10
Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 18
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 8
Shaf­fer v. Heit­ner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 , n. 37 (1977).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 21
Shapiro v. Thomp­son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 9
Shapiro v. Thomp­son, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 9
Shel­ton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 10
Shep­pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 at 350351 (1966) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 10
Shep­pard, 384 U.S. at 350351.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 18
Sink­ing Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, (1878) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 13, 15, 24
Skin­ner v. Okla­homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 7
Skin­ner v. Okla­homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 9
Sni­adach v. Fam­ily Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 18
South­east­ern Pro­mo­tions, Ltd. V. Con­rad, 420 U.S. 546, 558559 (1975) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 7
Stan­dard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1910) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 8
Stan­ley v. Colt, 72 U.S. 119, 1866 WL 9404 (U.S.,1866) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 13
Stan­ley v. Illi­nois, 405 U.S. 645, 647, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 556,.Ct. 1208 (1972).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 18
Stan­ley v. Illi­nois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 8
Supreme Court of NH v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 10
Tal­ley v. Cal­i­for­nia, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 7
Tashjian v. Repub­li­can Party of Con­necti­cut, 479 U.S. 208, 107 S.Ct. 544, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) .….….….….….….….….… 22
Thorn­burgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 7
Tram­mel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 at 51, 100 S.Ct. at 913 (1980).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 8
Trin­ity Epis­co­pal Corp. v. Rom­ney, D.C.N.Y., 387 F.Supp. 1044, 1084 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 17
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 8
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 19
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 18
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 73 (1965).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 10
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 7
Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51; 23 S.Ct. 20 (1902) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 16
U.S. v. Smith, D.C.Iowa, 249 F.Supp. 515, 516.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 17
Uni­formed San­i­ta­tion Men Assn., Inc. v. Com­mis­sioner of San­i­ta­tion of City of New York, 392 U.S. 280, 284285 (1968) 7
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Bots­ford, 141 U.S. 250, 251252 (1891).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 9
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 9
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 9
Vaughn v. State, 3 Tenn.Crim.App. 54, 456 S.W.2d 879, 883 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 17
Wash­ing­ton v. Glucks­berg, 521 U.S. 702, at 720 (1997) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 8
Wash­ing­ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 9
Web­ster v. Repro­duc­tive Health Ser­vices, 492 U.S. 490, 508511 (1989) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 11
White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 366 (1898) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 22
Williams v. Ver­mont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 9
Wis­con­sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 8
Wolff v. McDon­nell, 418 U.S. 539; 94 S.Ct. 2963; 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 17
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 4950 (1950) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 10
Woo­ley v. May­nard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977).….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 7
World-​Wide Volk­swa­gen Corp. v. Wood­son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 21
World-​Wide Volk­swa­gen v. Wood­son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 11
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
4 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
Other Author­i­ties
Admin­is­tra­tive Law and Process in a Nut­shell, Ernest Gell­horn, 1990, West Pub­lish­ing, p. 214.….….….….….….….….….….. 17
Am.Jur.2d, Con­sti­tu­tional law, §546: Forced and Pro­hib­ited Asso­ci­a­tions .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 7
Black’s Law Dic­tio­nary, Sixth Edi­tion, page 500.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 17
Code of Con­duct for U.S. Judges .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 16
F.R.E. 603 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 19
F.R.E. 901(a) .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 20
Fed­eral Usurpa­tion .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…. 12
Global Cor­rup­tion Report.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 16
James Madi­son, Fed­er­al­ist Paper #10 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 24
Judi­cial Ethics Hand­book.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….…… 16
Polit­i­cal Juris­dic­tion, Form #05.004 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 24
Prin­ci­ples of Nat­ural and Politic Law, J.J. Burla­maqui.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 13
Recusal: Analy­sis of Case Law Under 28 U.S.C. § 455 & 144.….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 16
Require­ment for Rea­son­able Notice, Form #05.022 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….. 15
Rut­ter Group, Fed­eral Civil Tri­als and Evi­dence, 8:220 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 20
Rut­ter Group, Fed­eral Civil Tri­als and Evi­dence, 8:375 .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 20
Woe to You Lawyers! .….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….….… 12
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
5 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
6 As we say repeat­edly on our web­site, you must know your rights before you have any! A (sov­er­eign) man who is not sub­ject to
fed­eral statu­tory law can­not cite that law in his defense, and can only defend him­self by lit­i­gat­ing in defense of his
Con­sti­tu­tional and nat­ural rights. He must do so in equity and not law, and pro­ceed against the per­pe­tra­tor as a pri­vate
indi­vid­ual. His stand­ing derives from the injury to his rights, and not from the author­ity of a fed­eral statute that only
applies to those domi­ciled within the fed­eral zone. This is cov­ered fur­ther in the Sov­er­eignty Forms and Instruc­tions
Man­ual, sec­tion 1.6.6 avail­able at:
7 http://​fam​guardian​.org/​P​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/​S​o​v​F​o​r​m​s​I​n​s​t​r​/​S​o​v​F​o​r​m​s​I​n​s​t​r​.​p​d​f
8 There is no sin­gle place we have found which even attempts to enu­mer­ate all of these rights or “pro­tected lib­erty inter­ests”.
You won’t find them listed in any statute or leg­isla­tive act or legal ref­er­ence book. The only source we have found which
iden­ti­fies them is mainly rul­ings of the U.S. Supreme Court and state Supreme Courts. The fol­low­ing sub­sec­tions
con­sti­tute a sum­mary of these rights, pro­vided for ready ref­er­ence in order to save you the MUCHO research time we had
to devote in pro­duc­ing it:
1
2
3
4
5
9
10
11
12
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
16 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1 1. ENU­MER­A­TION OF RIGHTS
2 Table 1: Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
# Descrip­tion Law(s)
1 ASSO­CI­A­TION AND RELI­GION
1.1 Right to asso­ciate
1.2 Right to be left alone
1.3 Free­dom from com­pelled asso­ci­a­tion First Amend­ment
1.4 First Amend­ment
1.5 First Amend­ment
2 Right to prac­tice reli­gion 2.3 Right of free­dom from prior restraints on speech 2.5 Right to not be penal­ized based on fail­ure to 2.6 3 Right to not be com­pelled to give tes­ti­mony in a 4.2 Right to pro­cre­ate
2.1 Col­lec­tive activ­ity to obtain mean­ing­ful access to 2.4 Right to remain anony­mous when speak­ing tes­tify 3.1 civil pro­ceed­ing
2.2 the courts is a fun­da­men­tal right within the 3.2 Right to demand grant of wit­ness immu­nity prior
pro­tec­tions of the First Amend­ment 3.3 to any tes­ti­mony
Right to be free from com­pul­sion by state to join 4 DEFENSE AND SELF-​DEFENSE
a labor union involved in ide­alog­i­cal activites 4.1 Right to bear arms
SPEECH Right to not quar­ter sol­diers in your house
Right to speak Right to self-​defense (when life threat­ened)
Right to not speak or remain silent FAM­ILY, SELF, AND HOME
Right to marry and divorce
1.6
2.7
Case or other author­i­ties
First Amend­ment
First Amend­ment
First Amend­ment
Olm­stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Bran­deis, J., dis­sent­ing)
Wash­ing­ton v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)
Hill v. Col­orado, 530 U.S. 703, 751, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 2508 (2000)
Am.Jur.2d, Con­sti­tu­tional law, §546: Forced and Pro­hib­ited Asso­ci­a­tions
Rutan v. Repub­li­can Party of Illi­nois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 111 L. Ed. 2d 52, 5 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 673 (1990)
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (for pris­on­ers)
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978)
NAACP v. But­ton, 371 U.S. 415, at 429430 (1963)
Abood v. Detroit Board of Edu­ca­tion, 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977)
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
Thorn­burgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (for pris­on­ers)
Woo­ley v. May­nard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977)
Miranda v. Ari­zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977)
Mal­loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (direct com­pul­sion to tes­tify)
Grif­fin v. Cal­i­for­nia, 380 U.S. 609, 613614 (1965) (indi­rect com­pul­sion to tes­tify pro­hib­ited)
McCune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (“we have con­strued the text to pro­hibit not only direct orders to
tes­tify, but also indi­rect com­pul­sion effected by com­ments on a defendant’s refusal to take the stand”)
South­east­ern Pro­mo­tions, Ltd. V. Con­rad, 420 U.S. 546, 558559 (1975)
Mac­in­tyre v. Ohio Elec­tions Com­mis­sion, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)
Tal­ley v. Cal­i­for­nia, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
Uni­formed San­i­ta­tion Men Assn., Inc. v. Com­mis­sioner of San­i­ta­tion of City of New York, 392 U.S. 280,
284285 (1968)
Lefkowitz v. Tur­ley, 414 U.S. 70, 7779 (1973)
Lefkowitz v. Cun­ning­ham, 431 U.S. 801, 804806 (1977)
McK­une v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35 (2002)
McCarthy v. Arnd­stein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)
Kasti­gar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446447 (1972)
Sec­ond Amend­ment
Third Amend­ment
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
See also: http://​fam​guardian​.org/​S​u​b​j​e​c​t​s​/​G​u​n​C​o​n​t​r​o​l​/​R​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​/​C​o​u​r​t​D​e​c​i​s​i​o​n​s​/​c​o​u​r​t​.​h​t​m
Beard v. U.S., 158 U.S. 550 (1895)
Lov­ing v. Vir­ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (for every­one)
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (for pris­on­ers)
Skin­ner v. Okla­homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
7 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
# Descrip­tion
4.3 Right to estab­lish a home and bring up chil­dren
4.4 Right to make deci­sions about the care, cus­tody,
and upbring­ing of one’s chil­dren
4.5 Right to use con­tra­cep­tives
4.6 Right to con­tract
4.7 4.10 Right to send chil­dren to pri­vate school
4.8 Right to pri­vacy
4.9 Free­dom from unrea­son­able searches and
seizures
Spousal priv­i­lege against incrim­i­na­tion of spouse
4.11 Right to enjoy prop­erty
4.12 Right of equal pro­tec­tion
4.13 Right to not be sub­jected to invol­un­tary servi­tude
or slav­ery
4.14
Law(s)
Right to not take anti-​psychotic drugs except in
pres­ence of com­pelling state inter­est
Con­sti­tu­tion, Art. 1, Sec­tion 10 (in
rela­tion to states)
42 U.S.C. §1981(b)
Case or other author­i­ties
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (“we held that the “lib­erty” pro­tected by the Due Process Clause
includes the right of par­ents to “estab­lish a home and bring up chil­dren” and “to con­trol the edu­ca­tion
of their own.” )
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) (estab­lish a home and bring up chil­dren)
Pierce v. Soci­ety of Sis­ters, 268 U.S. 510, 534535 (1925) (held that the “lib­erty of par­ents and
guardians” includes the right “to direct the upbring­ing and edu­ca­tion of chil­dren under their con­trol.”)
Stan­ley v. Illi­nois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It is plain that the inter­est of a par­ent in the
com­pan­ion­ship, care, cus­tody, and man­age­ment of his or her chil­dren ‘come[s] to this Court with a
momen­tum for respect lack­ing when appeal is made to lib­er­ties which derive merely from shift­ing
eco­nomic arrange­ments’” (cita­tion omit­ted));
Wis­con­sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The his­tory and cul­ture of West­ern civ­i­liza­tion reflect a
strong tra­di­tion of parental con­cern for the nur­ture and upbring­ing of their chil­dren. This pri­mary role
of the par­ents in the upbring­ing of their chil­dren is now estab­lished beyond debate as an endur­ing
Amer­i­can tra­di­tion”);
Quil­loin v. Wal­cott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have rec­og­nized on numer­ous occa­sions that the
rela­tion­ship between par­ent and child is con­sti­tu­tion­ally pro­tected”);
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurispru­dence his­tor­i­cally has reflected West­ern
civ­i­liza­tion con­cepts of the fam­ily as a unit with broad parental author­ity over minor chil­dren. Our
cases have con­sis­tently fol­lowed that course”);
San­tosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (dis­cussing “[t]he fun­da­men­tal lib­erty inter­est of nat­ural
par­ents in the care, cus­tody, and man­age­ment of their child”);
Wash­ing­ton v. Glucks­berg, 521 U.S. 702, at 720 (1997) (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in
addi­tion to the spe­cific free­doms pro­tected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘lib­erty’ spe­cially pro­tected by the
Due Process Clause includes the righ[t] … to direct the edu­ca­tion and upbring­ing of one’s chil­dren”
(cit­ing Meyer and Pierce))
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)
Gris­wold v. Con­necti­cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
Eisen­stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
Sink­ing Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878) (in rela­tion to fed­eral gov­ern­ment)
Stan­dard Oil v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1910). (not­ing “the free­dom of the indi­vid­ual right to con­tract when not
unduly or improp­erly exer­cised [is] the most effi­cient means for the pre­ven­tion of monop­oly”)
Pierce v. Soci­ety of Sis­ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
Fourth Amend­ment
Fourth Amend­ment
42 U.S.C. §1981(a)
Four­teenth Amend­ment
U.S. Con­sti­tu­tion, Arti­cle IV, Sec­tion
2
Thir­teenth Amend­ment
42 U.S.C. §1994
18 U.S.C. §1589 (abuse of legal
process)
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
What to Do When the IRS Comes Knock­ing, Sec­tion 5;
http://​fam​guardian​.org/​T​a​x​F​r​e​e​d​o​m​/​F​o​r​m​s​/​D​i​s​c​o​v​e​r​y​/​W​h​a​t​T​o​D​o​W​h​e​n​T​h​e​I​R​S​C​o​m​e​s​K​n​o​c​k​i​n​g​.​p​d​f
Tram­mel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 at 51, 100 S.Ct. at 913 (1980)
Lynch v. House­hold Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972)
Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897)
Plessy v. Fer­gu­son, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
Cly­att v. United States, 197 U.S. 207; 25 S.Ct. 429; 49 L.Ed. 726 (1905)
Wash­ing­ton v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)
Rig­gins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)
8 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
#
4.15
4.17 Descrip­tion
Right to refusal of arti­fi­cial pro­vi­sion of life–
sus­tain­ing food and water to has­ten­ing one’s own
death.
Right to make deci­sions that will affect one’s
own or one’s family’s des­tiny
Right to not be ster­il­ized as a felon
4.18 Right of invi­o­la­bil­ity of the per­son
5 TRAVEL
5.1 Right to travel
5.2 Right of free­dom from phys­i­cal restraint
5.3 Right to travel to another state to get an abor­tion
5.4 Right of non­res­i­dents to enter or leave a state
5.5 There is no fun­da­men­tal right to have or to
reg­is­ter a car
DUE PROCESS
Right to indict­ment by Grand Jury, not
gov­ern­ment
Right of free­dom from double-​jeopardy
Right to no incrim­i­nate self
Right to life, lib­erty, and prop­erty. Can­not be
deprived of with­out due process of law
Prop­erty may not be taken by state with­out just
com­pen­sa­tion
Right to not be vic­tim­ized by war­rant­less seizures
Right to speedy trial in crim­i­nal case
Right to impar­tial jury in the dis­trict where crime
com­mit­ted
Right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accu­sa­tions
Right to con­front wit­nesses
Right to com­pel wit­nesses to tes­tify in your
defense
Right to assis­tance of Coun­sel in Crim­i­nal
4.16
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
6.9
6.10
6.11
6.12
Law(s)
Case or other author­i­ties
Cruzan v. Direc­tor, MDH, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
Fitzger­ald v. Porter Memo­r­ial Hos­pi­tal, 523 F.2d 716, 719720 (CA7 1975) (foot­notes omit­ted), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976)
Skin­ner v. Okla­homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (inval­i­dat­ing a statute autho­riz­ing
ster­il­iza­tion of cer­tain felons).
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Bots­ford, 141 U.S. 250, 251252 (1891) (“The invi­o­la­bil­ity of the per­son” has
been held as “sacred” and “care­fully guarded” as any com­mon law right.)
Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 91 (Me.1974) (“The ratio­nale of this rule lies in the fact that every
com­pe­tent adult has the right to forego treat­ment, or even cure, if it entails what for him are intol­er­a­ble
con­se­quences or risks, how­ever unwise his sense of val­ues may be to oth­ers”)
Cruzan v. Direc­tor, MDH, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (thor­oughly explains the right)
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)
Shapiro v. Thomp­son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
Kansas v. Hen­dricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)
Ingra­ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673674 (1977)
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)
Jacob­son v. Mass­a­chu­setts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (“[T]he lib­erty secured by the Con­sti­tu­tion of the
United States to every per­son within its juris­dic­tion does not [521 U.S. 357] import an absolute right in
each per­son to be at all times and in all cir­cum­stances, wholly free from restraint. There are man­i­fold
restraints to which every per­son is nec­es­sar­ily sub­ject for the com­mon good. On any other basis,
orga­nized soci­ety could not exist with safety to its mem­bers.”)
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973)
Shapiro v. Thomp­son, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969)
Williams v. Ver­mont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985)
Fifth Amend­ment
Fifth Amend­ment
Fifth Amend­ment
Fifth Amend­ment
Fifth Amend­ment
Fourth Amend­ment
Sixth Amend­ment
Sixth Amend­ment
Sixth Amend­ment
Sixth Amend­ment Wash­ing­ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
Sixth Amend­ment
Sixth Amend­ment Gros­jean v. Amer­i­can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243244 (1936) (“the fun­da­men­tal right of the accused to
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
9 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
# Descrip­tion Law(s)
pros­e­cu­tions
6.13 Right of trial by jury Sixth Amend­ment
6.14 Right to be free of cruel or unusual pun­ish­ment Eighth Amend­ment
6.15 Rights not enu­mer­ated in the Con­sti­tu­tion are Ninth Amend­ment
retained by the peo­ple
Rights not enu­mer­ated in the Con­sti­tu­tion are
retained by the States or the Peo­ple
Right of pris­on­ers of access to court
6.18 Right to “rea­son­able notice” or “due notice” of 26 CFR §601.702(a)(2)(ii)
the laws which one is bound to obey (pub­li­ca­tion in fed­eral reg­is­ter
before enforce­able)
5 U.S.C. §553(b)
44 U.S.C. §1505(a), (c )(2)
6.19 Right of an indi­gent defen­dant to a free tran­script
in aid of appeal­ing his con­vic­tion for vio­lat­ing
city ordi­nances
Right of free­dom from insti­tu­tional con­fine­ment
6.16
6.17
6.20
6.21 8.2 Lawyers enjoy a “broad monop­oly” or right to do
things that other cit­i­zens may not law­fully do
POLIT­I­CAL RIGHTS
Right to vote, regard­less of gen­der
Right to vote with­out pay­ing a poll tax
Right to vote if 18 or older
EDU­CA­TION
Right to teach for­eign lan­guage in a parochial
school
Right of free speech in edu­ca­tional set­tings
9
Las­siter v. Depart­ment of Social Servs. Of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (parental rights)
Bod­die v. Con­necti­cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce)
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 4950 (1950) (depor­ta­tion)
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (“It is suf­fi­cient to say that there are cer­tain immutable prin­ci­ples
of jus­tice which inhere in the very idea of free gov­ern­ment which no mem­ber of the Union may
dis­re­gard, as that no man shall be con­demned in his per­son or prop­erty with­out due notice and an
oppor­tu­nity of being heard in his own defense.”)
Pow­ell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (“It never has been doubted by this court, or any other, so far as
we know, that notice and hear­ing are pre­lim­i­nary steps essen­tial to the pass­ing of an enforce­able
judg­ment, and that they, together with a legally com­pe­tent tri­bunal hav­ing juris­dic­tion of the case,
con­sti­tute basic ele­ments of the con­sti­tu­tional require­ment of due process of law.”)
Grif­fin v. Illi­nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
Schall v. Mar­tin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (chil­dren have a pro­tected lib­erty inter­est in “free­dom from
insti­tu­tional restraints”)
Reno v. Flo­res, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)
Crane v. Ken­tucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quot­ing Cal­i­for­nia v. Trombletta, 467 U.S. 479, 485
(1984)) (“the Con­sti­tu­tion guar­an­tees crim­i­nal defen­dants ‘a mean­ing­ful oppor­tu­nity to present a
com­plete defense.’”)
Shep­pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 at 350351 (1966)
Gen­tile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 73 (1965) (evi­dence in crim­i­nal trial must come solely from wit­ness
stand in pub­lic court­room with full evi­den­tiary pro­tec­tions).
Supreme Court of NH v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) ( Lawyers do enjoy a “broad monop­oly … to do
things other cit­i­zens may not law­fully do.” In re Grif­fiths, 413 U.S. 717, GO>731 (1973))
Right to a fair trial of impar­tial jurors
6.23
Tenth Amend­ment
Right to mean­ing­ful oppor­tu­nity to present a
defense
6.22
Case or other author­i­ties
the aid of coun­sel in a crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion” is “safe­guarded against state action by the due process of
law clause of the Four­teenth Amend­ment”).
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (“With­out coun­sel, the right to a trial itself would be of
lit­tle avail”)
McMann v. Richard­son, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970) (“the right to coun­sel is the right to the effec­tive
assis­tance of coun­sel.)
STATES RIGHTS
7
7.1
7.2
7.3
8
8.1
Nine­teenth Amend­ment
24th Amend­ment
26th Amend­ment
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
Board of edu­ca­tion of West­side Com­mu­nity Schools v. Mer­gens by and Through Mer­gens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990)
Shel­ton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
10 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
#
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
Descrip­tion
Right to NOT spend money on “non­ther­a­peu­tic
abor­tions for minor adults”
Right to not be civilly sued in a fed­eral court by a
res­i­dent of the state
Right of sov­er­eignty in courts of a for­eign
sov­er­eign when not con­duct­ing “com­merce”
within the leg­isla­tive juris­dic­tion of a for­eign
sov­er­eign
Gov­ern­ments or states may vio­late the
Con­sti­tu­tional rights of per­sons in the con­text of
their employ­ment role as “pub­lic offi­cers”
(Patron­age excep­tion)
Right to not sub­si­dize the exer­cise of a
fun­da­men­tal right
Law(s) Case or other author­i­ties
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
Web­ster v. Repro­duc­tive Health Ser­vices, 492 U.S. 490, 508511 (1989)
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
For­eign Sov­er­eign Immu­ni­ties Act, 28 World-​Wide Volk­swa­gen v. Wood­son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
U.S.C. §§16021611
Right to search an auto­mo­bile with­out a search
war­rant
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
Rutan v. Repub­li­can Party of Illi­nois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990)
Regan v. Tax­a­tion with Rep­re­sen­ta­tion of Wash, 461 U.S. 540, at 549 (1983) (“[A] legislature’s deci­sion
not to sub­si­dize the exer­cise of a fun­da­men­tal right does not infringe the right.”)
Buck­ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
Cam­marano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959)
Har­ris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 at 317 (1980), n.19. (“A refusal to fund pro­tected activ­ity, with­out more,
can­not be equated with the impo­si­tion of a ‘penalty’ on that activ­ity.”)
Cal­i­for­nia v. Car­ney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
Car­roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
11 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1 2. OTHER RESTRAINTS UPON THE GOV­ERN­MENT
2 3 The fol­low­ing rep­re­sent absolute pro­hi­bi­tions upon the actions of the gov­ern­ment iden­ti­fied by the U.S. Supreme Court.
They are not “rights” per se, but they are intended to pro­tect rights:
4 2.1
5 For fur­ther infor­ma­tion beyond that indi­cated in the fol­low­ing sub­sec­tions, refer to the fol­low­ing:
6 1.
7
8
9
2.
10
11
12
Restraints upon all branches of gov­ern­ment
Woe to You Lawyers!-Fred Rodell. A Pro­fes­sor of Law at Yale Uni­ver­sity explains how the legal pro­fes­sion is a big
fraud.
http://​fam​guardian​.org/​P​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/​W​o​e​T​o​Y​o​u​L​a​w​y​e​r​s​/​w​o​e​_​u​n​t​o​_​y​o​u​_​l​a​w​y​e​r​s​.​p​d​f
Fed­eral Usurpation-​Franklin Pierce. Exten­sive doc­u­men­ta­tion of destruc­tion of the con­sti­tu­tion and trea­son within the
gov­ern­ment
http://​fam​guardian​.org/​P​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/​F​e​d​e​r​a​l​U​s​u​r​p​a​t​i​o​n​/​F​e​d​e​r​a​l​U​s​u​r​p​a​t​i​o​n​.​p​d​f
2.1.1
Leg­is­la­ture may not pass and judi­ciary may not enforce any law that vio­lates nat­ural law
1
13 In Hooker v. Canal Co., a Con­necti­cut case, the court say:
14 ‘The fun­da­men­tal max­ims of a free gov­ern­ment require that the right of per­sonal lib­erty and pri­vate prop­erty
15 should be held sacred.’
16 They cite and approve the expres­sions of Mar­shall, C. J., in Fletcher v. Peck:
17 ‘And it may well be doubted whether the nature of soci­ety and of gov­ern­ment does not pre­scribe some lim­its
18 to the leg­isla­tive power,’ &c.
19 This whole sub­ject is fully treated in the late deci­sion of Booth v. Wood­bury, where it is expressly held that
20 the leg­is­la­ture can pass no laws con­trary to the ‘prin­ci­ples of nat­ural jus­tice.’
21 All these cases, and the jurispru­dence of Con­necti­cut on *133 this sub­ject, are in har­mony with and in fact
22 4
23 founded upon the case of Calder v. Bull, a case which went from Con­necti­cut to this court; and the
expres­sions in Goshen v. Ston­ing­ton are almost iden­ti­cal with those of Mr. Jus­tice Chase, where he says:
24 ‘I can­not sub­scribe to the omnipo­tence of a State leg­is­la­ture, or that it is absolute and with­out con­trol,
25 although its author­ity should not be expressly restrained by the con­sti­tu­tion or fun­da­men­tal law of the State.’
26 **13 But both in this court and many of the State courts the same rule is applied.
27 A case quite in point is Brown v. Hum­mel, 6 in the Supreme Court of Penn­syl­va­nia. There a devise of land was
28 made to an orphan asy­lum, with a pro­vi­sion that the land be never sold, but the rents and prof­its only be
29 applied to the use of the asy­lum. The leg­is­la­ture, by a spe­cial act, directed that part of the land be sold.
30 The court held unan­i­mously that the act was void and uncon­sti­tu­tional.
2
3
1 FN34 14 Con­necti­cut, 152; and see Gas Co. v. Gas Co., 25 Id. 38, and Hotchkiss v. Porter, 30 Id. 418.
2 FN35 5 Cranch, 185.
3 FN36 32 Con­necti­cut, 118.
4
5
FN37 3 Dal­las, 386.
5
FN38 Ter­rett v. Tay­lor, 9 Cranch, 43; Wilkin­son v. Leland, 2 Peters, 627; Irvine’s Appeal, 16 Penn­syl­va­nia State, 256; Shoen­berger v. School Dis­trict, 32
Id. 34; Rail­road Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev­ereux & Bat­tle, 451; Hatch v. Ver­mont Rail­road, 25 Ver­mont, 49; Ben­son v. Mayor, &c., 10 Bar­bour, 223; Regent’s
Uni­ver­sity v. Williams, 9 Gill & John­son, 365; Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal­i­for­nia, 1.
6
FN39 6 Penn­syl­va­nia State, 86.
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
12 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1 If the leg­is­la­ture can, by a spe­cial act, dis­pense with the per­for­mance of one con­di­tion of a devise, they can with
2 any.
3 Such an act as this is dif­fer­ent from those enabling or heal­ing acts often passed, such as those autho­riz­ing a
4 sale of minors’ lands, or those of lunatics, &c. In all such cases they merely remove a per­sonal dis­abil­ity. 7 Acts,
5 too, will be cited on the other side in which power has been given to cor­po­ra­tions to sell, where in the gifts to
6 them no such power was expressly given. Such cases are from the pur­pose. *134 To say noth­ing about the
7 con­sti­tu­tion­al­ity or safety of this sort of leg­is­la­tion in gen­eral, it may be noted that in many cases the leg­is­la­ture
8 has only aided an intent of a donor left unex­pressed or but insuf­fi­ciently given, or cases in which per­haps the
9 leg­is­la­ture was itself the donor. But can any case be found where, with­out the assent of the heirs, a power to
10 destroy the iden­tity and sub­stance of the gift has been given in any case where it was plain that the tes­ta­tor
11 meant to keep the land in specie, for­ever undi­vided in the cor­po­ra­tion, ben­e­fi­ciary, and devisee? What is proper
12 to be done in any case where heirs may have an inter­est, and what the leg­is­la­ture of Con­necti­cut itself has done,
13 may be seen in the Acts of Con­necti­cut, May Ses­sions, 1850, at page 82. There Thad­deus and Eunice Burr, she
14 own­ing it, had granted a lot for a par­son­age. An act recit­ing that the land was not now and never could be
15 wanted for a par­son­age, and that a sale was desir­able and expe­di­ent, autho­rized a sale. But how? It declares
16 the sale is to be made ‘with the assent of the heirs of the said Eunice;’ and the act autho­rized the heirs to
17 release a con­di­tion in the deed, in the pres­ence of wit­nesses; and such release, it was enacted, ‘shall oper­ate to
18 for­ever estop said heirs, and all claim­ing under them.’ This is the right way; and in no other way, assuredly, in
19 a case like the present, could a sale be autho­rized and the right of prop­erty in the heirs be duly respected.
20 **14 It will be argued that a leg­is­la­ture has power as parens patrioe to inter­fere and autho­rize a sale of land in
21 cases like the one at bar; but the author­i­ties say that the leg­is­la­tures in this coun­try have no such power.
22 In Moore v. Moore, 8 a Ken­tucky case, the court say:
23 ‘We do not admit that the com­mon­wealth as parens patrioe can right­fully inter­fere, unless there has been an
24 escheat to her, and then she can become absolute and ben­e­fi­cial owner. Rights here are reg­u­lated by law, and
25 if any per­son has a claim to prop­erty inef­fec­tu­ally ded­i­cated to char­ity, the com­mon­wealth has *135 no
26 pre­rog­a­tive right to decide on that claim and dis­pose of the prop­erty, as the King of Eng­land has been
27 per­mit­ted to do.’
28 [Stan­ley v. Colt, 72 U.S. 119, 1866 WL 9404 (U.S.,1866)]
29
If you would like a sum­mary of all the prin­ci­ples of nat­ural law referred to in the above case, see:
Prin­ci­ples of Nat­ural and Politic Law, J.J. Burla­maqui
http://​fam​guardian​.org/​P​u​b​l​i​s​h​e​d​A​u​t​h​o​r​s​/​I​n​d​i​v​/​B​u​r​l​a​m​a​q​u​i​J​J​/​b​u​r​l​a​_​.​h​t​m
30
2.1.2
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Gov­ern­ment can­not do indi­rectly what it can­not do directly
“I turn now to the argu­ments by which the con­sti­tu­tion­al­ity of the act of Con­gress has been attempted to be
sup­ported. It is said that, though Con­gress can­not directly abro­gate con­tracts, or impair their oblig­a­tion, it may
indi­rectly, by the exer­cise of other pow­ers granted to it. This I have con­ceded, but I deny that an acknowl­edged
power can be exerted solely for the pur­pose of effect­ing indi­rectly an uncon­sti­tu­tional end which the
leg­is­la­ture can­not directly attempt to reach. If the pur­pose were declared in the act, I think no court would
hes­i­tate to pro­nounce the act void. In Hoke v. Hard­er­son, to which I have referred, Chief Jus­tice Ruf­fin,
when con­sid­er­ing at length an argu­ment that a leg­is­la­ture could pur­posely do indi­rectly what it could not do
directly, used this strong lan­guage: ‘The argu­ment is unsound in this, that it sup­poses (what can­not be
admit­ted as a sup­po­si­tion) the leg­is­la­ture will, designedly and wil­fully, vio­late the Con­sti­tu­tion, in utter
dis­re­gard of their oaths and duty. To do indi­rectly in the abused exer­cise of an acknowl­edged power, not
given for, but per­verted for that pur­pose, that which is expressly for­bid­den to be done directly, is a gross and
wicked infrac­tion of the Con­sti­tu­tion.’”
[Sink­ing Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, (1878) ]
2.1.3
45
46
47
48
49
50
Gov­ern­ment can­not use its tax­ing pow­ers to take from A and give to B
**7 Of all the pow­ers con­ferred upon gov­ern­ment that of tax­a­tion is most liable to abuse. Given a pur­pose or
object for which tax­a­tion may be law­fully used and the extent of its exer­cise is in its very nature unlim­ited. It is
true that express lim­i­ta­tion on the amount of tax to levied or the things to be taxed may be imposed by
con­sti­tu­tion or statute, but in most instances for which taxes are levied, as the sup­port of gov­ern­ment, the
pros­e­cu­tion of war, the National defence, any lim­i­ta­tion is unsafe. The entire resources of the peo­ple should in
some instances be at the dis­posal of the gov­ern­ment.
7 FN40 Pow­ers v. Bergen, 2 Selden, 358; Shoen­berger v. School Dis­trict, 32 Penn­syl­va­nia State, 34; Leggett v. Hunter, 5 E. P. Smith, 445.
8 FN41 4 Dana, 366; and see Lep­age v. McNa­mara, 5 Clarke (Iowa), 124, and White v. Fisk, 22 Con­necti­cut, 31(54).
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
13 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1 The power to tax is, there­fore, the strongest, the most per­vad­ing of all the pow­ers of gov­ern­ment, reach­ing
2 directly or indi­rectly to all classes of the peo­ple. It was said by Chief Jus­tice Mar­shall, in the case of
3 McCul­loch v. The State of Mary­land, 9 that the power to tax is the power to destroy. A strik­ing instance of the
4 truth of the propo­si­tion is seen in the fact that the exist­ing tax of ten per cent. imposed by the United States on
5 the cir­cu­la­tion of all other banks than the National banks, drove out of exis­tence every *664 State bank of
6 cir­cu­la­tion within a year or two after its pas­sage. This power can as read­ily be employed against one class of
7 indi­vid­u­als and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlim­ited wealth and pros­per­ity to
8 the other, if there is no implied lim­i­ta­tion of the uses for which the power may be exer­cised.
9 To lay with one hand the power of the gov­ern­ment on the prop­erty of the cit­i­zen, and with the other to bestow
10 it upon favored indi­vid­u­als to aid pri­vate enter­prises and build up pri­vate for­tunes, is none the less a rob­bery
11 because it is done under the forms of law and is called tax­a­tion. This is not leg­is­la­tion. It is a decree under
12 leg­isla­tive forms.
13 Nor is it tax­a­tion. A ‘tax,’ says Webster’s Dic­tio­nary, ‘is a rate or sum of money assessed on the per­son or
14 prop­erty of a cit­i­zen by gov­ern­ment for the use of the nation or state.’ ‘Taxes are bur­dens or charges imposed
15 by the leg­is­la­ture upon per­sons or prop­erty to raise money for pub­lic pur­poses.’ 10
16 Coul­ter, J., in North­ern Lib­er­ties v. St. John’s Church, 11 says, very forcibly, ‘I think the com­mon mind has
17 every­where taken in the under­stand­ing that taxes are a pub­lic impo­si­tion, levied by author­ity of the gov­ern­ment
18 for the pur­pose of car­ry­ing on the gov­ern­ment in all its machin­ery and operations-​that they are imposed for a
19 pub­lic pur­pose.’
20 **8 We have estab­lished, we think, beyond cavil that there can be no law­ful tax which is not laid for a pub­lic
21 pur­pose.”
22 [Cit­i­zens’ Sav­ings & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874)]
23 _​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​
24 Whether the Leg­is­la­ture of any of the States can revise and cor­rect by law, a deci­sion of any of its Courts of
25 Jus­tice, although not pro­hib­ited by the Con­sti­tu­tion of the State, is a ques­tion of very great impor­tance, and not
26 nec­es­sary NOW to be deter­mined; because the res­o­lu­tion or law in ques­tion does not go so far. I can­not
27 sub­scribe to the omnipo­tence of a State *388 Leg­is­la­ture, or that it is absolute and with­out con­trol; although its
28 author­ity should not be expressly restrained by the Con­sti­tu­tion, or fun­da­men­tal law, of the State. The peo­ple of
29 the United States erected their Con­sti­tu­tions, or forms of gov­ern­ment, to estab­lish jus­tice, to pro­mote the
30 gen­eral wel­fare, to secure the bless­ings of lib­erty; and to pro­tect their per­sons and prop­erty from vio­lence. The
31 pur­poses for which men enter into soci­ety will deter­mine the nature and terms of the social com­pact; and as
32 they are the foun­da­tion of the leg­isla­tive power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it: The nature,
33 and ends of leg­isla­tive power will limit the exer­cise of it. This fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­ple flows from the very nature
34 of our free Repub­li­can gov­ern­ments, that no man should be com­pelled to do what the laws do not require; nor
35 to refrain from acts which the laws per­mit. There are acts which the Fed­eral, or State, Leg­is­la­ture can­not do,
36 with­out exceed­ing their author­ity. There are cer­tain vital prin­ci­ples in our free Repub­li­can gov­ern­ments,
37 which will deter­mine and over-​rule an appar­ent and fla­grant abuse of leg­isla­tive power; as to autho­rize
38 man­i­fest injus­tice by pos­i­tive law; or to take away that secu­rity for per­sonal lib­erty, or pri­vate prop­erty, for
39 the pro­tec­tion whereof of the gov­ern­ment was estab­lished. An ACT of the Leg­is­la­ture (for I can­not call it a
40 law) con­trary to the great first prin­ci­ples of the social com­pact, can­not be con­sid­ered a right­ful exer­cise of
41 leg­isla­tive author­ity. The oblig­a­tion of a law in gov­ern­ments estab­lished on express com­pact, and on
42 repub­li­can prin­ci­ples, must be deter­mined by the nature of the power, on which it is founded. A few instances
43 will suf­fice to explain what I mean. A law that pun­ished a cit­i­zen for an inno­cent action, or, in other words, for
44 an act, which, when done, was in vio­la­tion of no exist­ing law; a law that destroys, or impairs, the law­ful pri­vate
45 con­tracts of cit­i­zens; a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes prop­erty from A.
46 and gives it to B: It is against all rea­son and jus­tice, for a peo­ple to entrust a Leg­is­la­ture with SUCH pow­ers;
47 and, there­fore, it can­not be pre­sumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our
48 State Gov­ern­ments, amount to a pro­hi­bi­tion of such acts of leg­is­la­tion; and the gen­eral prin­ci­ples of law and
49 rea­son for­bid them. The Leg­is­la­ture may enjoin, per­mit, for­bid, and pun­ish; they may declare new crimes; and
50 estab­lish rules of con­duct for all its cit­i­zens in future cases; they may com­mand what is right, and pro­hibit what
51 is wrong; but they can­not change inno­cence into guilt; or pun­ish inno­cence as a crime; or vio­late the right of
52 an antecedent law­ful pri­vate con­tract; or the right of pri­vate prop­erty. To main­tain that our Fed­eral, or State,
53 Leg­is­la­ture pos­sesses such pow­ers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, *389 in my opin­ion, be a
54 polit­i­cal heresy, alto­gether inad­mis­si­ble in our free repub­li­can gov­ern­ments.
55 [Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, (1798)]
56 _​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​
9
FN5 4 Wheaton 431.
10
FN6 Coo­ley on Con­sti­tu­tional Lim­i­ta­tions, 479.
11
FN7 13 Penn­syl­va­nia State, 104; see also Pray v. North­ern Lib­er­ties, 31 Id. 69; Mat­ter of Mayor of New York, 11 John­son, 77; Cam­den v. Allen, 2
Dutcher, 398; Sharp­less v. Mayor of Philadel­phia, supra; Han­son v. Ver­non, 27 Iowa, 47; Whit­ing v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis­con­sin, 188.
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
14 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
In Calder v. Bull, which was here in 1798, Mr. Jus­tice Chase said, that there were acts which the Fed­eral and
State leg­is­la­tures could not do with­out exceed­ing their author­ity, and among them he men­tioned a law which
pun­ished a cit­i­zen for an inno­cent act; a law that destroyed or impaired the law­ful pri­vate con­tracts of cit­i­zens;
a law that made a man judge in his own case; and a law that took the prop­erty from A. and gave it to B. ‘It is
against all rea­son and jus­tice,’ he added, ‘for a peo­ple to intrust a leg­is­la­ture with such pow­ers, and
there­fore it can­not be pre­sumed that they have done it. They may com­mand what is right and pro­hibit what is
wrong; but they can­not change inno­cence into guilt, or pun­ish inno­cence as a crime, or vio­late the right of
an antecedent law­ful pri­vate con­tract, or the right of pri­vate prop­erty. To main­tain that a Fed­eral or State
leg­is­la­ture pos­sesses such pow­ers if they had not been expressly restrained, would, in my opin­ion, be a
polit­i­cal heresy alto­gether inad­mis­si­ble in all free repub­li­can gov­ern­ments.’ 3 Dall. 388.
[Sink­ing Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, (1878) ]
2.1.4
Gov­ern­ment may not pun­ish cit­i­zens for inno­cent acts or turn inno­cense into guilt
13 Whether the Leg­is­la­ture of any of the States can revise and cor­rect by law, a deci­sion of any of its Courts of
14 Jus­tice, although not pro­hib­ited by the Con­sti­tu­tion of the State, is a ques­tion of very great impor­tance, and not
15 nec­es­sary NOW to be deter­mined; because the res­o­lu­tion or law in ques­tion does not go so far. I can­not
16 sub­scribe to the omnipo­tence of a State *388 Leg­is­la­ture, or that it is absolute and with­out con­trol; although its
17 author­ity should not be expressly restrained by the Con­sti­tu­tion, or fun­da­men­tal law, of the State. The peo­ple of
18 the United States erected their Con­sti­tu­tions, or forms of gov­ern­ment, to estab­lish jus­tice, to pro­mote the
19 gen­eral wel­fare, to secure the bless­ings of lib­erty; and to pro­tect their per­sons and prop­erty from vio­lence. The
20 pur­poses for which men enter into soci­ety will deter­mine the nature and terms of the social com­pact; and as
21 they are the foun­da­tion of the leg­isla­tive power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it: The nature,
22 and ends of leg­isla­tive power will limit the exer­cise of it. This fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­ple flows from the very nature
23 of our free Repub­li­can gov­ern­ments, that no man should be com­pelled to do what the laws do not require; nor
24 to refrain from acts which the laws per­mit. There are acts which the Fed­eral, or State, Leg­is­la­ture can­not do,
25 with­out exceed­ing their author­ity. There are cer­tain vital prin­ci­ples in our free Repub­li­can gov­ern­ments,
26 which will deter­mine and over-​rule an appar­ent and fla­grant abuse of leg­isla­tive power; as to autho­rize
27 man­i­fest injus­tice by pos­i­tive law; or to take away that secu­rity for per­sonal lib­erty, or pri­vate prop­erty, for
28 the pro­tec­tion whereof of the gov­ern­ment was estab­lished. An ACT of the Leg­is­la­ture (for I can­not call it a
29 law) con­trary to the great first prin­ci­ples of the social com­pact, can­not be con­sid­ered a right­ful exer­cise of
30 leg­isla­tive author­ity. The oblig­a­tion of a law in gov­ern­ments estab­lished on express com­pact, and on
31 repub­li­can prin­ci­ples, must be deter­mined by the nature of the power, on which it is founded. A few instances
32 will suf­fice to explain what I mean. A law that pun­ished a cit­i­zen for an inno­cent action, or, in other words,
33 for an act, which, when done, was in vio­la­tion of no exist­ing law; a law that destroys, or impairs, the law­ful
34 pri­vate con­tracts of cit­i­zens; a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes prop­erty
35 from A. and gives it to B: It is against all rea­son and jus­tice, for a peo­ple to entrust a Leg­is­la­ture with SUCH
36 pow­ers; and, there­fore, it can­not be pre­sumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit,
37 of our State Gov­ern­ments, amount to a pro­hi­bi­tion of such acts of leg­is­la­tion; and the gen­eral prin­ci­ples of
38 law and rea­son for­bid them. The Leg­is­la­ture may enjoin, per­mit, for­bid, and pun­ish; they may declare new
39 crimes; and estab­lish rules of con­duct for all its cit­i­zens in future cases; they may com­mand what is right, and
40 pro­hibit what is wrong; but they can­not change inno­cence into guilt; or pun­ish inno­cence as a crime; or vio­late
41 the right of an antecedent law­ful pri­vate con­tract; or the right of pri­vate prop­erty. To main­tain that our
42 Fed­eral, or State, Leg­is­la­ture pos­sesses such pow­ers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, *389 in
43 my opin­ion, be a polit­i­cal heresy, alto­gether inad­mis­si­ble in our free repub­li­can gov­ern­ments.
44 [Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, (1798)]
45 _​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​
46 In Calder v. Bull, which was here in 1798, Mr. Jus­tice Chase said, that there were acts which the Fed­eral and
47 State leg­is­la­tures could not do with­out exceed­ing their author­ity, and among them he men­tioned a law which
48 pun­ished a cit­i­zen for an inno­cent act; a law that destroyed or impaired the law­ful pri­vate con­tracts of
49 cit­i­zens; a law that made a man judge in his own case; and a law that took the prop­erty from A. and gave it to
50 B. ‘It is against all rea­son and jus­tice,’ he added, ‘for a peo­ple to intrust a leg­is­la­ture with such pow­ers, and
51 there­fore it can­not be pre­sumed that they have done it. They may com­mand what is right and pro­hibit what is
52 wrong; but they can­not change inno­cence into guilt, or pun­ish inno­cence as a crime, or vio­late the right of
53 an antecedent law­ful pri­vate con­tract, or the right of pri­vate prop­erty. To main­tain that a Fed­eral or State
54 leg­is­la­ture pos­sesses such pow­ers if they had not been expressly restrained, would, in my opin­ion, be a
55 polit­i­cal heresy alto­gether inad­mis­si­ble in all free repub­li­can gov­ern­ments.’ 3 Dall. 388.
56 [Sink­ing Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, (1878) ]
58 2.1.5 Gov­ern­ment can­not hold a man account­able to a law with­out giv­ing him “rea­son­able
notice” of what he will be held account­able for in advance of any penal­ties
59 This con­cept is exhaus­tively explained below:
57
Require­ment for Rea­son­able Notice, Form #05.022
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
15 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
http://​sedm​.org/​F​o​r​m​s​/​F​o​r​m​I​n​d​e​x​.​h​t​m
1 2.2
2 For fur­ther infor­ma­tion beyond that indi­cated in the fol­low­ing sub­sec­tions, refer to the fol­low­ing:
3 3.
4
5
4.
6
7
5.
8
9
10
6.
11
12
13
7.
Restraints upon the Judi­ciary
Code of Con­duct for U.S. Judges-​Federal Judi­cial Cen­ter
http://​www​.uscourts​.gov/​g​u​i​d​e​/​v​o​l​2​/​c​h​1​.​h​t​m​l
Judi­cial Ethics Hand­book
http://​jec​.unm​.edu/​r​e​s​o​u​r​c​e​s​/​j​u​d​i​c​i​a​l​_​h​a​n​d​b​o​o​k​/​e​t​h​i​c​s​/
What Hap­pened to Justice-​proves why we don’t have an Arti­cle III judi­ciary and why the courts we do have are in the
Exec­u­tive branch.
http://​sedm​.org/​I​t​e​m​I​n​f​o​/​E​b​o​o​k​s​/​W​h​a​t​H​a​p​p​J​u​s​t​i​c​e​/​W​h​a​t​H​a​p​p​J​u​s​t​i​c​e​.​h​t​m
Global Cor­rup­tion Report-​Corruption throughtout the world in the judi­ciary
http://​www​.trans​parency​.org/​p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/​g​c​r​/​d​o​w​n​l​o​a​d​_​g​c​r
Recusal: Analy­sis of Case Law Under 28 U.S.C. § 455 & 144-​Federal Judi­cial Cen­ter (FJC)
http://​fam​guardian​.org/​P​u​b​l​i​s​h​e​d​A​u​t​h​o​r​s​/​G​o​v​t​/​F​J​C​/​R​e​c​u​s​a​l​.​p​d​f
14 2.2.1
No lit­i­gant may be deprived of “due process of law”
15 The U.S. Supreme Court has said the fol­low­ing about “due process” in the con­text of tax pro­ceed­ings:
16 Exactly what due process of law requires in the assess­ment and col­lec­tion of gen­eral taxes has never been
17 decided by this court, although we have had fre­quent occa­sion to hold that, in pro­ceed­ings for the
18 con­dem­na­tion of land under the laws of emi­nent domain, or for the impo­si­tion of spe­cial taxes for local
19 improve­ments, notice to the owner at some stage of the pro­ceed­ings, as well as an oppor­tu­nity to defend, is
20 essen­tial. [Cites omit­ted.] But laws for the assess­ment and col­lec­tion of gen­eral taxes stand upon a some­what
21 dif­fer­ent foot­ing, and are con­strued with the utmost lib­er­al­ity, some­times even to the extent of hold­ing that no
22 notice what­ever is nec­es­sary. Due process of law was well defined by Mr. Jus­tice Field in Hagar v.
23 Recla­ma­tion Dist., No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 28 L.Ed. 569, 4 Sup.Ct.Rep. 663, in the fol­low­ing words: “It is
24 suf­fi­cient to observe here, that by ‘due process’ is meant one which, fol­low­ing the forms of law, is appro­pri­ate to
25 the case, and just to the par­ties to be affected. It must be pur­suant in the ordi­nary mode pre­scribed by the law;
26 it must be adapted too the end to be attained; and wher­ever it is nec­es­sary for the pro­tec­tion of the par­ties, it
27 must give them an oppor­tu­nity to be heard respect­ing the jus­tice of the judg­ment sought. The clause in ques­tion
28 means, there­fore, that there can be no pro­ceed­ing against life, lib­erty, or prop­erty which may result in
29 depri­va­tion of either, with­out the obser­vance of those gen­eral rules estab­lished in our sys­tem of jurispru­dence
30 for the secu­rity of pri­vate rights.“
31 Under the Fourth Amend­ment, the leg­is­la­ture is bound to pro­vide a method for the assess­ment and col­lec­tion of
32 taxes that shall not be incon­sis­tent with nat­ural jus­tice; but it is not bound to pro­vide that the par­tic­u­lar steps of
33 a pro­ce­dure for the col­lec­tion of such taxes shall be proved by writ­ten evi­dence; and it may prop­erly impose
34 upon the tax­payer the bur­den of show­ing that in a par­tic­u­lar case the statu­tory method was not observed.“
35 [Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51; 23 S.Ct. 20 (1902)]
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
In the con­text of legal pro­ceed­ings gen­er­ally, “due process” is defined as fol­lows:
Due process of law. Law in its reg­u­lar course of admin­is­tra­tion through courts of jus­tice. Due process of law
in each par­tic­u­lar case means such an exer­cise of the pow­ers of the gov­ern­ment as the set­tled max­ims of law
per­mit and sanc­tion, and under such safe­guards for the pro­tec­tion of indi­vid­ual rights as those max­ims
pre­scribe for the class of cases to which the one in ques­tion belongs. A course of legal pro­ceed­ings accord­ing
to those rules and prin­ci­ples which have been estab­lished in our sys­tems of jurispru­dence for the
enforce­ment and pro­tec­tion of pri­vate rights. To give such pro­ceed­ings any valid­ity, there must be a tri­bunal
com­pe­tent by its con­sti­tu­tion — that is, by the law of the cre­ation — to pass upon the subject-​matter of the suit;
and, if that involves merely a deter­mi­na­tion of the per­sonal lia­bil­ity of the defen­dant, he must be brought
within its juris­dic­tion by ser­vice of process within the state, or his vol­un­tary appear­ance. Pen­noyer v. Neff, 96
U.S. 733, 24 L.Ed. 565. Due process of law implies the right of the per­son affected thereby to be present before
the tri­bunal which pro­nounces judg­ment upon the ques­tion of life, lib­erty, or prop­erty, in its most
com­pre­hen­sive sense; to be heard, by tes­ti­mony or oth­er­wise, and to have the right of con­tro­vert­ing, by proof,
every mate­r­ial fact which bears on the ques­tion of right in the mat­ter involved. If any ques­tion of fact or
lia­bil­ity be con­clu­sively be pre­sumed [rather than proven] against him, this is not due process of law.
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
16 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1 An orderly pro­ceed­ing wherein a per­son with notice, actual or con­struc­tive, and has an oppor­tu­nity to be heard
2 and to enforce and pro­tect his rights before a court hav­ing the power to hear and deter­mine the case.
3 Kazubowski v. Kazubowski, 45 Ill.2d 405, 259 N.E.2d 282, 290. Phrase means that no per­son shall be deprived
4 of life, lib­erty, prop­erty or of any right granted him by statute, unless mat­ter involved first shall have been
5 adju­di­cated against him upon trial con­ducted accord­ing to estab­lished rules reg­u­lat­ing judi­cial pro­ceed­ings,
6 and it for­bids con­dem­na­tion with­out a hear­ing. Pet­tit v. Penn, LaApp., 180 So.2d 66, 69. The con­cept of “due
7 process of law” as it is embod­ied in the Fifth Amend­ment demands that a law shall not be unrea­son­able,
8 arbi­trary, or capri­cious and that the means selected shall have a rea­son­able and sub­stan­tial rela­tion to the
9 object being sought. U.S. v. Smith, D.C.Iowa, 249 F.Supp. 515, 516. Fun­da­men­tal req­ui­site of “due process of
10 law” is the oppor­tu­nity to be heard, to be aware that a mat­ter is pend­ing, to make an informed choice whether
11 to acqui­esce or con­test, and to assert before the appro­pri­ate decision-​making body the rea­sons for such choice.
12 Trin­ity Epis­co­pal Corp. v. Rom­ney, D.C.N.Y., 387 F.Supp. 1044, 1084. Aside from all else, “due process”
13 means fun­da­men­tal fair­ness and sub­stan­tial jus­tice. Vaughn v. State, 3 Tenn.Crim.App. 54, 456 S.W.2d 879,
14 883.
15 Embod­ied in the due process con­cept are the basic rights of a defen­dant in crim­i­nal pro­ceed­ings and the
16 req­ui­sites for a fair trial. These rights and require­ments have been expanded by Supreme Court deci­sions and
17 include, timely notice of a hear­ing or trial which informs the accused of the charges against him or her; the
18 oppor­tu­nity to con­front accusers and to present evi­dence on one’s own behalf before an impar­tial jury or judge;
19 the pre­sump­tion of inno­cence under which guilt must be proven by legally obtained evi­dence and the ver­dict
20 must be sup­ported by the evi­dence pre­sented; rights at the ear­li­est stage of the crim­i­nal process; and the
21 guar­an­tee that an indi­vid­ual will not be tried more than once for the same offence (dou­ble jeop­ardy).
22 [Black’s Law Dic­tio­nary, Sixth Edi­tion, page 500]
23
Due process is the law­ful means by which the gov­ern­ment pro­tects your right to pri­vate prop­erty.
24
25
26
27
28
29
“The guar­anty of due process of law is one of the most impor­tant to be found in the Fed­eral Con­sti­tu­tion or any
of the Amend­ments; Ulman v. Mayor, etc. of Bal­ti­more, 72 Md 587, 20 A 141, affd 165 US 719, 41 L Ed 1184,
17 S Ct 1001. It has been described as the very essence of a scheme of ordered jus­tice, Brock v. North
Car­olina, 344 US 424, 97 L Ed 456, 73 S Ct 349 and it has been said that with­out it the right to pri­vate
prop­erty could not be said to exist, in the sense in which it is known to our laws.
[Ochoa v. Her­nan­dez y Morales, 230 US 139, 57 L Ed 1427, 33 S Ct 1033]
31 Due process includes or implies all the min­i­mum ele­ments indi­cated below, in addi­tion to sev­eral other ele­ments not
men­tioned here:
32 1.
30
Rea­son­able notice of the pen­dency of the suit or pro­ceed­ings. See:
33 “It is suf­fi­cient to say that there are cer­tain immutable prin­ci­ples of jus­tice which inhere in the very idea of free
34 gov­ern­ment which no mem­ber of the Union may dis­re­gard, as that no man shall be con­demned in his per­son
35 or prop­erty with­out due notice and an oppor­tu­nity of being heard in his own defense.”
36 [Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)]
37 “An ele­men­tary and fun­da­men­tal require­ment of due process in any pro­ceed­ing which is to be accorded final­ity
38 is notice rea­son­ably cal­cu­lated, under all cir­cum­stances, to apprise inter­ested par­ties of the pen­dency of the
39 action and afford them an oppor­tu­nity to present their objec­tions.” Mul­lane v. Cen­tral Hanover Bank & Trust
40 Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). With­out proper prior notice to those who may be affected by a gov­ern­ment
41 deci­sion, all other pro­ce­dural rights may be nul­li­fied. The exact con­tents of the notice required by due process
42 will, of course, vary with the cir­cum­stances.
43 [Admin­is­tra­tive Law and Process in a Nut­shell, Ernest Gell­horn, 1990, West Pub­lish­ing, p. 214]
44
2.
An oppor­tu­nity for a hear­ing prior to being deprived of prop­erty.
45 “This analy­sis as to lib­erty par­al­lels the accepted due process analy­sis as to prop­erty. The Court has
46 con­sis­tently held that some kind of hear­ing is required at some time before a per­son is finally deprived of his
47 prop­erty [418 U.S. 539, 558] inter­ests. Anti-​Fascist Com­mit­tee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
48 (Frank­furter, J., con­cur­ring). The require­ment for some kind of a hear­ing applies to the tak­ing of pri­vate
49 prop­erty, Gran­nis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914), the revo­ca­tion of licenses, In re Ruf­falo, 390 U.S. 544
50 (1968), the oper­a­tion of state dispute-​settlement mech­a­nisms, when one per­son seeks to take prop­erty from
51 another, or to government-​created jobs held, absent “cause” for ter­mi­na­tion, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
52 U.S. 564 (1972); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (POW­ELL, J., con­cur­ring); id., at 171 (WHITE,
53 J., con­cur­ring in part and dis­sent­ing in part); id., at 206 (MAR­SHALL, J., dis­sent­ing). Cf. Stan­ley v. Illi­nois,
54 405 U.S. 645, 652654 (1972); Bell v. Bur­son, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).“
55 [Wolff v. McDon­nell, 418 U.S. 539; 94 S.Ct. 2963; 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)]
56 “In this case the sole ques­tion is whether there has been a tak­ing of prop­erty with­out that pro­ce­dural due
57 process that is required by the Four­teenth Amend­ment. We have dealt over and over again with the ques­tion of
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
17 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1 what con­sti­tutes “the right to be heard” (Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 ) within the mean­ing of
2 pro­ce­dural due process. See Mul­lane v. Cen­tral Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 . In the lat­ter case we
3 said that the right to be heard “has lit­tle real­ity or worth unless one is informed that the mat­ter is pend­ing and
4 can choose for him­self whether [395 U.S. 337, 340] to appear or default, acqui­esce or con­test.” 339 U.S., at
5 314 .
6 [Sni­adach v. Fam­ily Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)]
7 “If the right to notice and a hear­ing is to serve its full pur­pose, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when
8 the depri­va­tion can still be pre­vented. At a later hear­ing, an individual’s pos­ses­sions can be returned to him if
9 they were unfairly or mis­tak­enly taken in the first place. Dam­ages may even be awarded him for wrong­ful
10 depri­va­tion. But no later hear­ing and no dam­age award can undo the fact that the arbi­trary tak­ing that was
11 sub­ject to the right of due process has already occurred. This Court [the Supreme Court] has not embraced the
12 gen­eral propo­si­tion that a wrong may be done if it can be undone.”
13 [Stan­ley v. Illi­nois, 405 U.S. 645, 647, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 556,.Ct. 1208 (1972)]
14
3.
Impar­tial jurors and deci­sion mak­ers.
15 26 CFR §601.106(f)(1): Appeals Func­tions
16 (1) Rule I.
17 An exac­tion by the U.S. Gov­ern­ment, which is not based upon law, statu­tory or oth­er­wise, is a tak­ing of
18 prop­erty with­out due process of law, in vio­la­tion of the Fifth Amend­ment to the U.S. Con­sti­tu­tion. Accord­ingly,
19 an Appeals rep­re­sen­ta­tive in his or her con­clu­sions of fact or appli­ca­tion of the law, shall hew to the law and
20 the rec­og­nized stan­dards of legal con­struc­tion. It shall be his or her duty to deter­mine the cor­rect amount of
21 the tax, with strict impar­tial­ity as between the tax­payer and the Gov­ern­ment, and with­out favoritism or
22 dis­crim­i­na­tion as between tax­pay­ers.
23 _​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​
24 Few, if any, inter­ests under the Con­sti­tu­tion are more fun­da­men­tal than the right to a fair trial by
25 “impar­tial” jurors, and an out­come affected by extra­ju­di­cial state­ments would vio­late that fun­da­men­tal right.
26 See, e.g., Shep­pard, 384 U.S. at 350351; Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965) (evi­dence in crim­i­nal
27 trial must come solely from wit­ness stand in pub­lic court­room with full evi­den­tiary pro­tec­tions). Even if a fair
28 trial can ulti­mately be ensured through voir dire, change of venue, or some other device, these mea­sures entail
29 seri­ous costs to the sys­tem. Exten­sive voir dire may not be able to fil­ter out all of the effects of pre­trial
30 pub­lic­ity, and with increas­ingly wide­spread media cov­er­age of crim­i­nal tri­als, a change of venue may not
31 suf­fice to undo the effects of state­ments such as those made by peti­tioner. The State has a sub­stan­tial inter­est in
32 pre­vent­ing offi­cers of the court, such as lawyers, from impos­ing such costs on the judi­cial sys­tem and on the
33 lit­i­gants. [501 U.S. 1076]
34 The restraint on speech is nar­rowly tai­lored to achieve those objec­tives. The reg­u­la­tion of attor­neys’ speech is
35 lim­ited — it applies only to speech that is sub­stan­tially likely to have a mate­ri­ally prej­u­di­cial effect; it is neu­tral
36 as to points of view, apply­ing equally to all attor­neys par­tic­i­pat­ing in a pend­ing case; and it merely post­pones
37 the attor­neys’ com­ments until after the trial. While sup­ported by the sub­stan­tial state inter­est in pre­vent­ing
38 prej­u­dice to an adju­dica­tive pro­ceed­ing by those who have a duty to pro­tect its integrity, the Rule is lim­ited on
39 its face to pre­vent­ing only speech hav­ing a sub­stan­tial like­li­hood of mate­ri­ally prej­u­dic­ing that pro­ceed­ing.
40 [Gen­tile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)]
41 _​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​
42 “More­over, in each case, the deci­sion­maker must be impar­tial, there must be some record of the pro­ceed­ings,
43 and the decisionmaker’s con­clu­sions must be set forth in writ­ten form indi­cat­ing both the evi­dence and the
44 rea­sons relied upon. Because the Due Process Clause requires these pro­ce­dures, I agree that the case must be
45 remanded as the Court orders.”
46 [Mor­ris­sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)]
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
4.
Impar­tial wit­nesses:
A fair trial in a fair tri­bunal is a basic require­ment of due process. Fair­ness, of course, requires an absence
of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our sys­tem of law has always endeav­ored to pre­vent even the
prob­a­bil­ity of unfair­ness. To this end, no man can be a judge in his own case, and no man is per­mit­ted to try
cases where he has an inter­est in the out­come. That inter­est can­not be defined with pre­ci­sion. Cir­cum­stances
and rela­tion­ships must be con­sid­ered. This Court has said, how­ever, that
Every pro­ce­dure which would offer a pos­si­ble temp­ta­tion to the aver­age man as a judge …
not to hold the bal­ance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused denies the
lat­ter due process of law.
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
18 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532. Such a strin­gent rule may some­times bar trial by judges who have no actual
2 bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of jus­tice equally between con­tend­ing par­ties. But, to
3 per­form its high func­tion in the best way, “jus­tice must sat­isfy the appear­ance of jus­tice.” Offutt v. United
4 States, 348 U.S. 11, 14. [349 U.S. 137]
5 It would be very strange if our sys­tem of law per­mit­ted a judge to act as a grand jury and then try the very
6 per­sons accused as a result of his inves­ti­ga­tions. Per­haps no State has ever forced a defen­dant to accept grand
7 jurors as proper trial jurors to pass on charges grow­ing out of their hearings.{7} A sin­gle “judge-​grand jury“
8 is even more a part of the accusatory process than an ordi­nary lay grand juror. Hav­ing been a part of that
9 process, a judge can­not be, in the very nature of things, wholly dis­in­ter­ested in the con­vic­tion or acquit­tal of
10 those accused. While he would not likely have all the zeal of a pros­e­cu­tor, it can cer­tainly not be said that he
11 would have none of that zeal.{8} Fair tri­als are too impor­tant a part of our free soci­ety to let pros­e­cut­ing
12 judges be trial judges of the charges they prefer.{9} It is true that con­tempt com­mit­ted in a trial court­room can
13 under some cir­cum­stances be pun­ished sum­mar­ily by the trial judge. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517,
14 539. But adju­di­ca­tion by a trial judge of a con­tempt com­mit­ted in his imme­di­ate pres­ence in open court can­not
15 be likened to the pro­ceed­ings here. For we held in the Oliver case that a per­son charged with con­tempt before
16 a “one-​man grand jury” could not be sum­mar­ily tried. [349 U.S. 138]
17 [In Re. Murchi­son, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)]
18
5.
Trial by jury in a civil mat­ter when demanded:
19 U.S. Con­sti­tu­tion: Sev­enth Amend­ment
20 Sev­enth Amend­ment — Civil Tri­als
21 In Suits at com­mon law, where the value in con­tro­versy shall exceed twenty dol­lars, the right of trial by jury
22 shall be pre­served, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be oth­er­wise re-​examined in any Court of the United States,
23 than accord­ing to the rules of the com­mon law.
24
6.
All actions of the agency must be jus­ti­fied with the author­ity of law.
25 26 CFR § 601.106(f)(1)
26 Rule I. An exac­tion by the U.S. Gov­ern­ment, which is not based upon law, statu­tory or oth­er­wise, is a tak­ing
27 of prop­erty with­out due process of law, in vio­la­tion of the Fifth Amend­ment to the U.S. Con­sti­tu­tion.
28
7.
Right to exam­ine all the evi­dence being used against you:
29 “Cer­tain prin­ci­ples have remained rel­a­tively immutable in our jurispru­dence. One of these is that where
30 gov­ern­men­tal action seri­ously injures an indi­vid­ual, and the rea­son­able­ness of the action depends on fact
31 find­ings, the evi­dence used to prove the Government’s case must be dis­closed to the indi­vid­ual so that he has an
32 oppor­tu­nity to show that it is untrue. While it is impor­tant in the case of doc­u­men­tary evi­dence, it is more
33 impor­tant where the evi­dence con­sists of tes­ti­mony of indi­vid­u­als…“
34 “We have for­mal­ized these pro­tec­tions in the require­ments of con­fronta­tion and cross-​examination. This court
35 has been zeal­ous to pro­tect these rights from ero­sion. It has spo­ken out…in all types of cases where
36 administrative…actions were under scrutiny.“
37 [Greene v. McEl­roy, 360 U.S. 474. 496497 (1959)]
38
8.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
Right to speak in your own defense and present evi­dence in the record in your own defense.
“I agree that a parole may not be revoked, con­sis­tently with the Due Process Clause, unless the parolee is
afforded, first, a pre­lim­i­nary hear­ing at the time of arrest to deter­mine whether there is prob­a­ble cause to
believe [408 U.S. 491] that he has vio­lated his parole con­di­tions and, sec­ond, a final hear­ing within a
rea­son­able time to deter­mine whether he has, in fact, vio­lated those con­di­tions and whether his parole should
be revoked. For each hear­ing, the parolee is enti­tled to notice of the vio­la­tions alleged and the evi­dence
against him, oppor­tu­nity to be heard in per­son and to present wit­nesses and doc­u­men­tary evi­dence, and the
right to con­front and cross-​examine adverse wit­nesses, unless it is specif­i­cally found that a wit­ness would
thereby be exposed to a sig­nif­i­cant risk of harm. More­over, in each case, the deci­sion­maker must be
impar­tial, there must be some record of the pro­ceed­ings, and the decisionmaker’s con­clu­sions must be set forth
in writ­ten form indi­cat­ing both the evi­dence and the rea­sons relied upon. Because the Due Process Clause
requires these pro­ce­dures, I agree that the case must be remanded as the Court orders.”
[Mor­ris­sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)]
9.
All evi­dence used must be com­pletely con­sis­tent with the rules of evi­dence.
9.1. All evi­dence used must be intro­duced only through tes­ti­mony under oath. F.R.E. 603.
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
19 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
“Tes­ti­mony which is not given under oath (or affir­ma­tion) is not com­pe­tent evi­dence and may not be con­sid­ered
unless objec­tion is waived”
[Rut­ter Group, Fed­eral Civil Tri­als and Evi­dence, 8:220]
IMPOR­TANT NOTE!: If you don’t object to evi­dence sub­mit­ted with­out an oath or authen­ti­cat­ing sig­na­ture,
then you are pre­sumed to waive this require­ment.
9.2. Wit­ness must lay a foun­da­tion for real [phys­i­cal] evi­dence, and pro­po­nent must offer suf­fi­cient evi­dence to
sup­port a find­ing that the mat­ter in ques­tion is what the pro­po­nent claims it to be. F.R.E. 901(a). If the per­son
authen­ti­cat­ing pro­vides a “pseudo name”, refuses to pro­vide their real legal name, refuses to iden­tify them­selves,
or is pro­tected by the court from iden­ti­fy­ing them­selves and thereby becomes a “secret wit­ness”, then none of the
evi­dence is admis­si­ble. If the wit­ness can­not be held liable for per­jury because he did not swear an oath, then all
evi­dence he pro­vides is inad­mis­si­ble and lacks rel­e­vancy. Rut­ter Group, Fed­eral Civil Tri­als and Evi­dence,
8:375. It is quite fre­quent for IRS agents to use psudon­ames and to print those pseudon­ames on the offi­cial IRS
iden­ti­fi­ca­tion badges. It is there­fore cru­cial to obtain copies of not only their IRS badges, but also of their state
and fed­eral gov­ern­ment ID, like driver’s licenses and pass­ports, and to com­pare the IRS ID with the oth­ers to
ensure con­sis­tency.
16 “From the scant infor­ma­tion avail­able it may ten­ta­tively be con­cluded that the Con­fronta­tion Clause was
17 meant to con­sti­tu­tion­al­ize a bar­rier against fla­grant abuses, tri­als by anony­mous accusers, and absen­tee
18 wit­nesses. That the Clause was intended to ordain com­mon law rules of evi­dence with con­sti­tu­tional sanc­tion is
19 doubt­ful, notwith­stand­ing Eng­lish deci­sions that equate con­fronta­tion and hearsay. Rather, hav­ing estab­lished
20 a broad prin­ci­ple, it is far more likely that the Framers antic­i­pated it would be sup­ple­mented, as a mat­ter of
21 judge-​made com­mon law, by pre­vail­ing rules of evi­dence.
22 [Cal­i­for­nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)]
23 “No nation can remain true to the ideal of lib­erty under law and at the same time per­mit peo­ple to have their
24 homes destroyed and their lives blasted by the slurs of unseen and unsworn inform­ers. There is no pos­si­ble
25 way to con­test the truth­ful­ness of anony­mous accu­sa­tions. The sup­posed accuser can nei­ther be iden­ti­fied nor
26 inter­ro­gated. He may be the most worth­less and irre­spon­si­ble char­ac­ter in the com­mu­nity. What he said may
27 be wholly mali­cious, untrue, unre­li­able, or inac­cu­rately reported. In a court of law, the tri­ers of fact could not
28 even lis­ten to such gos­sip, must less decide the most tri­fling issue on it.”
29 [Jay v. Boy, 351 U.S. 345 (1956)]
30
10. An oppor­tu­nity to face your accusers and ask them ques­tions on the record.
31 “The fun­da­men­tal req­ui­site of due process of law is the oppor­tu­nity to be heard”. Gran­nis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
32 385,394 (1914). The hear­ing must be “at a mean­ing­ful time and in a mean­ing­ful manner.“Armstrong v. Manzo,
33 380 U.S. 545, 552(1965). In the present con­text these prin­ci­ples require…timely and ade­quate notice detail­ing
34 rea­sons…, and an effec­tive oppor­tu­nity to defend by con­fronting any adverse wit­nesses and by pre­sent­ing
35 argu­ments and evi­dence… These rights are impor­tant in cases…challenged…as rest­ing on incor­rect or
36 mis­lead­ing fac­tual premises or on mis­ap­pli­ca­tion of rules or poli­cies to the facts of par­tic­u­lar cases.“
37 “In almost every set­ting where impor­tant deci­sions turn on ques­tions of fact, due process requires an
38 oppor­tu­nity to con­front and cross-​examine adverse wit­nesses. E.g., ICC v. Lousiville & N.R. Co., 227 U.S.
39 88, 9394 (1913) 503 US L.Ed 2nd 391(1992), Will­ner v. Com­mit­tee on Char­ac­ter and Fit­ness, 373 U.S.
40 474,496497 (1959)“
41 [Gold­berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (empha­sis added)]
42 _​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​
43 The Sixth Amend­ment gives a crim­i­nal defen­dant the right “to be con­fronted with the wit­nesses against him.“
44 This lan­guage “comes to us on faded parch­ment,” Cal­i­for­nia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Har­lan, J.,
45 con­cur­ring), with a lin­eage that traces back to the begin­nings of West­ern legal cul­ture. There are indi­ca­tions
46 that a right of con­fronta­tion existed under Roman law. The Roman Gov­er­nor Fes­tus, dis­cussing the proper
47 treat­ment of his pris­oner, Paul, stated: “It is not the man­ner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die before
48 the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend him­self against the [487
49 U.S. 1012, 1016] charges.” Acts 25:16. It has been argued that a form of the right of con­fronta­tion was
50 rec­og­nized in Eng­land well before the right to jury trial. Pol­litt, The Right of Con­fronta­tion: Its His­tory and
51 Mod­ern Dress, 8 J. Pub. L. 381, 384387 (1959).
52 Most of this Court’s encoun­ters with the Con­fronta­tion Clause have involved either the admis­si­bil­ity of out-​of–
53 court state­ments, see, e. g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Dut­ton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), or
54 restric­tions on the scope of cross-​examination, Delaware v. Van Ars­dall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Davis v. Alaska,
55 415 U.S. 308 (1974). Cf. Delaware v. Fen­sterer, 474 U.S. 15, 1819 (1985) (per curiam) (not­ing these two
56 cat­e­gories and find­ing nei­ther applic­a­ble). The rea­son for that is not, as the State sug­gests, that these ele­ments
57 are the essence of the Clause’s pro­tec­tion — but rather, quite to the con­trary, that there is at least some room for
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
20 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1 doubt (and hence lit­i­ga­tion) as to the extent to which the Clause includes those ele­ments, whereas, as Jus­tice
2 Har­lan put it, “[s]imply as a mat­ter of Eng­lish” it con­fers at least “a right to meet face to face all those who
3 appear and give evi­dence at trial.” Cal­i­for­nia v. Green, supra, at 175. Sim­ply as a mat­ter of Latin as well, since
4 the word “con­front” ulti­mately derives from the pre­fix “con-​” (from “con­tra” mean­ing “against” or “opposed”)
5 and the noun “frons” (fore­head). Shake­speare was thus describ­ing the root mean­ing of con­fronta­tion when he
6 had Richard the Sec­ond say: “Then call them to our pres­ence — face to face, and frown­ing brow to brow,
7 our­selves will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak .…” Richard II, Act 1, sc. 1.
8 We have never doubted, there­fore, that the Con­fronta­tion Clause guar­an­tees the defen­dant a face-​to-​face
9 meet­ing with wit­nesses appear­ing before the trier of fact. See Ken­tucky v. Stin­cer, 482 U.S. 730, 748 , 749
10 750 (1987) (MAR­SHALL, J., dis­sent­ing). For exam­ple, in Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899),
11 which con­cerned the admis­si­bil­ity of prior con­vic­tions of code­fen­dants to prove an ele­ment of the offense
12 [487 U.S. 1012, 1017] of receiv­ing stolen Gov­ern­ment prop­erty, we described the oper­a­tion of the
13 Clause as fol­lows: “[A] fact which can be pri­mar­ily estab­lished only by wit­nesses can­not be proved against
14 an accused … except by wit­nesses who con­front him at the trial, upon whom he can look while being tried,
15 whom he is enti­tled to cross-​examine, and whose tes­ti­mony he may impeach in every mode autho­rized by the
16 estab­lished rules gov­ern­ing the trial or con­duct of crim­i­nal cases.” Sim­i­larly, in Dowdell v. United States,
17 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911), we described a pro­vi­sion of the Philip­pine Bill of Rights as sub­stan­tially the same
18 as the Sixth Amend­ment, and pro­ceeded to inter­pret it as intended “to secure the accused the right to be
19 tried, so far as facts prov­able by wit­nesses are con­cerned, by only such wit­nesses as meet him face to face at
20 the trial, who give their tes­ti­mony in his pres­ence, and give to the accused an oppor­tu­nity of cross–
21 exam­i­na­tion.” More recently, we have described the “lit­eral right to ‘con­front’ the wit­ness at the time of
22 trial” as form­ing “the core of the val­ues fur­thered by the Con­fronta­tion Clause.” Cal­i­for­nia v. Green, supra,
23 at 157. Last Term, the plu­ral­ity opin­ion in Penn­syl­va­nia v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987), stated that “[t]he
24 Con­fronta­tion Clause pro­vides two types of pro­tec­tions for a crim­i­nal defen­dant: the right phys­i­cally to face
25 those who tes­tify against him, and the right to con­duct cross-​examination.“
26 [Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)]
27
28
29
30
31
32
11. The right to point out vio­la­tions of law and other griev­ances of the gov­ern­ment with­out the impo­si­tion of any penalty.
The First Amend­ment guar­an­tees us a right to Peti­tion the Gov­ern­ment for redress of griev­ances. Every such right
cre­ates a duty on the part of the gov­ern­ment it is directed at, and that right implies the absence of any penalty for
engag­ing in such a peti­tion.
12. The right to not be hauled into a for­eign juris­dic­tion as a non­res­i­dent defen­dant with­out proof on the record of
“min­i­mum con­tacts” with the forum:
33 The Due Process Clause of the Four­teenth Amend­ment lim­its the power of a state court to ren­der a valid
34 per­sonal judg­ment against a non­res­i­dent defen­dant. Kulko v. Cal­i­for­nia Supe­rior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91
35 (1978). A judg­ment ren­dered in vio­la­tion of due process is void in the ren­der­ing State and is not enti­tled to
36 full faith and credit else­where. Pen­noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732733 (1878). Due process requires that the
37 defen­dant be given ade­quate notice of the suit, Mul­lane v. Cen­tral Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313314
38 (1950), and be sub­ject to the per­sonal juris­dic­tion of the court, Inter­na­tional Shoe Co. v. Wash­ing­ton, 326 U.S.
39 310 (1945). In the present case, it is not con­tended that notice was inad­e­quate; the only ques­tion is whether
40 these par­tic­u­lar peti­tion­ers were sub­ject to the juris­dic­tion of the Okla­homa courts.
41 As has long been set­tled, and as we reaf­firm today, a state court may exer­cise per­sonal juris­dic­tion over a
42 non­res­i­dent defen­dant only so long as there exist “min­i­mum con­tacts” between the defen­dant and the forum
43 State. Inter­na­tional Shoe Co. v. Wash­ing­ton, supra, at 316. The con­cept of min­i­mum con­tacts, in turn, can
44 be seen to per­form two related, but [444 U.S. 286, 292] dis­tin­guish­able, func­tions. It pro­tects the defen­dant
45 against the bur­dens of lit­i­gat­ing in a dis­tant or incon­ve­nient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States,
46 through their courts, do not reach out beyond the lim­its imposed on them by their sta­tus as coequal
47 sov­er­eigns in a fed­eral sys­tem.
48 The pro­tec­tion against incon­ve­nient lit­i­ga­tion is typ­i­cally described in terms of “rea­son­able­ness” or “fair­ness.“
49 We have said that the defendant’s con­tacts with the forum State must be such that main­te­nance of the suit “does
50 not offend ‘tra­di­tional notions of fair play and sub­stan­tial jus­tice.’” Inter­na­tional Shoe Co. v. Wash­ing­ton,
51 supra, at 316, quot­ing Mil­liken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). The rela­tion­ship between the defen­dant and
52 the forum must be such that it is “rea­son­able … to require the cor­po­ra­tion to defend the par­tic­u­lar suit which
53 is brought there.” 326 U.S., at 317 . Implicit in this empha­sis on rea­son­able­ness is the under­stand­ing that the
54 bur­den on the defen­dant, while always a pri­mary con­cern, will in an appro­pri­ate case be con­sid­ered in light of
55 other rel­e­vant fac­tors, includ­ing the forum State’s inter­est in adju­di­cat­ing the dis­pute, see McGee v.
56 Inter­na­tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); the plaintiff’s inter­est in obtain­ing con­ve­nient and
57 effec­tive relief, see Kulko v. Cal­i­for­nia Supe­rior Court, supra, at 92, at least when that inter­est is not
58 ade­quately pro­tected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum, cf. Shaf­fer v. Heit­ner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 , n.
59 37 (1977); the inter­state judi­cial system’s inter­est in obtain­ing the most effi­cient res­o­lu­tion of con­tro­ver­sies;
60 and the shared inter­est of the sev­eral States in fur­ther­ing fun­da­men­tal sub­stan­tive social poli­cies, see Kulko v.
61 Cal­i­for­nia Supe­rior Court, supra, at 93, 98.
62 [World-​Wide Volk­swa­gen Corp. v. Wood­son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
21 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1
2.2.2
Men are pre­sumed inno­cent until proven guilty with evi­dence
2 The pre­sump­tion of inno­cence, although not artic­u­lated in the Con­sti­tu­tion, is a basic com­po­nent of a fair trial
3 under our sys­tem of crim­i­nal jus­tice. Long ago this Court stated:
4 The prin­ci­ple that there is a pre­sump­tion of inno­cence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic
5 and ele­men­tary, and its enforce­ment lies at the foun­da­tion of the admin­is­tra­tion of our crim­i­nal law.
6 [Cof­fin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).]
7 2.2.3
Courts may not enter­tain “polit­i­cal ques­tions”
8 Courts may not involve them­selves in any strictly polit­i­cal ques­tion:
9 1.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16 Courts may not involve them­selves in the affairs of a polit­i­cal party or its mem­bers:
17 1.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 Courts may not com­pel par­tic­i­pa­tion in polit­i­cal par­ties or inter­fere with mem­ber­ship in them:
27 1.
28
29
30
31
32 The cri­te­ria for deter­min­ing whether a ques­tion is a “polit­i­cal ques­tion” is best described in Baker v. Carr, which was
explained in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) as fol­lows:
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
2.
3.
4.
2.
3.
2.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Estab­lishes cri­te­ria for deter­min­ing juris­dic­tion to decide spe­cific aspects of
polit­i­cal ques­tions.
Luther v. Bor­den, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). Denied all courts juris­dic­tion to hear strictly polit­i­cal mat­ters.
Fletcher v. Tut­tle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N.E. 683 (1894). Defined “polit­i­cal rights”.
O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). Ruled that equity courts must refrain from inter­fer­ing in the admin­is­tra­tion of
the inter­nal affairs of a polit­i­cal party. The court will note that any num­ber of peo­ple, includ­ing a sin­gle per­son, can
defined a polit­i­cal party.
Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3rd Cir. 1965). Court dis­missed petitioner’s chal­lenge to the method of select­ing the
Demo­c­ra­tic County Com­mit­tee and Chair­man.
Farmer-​Labor State Cen­tral Com­mit­tee v. Holm, 227 Minn. 52, 33 N.W.2d 831 (1948). Court ruled that “In fac­tional
con­tro­ver­sies within a party, where there is not con­trol­ling statute or clear right based on statute law, the courts will not
assume juris­dic­tion, but will leave the mat­ter for deter­mi­na­tion within the party orga­ni­za­tion.. . Such a con­ven­tion is a
delib­er­a­tive body, and unless it acts arbi­trar­ily, oppres­sively, or fraud­u­lently, its final deter­mi­na­tion as to can­di­dates, or
any other ques­tion of which it has juris­dic­tion, will be fol­lowed by the courts.”
White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 366 (1898). Ruled that court of equity will refrain from exer­cis­ing juris­dic­tion over the
appoint­ment or removal of pub­lic offi­cers.
Demo­c­ra­tic Party of U.S. v. Wis­con­sin, ex re. LaFol­lette, 450 U.S. 107, 101 S.Ct. 1010, 67 L.Ed.2d 82 (1981). Court
ruled that free­dom of polit­i­cal asso­ci­a­tion “nec­es­sar­ily pre­sup­poses the free­dom to iden­tify the peo­ple who com­prise
the asso­ci­a­tion, and to limit the asso­ci­a­tion to those peo­ple only.”
Tashjian v. Repub­li­can Party of Con­necti­cut, 479 U.S. 208, 107 S.Ct. 544, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986): Ruled that a state
could not con­sti­tu­tion­ally require that vot­ers in party pri­maries be reg­is­tered mem­bers of that party.
“A con­tro­versy is non­jus­ti­cia­ble — i.e., involves a polit­i­cal ques­tion — where there is a tex­tu­ally demon­stra­ble
con­sti­tu­tional com­mit­ment of the issue to a coor­di­nate polit­i­cal depart­ment; or a lack of judi­cially dis­cov­er­able
and man­age­able stan­dards for resolv­ing it.…”
[Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)]
The sec­ond cri­te­ria above: “or a lack of judi­cially dis­cov­er­able and man­age­able stan­dards for resolv­ing it” is explained in
the same case:
The major­ity states that the ques­tion raised in this case meets two of the cri­te­ria for polit­i­cal ques­tions set out in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). It con­cludes first that there is “‘a tex­tu­ally demon­stra­ble con­sti­tu­tional
com­mit­ment of the issue to a coor­di­nate polit­i­cal depart­ment.’” It also finds that the ques­tion can­not be resolved
for “‘a lack of judi­cially dis­cov­er­able and man­age­able stan­dards.’” Ante, at 228.
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
22 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
1 Of course the issue in the polit­i­cal ques­tion doc­trine is not whether the con­sti­tu­tional text com­mits exclu­sive
2 respon­si­bil­ity for a par­tic­u­lar gov­ern­men­tal func­tion to one of the polit­i­cal branches. There are numer­ous
3 instances of this sort of tex­tual com­mit­ment, e.g., Art. I, 8, and it is not thought that dis­putes impli­cat­ing these
4 pro­vi­sions are non­jus­ti­cia­ble. Rather, the issue is whether the Con­sti­tu­tion has given one of the polit­i­cal
5 branches final respon­si­bil­ity for inter­pret­ing the scope and nature of such a power.
6 Although Baker directs the Court to search for “a tex­tu­ally demon­stra­ble con­sti­tu­tional com­mit­ment” of such
7 respon­si­bil­ity, there are few, if any, explicit and unequiv­o­cal instances in the Con­sti­tu­tion of this sort of tex­tual
8 com­mit­ment. Con­fer­ral on Con­gress of the power to “Judge” qual­i­fi­ca­tions of its Mem­bers by Art. I, 5, may, for
9 exam­ple, pre­clude judi­cial review of whether a prospec­tive mem­ber in fact meets those qual­i­fi­ca­tions. See
10 Pow­ell v. McCor­mack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969). The courts there­fore are usu­ally left to infer the pres­ence of a
11 polit­i­cal ques­tion from the text and struc­ture of the Con­sti­tu­tion. In draw­ing the infer­ence that the Con­sti­tu­tion
12 has com­mit­ted final inter­pre­tive author­ity to one of the polit­i­cal branches, courts are some­times aided by
13 tex­tual evi­dence that the judi­ciary was not meant to exer­cise judi­cial review — a coor­di­nate inquiry expressed in
14 Baker’s “lack of judi­cially dis­cov­er­able and man­age­able stan­dards” cri­te­rion. See, e.g., Cole­man v. Miller, 307
15 U.S. 433, 452454 (1939), where the Court refused to deter­mine [506 U.S. 224, 241] the lifes­pan of a
16 pro­posed con­sti­tu­tional amend­ment, given Art. V’s place­ment of the amend­ment process with Con­gress and the
17 lack of any judi­cial stan­dard for resolv­ing the ques­tion. See also id., at 457460 (Black, J., con­cur­ring).
18 [Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)]
19
The best descrip­tion of the polit­i­cal que­si­tons doc­trine appears in the fol­low­ing U.S. Supreme Court case:
20 “But, for­tu­nately for our free­dom from polit­i­cal excite­ments in judi­cial duties, this court [the U.S. Supreme
21 Court] can never with pro­pri­ety be called on offi­cially to be the umpire in ques­tions merely polit­i­cal. The
22 adjust­ment of these ques­tions belongs to the peo­ple and their polit­i­cal rep­re­sen­ta­tives, either in the State or
23 gen­eral gov­ern­ment. These ques­tions relate to mat­ters not to be set­tled on strict legal prin­ci­ples. They are
24 adjusted rather by incli­na­tion, or prej­u­dice or com­pro­mise, often.
25 […]
26 Another evil, alarm­ing and lit­tle fore­seen, involved in regard­ing these as ques­tions for the final arbitra­ment
27 of judges would be that, in such an event, all polit­i­cal priv­i­leges and rights would, in a dis­pute among the
28 peo­ple, depend on our deci­sion finally. We would pos­sess the power to decide against, as well as for, them,
29 and, under a prej­u­diced or arbi­trary judi­ciary, the pub­lic lib­er­ties and pop­u­lar priv­i­leges might thus be much
30 per­verted, if not entirely pros­trated. But, allow­ing the peo­ple to make con­sti­tu­tions and unmake them, allow­ing
31 their rep­re­sen­ta­tives to make laws and unmake them, and with­out our inter­fer­ence as to their prin­ci­ples or
32 pol­icy in doing it, yet, when con­sti­tu­tions and laws are made and put in force by oth­ers, then the courts, as
33 empow­ered by the State or the Union, com­mence their func­tions and may decide on the rights which con­flict­ing
34 par­ties can legally set up under them, rather than about their for­ma­tion itself. Our power begins after theirs
35 [the Sov­er­eign Peo­ple] ends. Con­sti­tu­tions and laws pre­cede the judi­ciary, and we act only under and after
36 them, and as to dis­puted rights beneath them, rather than dis­puted points in mak­ing them. We speak what is
37 the law, jus dicere, we speak or con­strue what is the con­sti­tu­tion, after both are made, but we make, or revise,
38 or con­trol nei­ther. The dis­puted rights beneath con­sti­tu­tions already made are to be gov­erned by prece­dents,
39 by sound legal prin­ci­ples, by pos­i­tive leg­is­la­tion [e.g. “pos­i­tive law”], clear con­tracts, moral duties, and fixed
40 rules; they are per se ques­tions of law, and are well suited to the edu­ca­tion and habits of the bench. But the
41 other dis­puted points in mak­ing con­sti­tu­tions, depend­ing often, as before shown, on pol­icy, incli­na­tion, pop­u­lar
42 resolves and pop­u­lar will and aris­ing not in respect to pri­vate rights, not what is meum and tuum, but in
43 rela­tion to pol­i­tics, they belong to pol­i­tics, and they are set­tled by polit­i­cal tri­bunals, and are too dear to a
44 peo­ple bred in the school of Syd­ney and Rus­sel for them ever to intrust their final deci­sion, when dis­puted, to a
45 class of men who are so far removed from them as the judi­ciary, a class also who might decide them
46 erro­neously, as well as right, and if in the for­mer way, the con­se­quences might not be able to be averted except
47 by a rev­o­lu­tion, while a wrong deci­sion by a polit­i­cal forum can often be peace­fully cor­rected by new
48 elec­tions or instruc­tions in a sin­gle month; and if the peo­ple, in the dis­tri­b­u­tion of pow­ers under the
49 con­sti­tu­tion, should ever think of mak­ing judges supreme arbiters in polit­i­cal con­tro­ver­sies when not selected
50 by nor, fre­quently, amenable to them nor at lib­erty to fol­low such var­i­ous con­sid­er­a­tions in their judg­ments
51 as [48 U.S. 53] belong to mere polit­i­cal ques­tions, they will dethrone them­selves and lose one of their own
52 invalu­able birthrights; build­ing up in this way — slowly, but surely — a new sov­er­eign power in the repub­lic,
53 in most respects irre­spon­si­ble and unchange­able for life, and one more dan­ger­ous, in the­ory at least, than
54 the worst elec­tive oli­garchy in the worst of times. Again, instead of con­trol­ling the peo­ple in polit­i­cal affairs,
55 the judi­ciary in our sys­tem was designed rather to con­trol indi­vid­u­als, on the one hand, when encroach­ing,
56 or to defend them, on the other, under the Con­sti­tu­tion and the laws, when they are encroached upon. And if
57 the judi­ciary at times seems to fill the impor­tant sta­tion of a check in the gov­ern­ment, it is rather a check on the
58 leg­is­la­ture, who may attempt to pass laws con­trary to the Con­sti­tu­tion, or on the exec­u­tive, who may vio­late
59 both the laws and Con­sti­tu­tion, than on the peo­ple them­selves in their pri­mary capac­ity as mak­ers and
60 amenders of con­sti­tu­tions.“
61 [Luther v. Bor­den, 48 U.S. 1 (1849)]
62
For fur­ther infor­ma­tion on this sub­ject, see:
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
23 of 24
EXHIBIT:________
Polit­i­cal Juris­dic­tion, Form #05.004
http://​sedm​.org/​F​o​r​m​s​/​F​o​r​m​I​n​d​e​x​.​h​t​m
1
2.2.4
A man can­not be judge in his own case
2 “No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his inter­est would cer­tainly bias his judg­ment,
3 and, not improb­a­bly, cor­rupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater rea­son, a body of men are unfit to be
4 both judges and par­ties at the same time; yet what are many of the most impor­tant acts of leg­is­la­tion, but so
5 many judi­cial deter­mi­na­tions, not indeed con­cern­ing the rights of sin­gle per­sons, but con­cern­ing the rights of
6 large bod­ies of cit­i­zens? And what are the dif­fer­ent classes of leg­is­la­tors but advo­cates and par­ties to the
7 causes which they deter­mine? Is a law pro­posed con­cern­ing pri­vate debts? It is a ques­tion to which the
8 cred­i­tors are par­ties on one side and the debtors on the other. Jus­tice ought to hold the bal­ance between them.
9 Yet the par­ties are, and must be, them­selves the judges; and the most numer­ous party, or, in other words, the
10 most pow­er­ful fac­tion must be expected to pre­vail. Shall domes­tic man­u­fac­tures be encour­aged, and in what
11 degree, by restric­tions on for­eign man­u­fac­tures? are ques­tions which would be dif­fer­ently decided by the
12 landed and the man­u­fac­tur­ing classes, and prob­a­bly by nei­ther with a sole regard to jus­tice and the pub­lic
13 good. The appor­tion­ment of taxes on the var­i­ous descrip­tions of prop­erty is an act which seems to require the
14 most exact impar­tial­ity; yet there is, per­haps, no leg­isla­tive act in which greater oppor­tu­nity and temp­ta­tion are
15 given to a pre­dom­i­nant party to tram­ple on the rules of jus­tice. Every shilling with which they over­bur­den the
16 infe­rior num­ber, is a shilling saved to their own pock­ets.”
17 [James Madi­son, Fed­er­al­ist Paper #10]
18 _​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​
19 Whether the Leg­is­la­ture of any of the States can revise and cor­rect by law, a deci­sion of any of its Courts of
20 Jus­tice, although not pro­hib­ited by the Con­sti­tu­tion of the State, is a ques­tion of very great impor­tance, and not
21 nec­es­sary NOW to be deter­mined; because the res­o­lu­tion or law in ques­tion does not go so far. I can­not
22 sub­scribe to the omnipo­tence of a State *388 Leg­is­la­ture, or that it is absolute and with­out con­trol; although its
23 author­ity should not be expressly restrained by the Con­sti­tu­tion, or fun­da­men­tal law, of the State. The peo­ple of
24 the United States erected their Con­sti­tu­tions, or forms of gov­ern­ment, to estab­lish jus­tice, to pro­mote the
25 gen­eral wel­fare, to secure the bless­ings of lib­erty; and to pro­tect their per­sons and prop­erty from vio­lence. The
26 pur­poses for which men enter into soci­ety will deter­mine the nature and terms of the social com­pact; and as
27 they are the foun­da­tion of the leg­isla­tive power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it: The nature,
28 and ends of leg­isla­tive power will limit the exer­cise of it. This fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­ple flows from the very nature
29 of our free Repub­li­can gov­ern­ments, that no man should be com­pelled to do what the laws do not require; nor
30 to refrain from acts which the laws per­mit. There are acts which the Fed­eral, or State, Leg­is­la­ture can­not do,
31 with­out exceed­ing their author­ity. There are cer­tain vital prin­ci­ples in our free Repub­li­can gov­ern­ments,
32 which will deter­mine and over-​rule an appar­ent and fla­grant abuse of leg­isla­tive power; as to autho­rize
33 man­i­fest injus­tice by pos­i­tive law; or to take away that secu­rity for per­sonal lib­erty, or pri­vate prop­erty, for
34 the pro­tec­tion whereof of the gov­ern­ment was estab­lished. An ACT of the Leg­is­la­ture (for I can­not call it a
35 law) con­trary to the great first prin­ci­ples of the social com­pact, can­not be con­sid­ered a right­ful exer­cise of
36 leg­isla­tive author­ity. The oblig­a­tion of a law in gov­ern­ments estab­lished on express com­pact, and on
37 repub­li­can prin­ci­ples, must be deter­mined by the nature of the power, on which it is founded. A few instances
38 will suf­fice to explain what I mean. A law that pun­ished a cit­i­zen for an inno­cent action, or, in other words, for
39 an act, which, when done, was in vio­la­tion of no exist­ing law; a law that destroys, or impairs, the law­ful pri­vate
40 con­tracts of cit­i­zens; a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes prop­erty from A.
41 and gives it to B: It is against all rea­son and jus­tice, for a peo­ple to entrust a Leg­is­la­ture with SUCH pow­ers;
42 and, there­fore, it can­not be pre­sumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our
43 State Gov­ern­ments, amount to a pro­hi­bi­tion of such acts of leg­is­la­tion; and the gen­eral prin­ci­ples of law and
44 rea­son for­bid them. The Leg­is­la­ture may enjoin, per­mit, for­bid, and pun­ish; they may declare new crimes; and
45 estab­lish rules of con­duct for all its cit­i­zens in future cases; they may com­mand what is right, and pro­hibit what
46 is wrong; but they can­not change inno­cence into guilt; or pun­ish inno­cence as a crime; or vio­late the right of
47 an antecedent law­ful pri­vate con­tract; or the right of pri­vate prop­erty. To main­tain that our Fed­eral, or State,
48 Leg­is­la­ture pos­sesses such pow­ers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, *389 in my opin­ion, be a
49 polit­i­cal heresy, alto­gether inad­mis­si­ble in our free repub­li­can gov­ern­ments.
50 [Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, (1798)]
51 _​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​
52 In Calder v. Bull, which was here in 1798, Mr. Jus­tice Chase said, that there were acts which the Fed­eral and
53 State leg­is­la­tures could not do with­out exceed­ing their author­ity, and among them he men­tioned a law which
54 pun­ished a cit­i­zen for an inno­cent act; a law that destroyed or impaired the law­ful pri­vate con­tracts of cit­i­zens;
55 a law that made a man judge in his own case; and a law that took the prop­erty from A. and gave it to B. ‘It is
56 against all rea­son and jus­tice,’ he added, ‘for a peo­ple to intrust a leg­is­la­ture with such pow­ers, and
57 there­fore it can­not be pre­sumed that they have done it. They may com­mand what is right and pro­hibit what is
58 wrong; but they can­not change inno­cence into guilt, or pun­ish inno­cence as a crime, or vio­late the right of
59 an antecedent law­ful pri­vate con­tract, or the right of pri­vate prop­erty. To main­tain that a Fed­eral or State
60 leg­is­la­ture pos­sesses such pow­ers if they had not been expressly restrained, would, in my opin­ion, be a
61 polit­i­cal heresy alto­gether inad­mis­si­ble in all free repub­li­can gov­ern­ments.’ 3 Dall. 388.
62 [Sink­ing Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, (1878)]
Enu­mer­a­tion of Inalien­able Rights
Copy­right Sov­er­eignty Edu­ca­tion and Defense Min­istry, http://​sedm​.org
Form 10.002, Rev. 8-​2-​2007
24 of 24
EXHIBIT:________


welcome

If you do noth­ing else, Check out the for­got­ten post sec­tion above it’s the rea­son the site was made. If you are going to court read or lis­ten to Free Speech Radio, Seat-​belts 1 & 2 and Cog­ni­tive Dis­so­nance at High Fre­quency! In that order. Posted in Audio and text format.

Bread­crumbs

Join Us!

Web Analytics