I am not this hair or this skin, I'm the soul that lives within...
India Arie


The Cur­rent Year is 6273

The feel­ing is strong and it over­pow­ers my thoughts, I am not aware of the real­ity that my blood knows only to well!
My mind is hos­tile for the wrong rea­sons, I am only sun and man, but the need to be brother is tremendous!

The Con­sti­tu­tion has been sus­pended since the time of recon­struc­tion. As long as we are at WAR the Con­sti­tu­tion is sus­pended. We have only had 22 years of peace in our entire his­tory. We are under Mar­tial Law and have been since April 23,1863 with the issue of Gen­eral orders 100. If you truly want to fix things, we need a TREATY FOR PEACE FOR ALL WARS.

Read the Lieber Codes. The army gen­er­als know this. As of now we are under the vel­vet glove,but soon very soon we will be under the IRON FIST of gov­ern­ment. Wait till they come to take the guns with U.N. troops. You can not fix it if you do not know what is broken.

Mar­tial Law — Mil­i­tary juris­dic­tion — Mil­i­tary neces­sity — Retaliation

Arti­cle 1.

A place, dis­trict, or coun­try occu­pied by an enemy stands, in con­se­quence of the occu­pa­tion, under the Mar­tial Law of the invad­ing or occu­py­ing army, whether any procla­ma­tion declar­ing Mar­tial Law, or any pub­lic warn­ing to the inhab­i­tants, has been issued or not. Mar­tial Law is the imme­di­ate and direct effect and con­se­quence of occu­pa­tion or con­quest.

The pres­ence of a hos­tile army pro­claims its Mar­tial Law.
Art. 2.

Mar­tial Law does not cease dur­ing the hos­tile occu­pa­tion, except by spe­cial procla­ma­tion, ordered by the com­man­der in chief; or by spe­cial men­tion in the treaty of peace con­clud­ing the war, when the occu­pa­tion of a place or ter­ri­tory con­tin­ues beyond the con­clu­sion of peace as one of the con­di­tions of the same.
Art. 3.

Mar­tial Law in a hos­tile coun­try con­sists in the sus­pen­sion, by the occu­py­ing mil­i­tary author­ity, of the crim­i­nal and civil law, and of the domes­tic admin­is­tra­tion and gov­ern­ment in the occu­pied place or ter­ri­tory, and in the sub­sti­tu­tion of mil­i­tary rule and force for the same, as well as in the dic­ta­tion of gen­eral laws, as far as mil­i­tary neces­sity requires this sus­pen­sion, sub­sti­tu­tion, or dic­ta­tion.

The com­man­der of the forces may pro­claim that the admin­is­tra­tion of all civil and penal law shall con­tinue either wholly or in part, as in times of peace, unless oth­er­wise ordered by the mil­i­tary author­ity.
Art. 4.

Mar­tial Law is sim­ply mil­i­tary author­ity exer­cised in accor­dance with the laws and usages of war. Mil­i­tary oppres­sion is not Mar­tial Law: it is the abuse of the power which that law con­fers. As Mar­tial Law is exe­cuted by mil­i­tary force, it is incum­bent upon those who admin­is­ter it to be strictly guided by the prin­ci­ples of jus­tice, honor, and human­ity — virtues adorn­ing a sol­dier even more than other men, for the very rea­son that he pos­sesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.
Art. 5.

Mar­tial Law should be less strin­gent in places and coun­tries fully occu­pied and fairly con­quered. Much greater sever­ity may be exer­cised in places or regions where actual hos­til­i­ties exist, or are expected and must be pre­pared for. Its most com­plete sway is allowed — even in the commander’s own coun­try — when face to face with the enemy, because of the absolute neces­si­ties of the case, and of the para­mount duty to defend the coun­try against inva­sion.

To save the coun­try is para­mount to all other con­sid­er­a­tions.
Art. 6.

All civil and penal law shall con­tinue to take its usual course in the enemy’s places and ter­ri­to­ries under Mar­tial Law, unless inter­rupted or stopped by order of the occu­py­ing mil­i­tary power; but all the func­tions of the hos­tile gov­ern­ment — leg­isla­tive exec­u­tive, or admin­is­tra­tive — whether of a gen­eral, provin­cial, or local char­ac­ter, cease under Mar­tial Law, or con­tinue only with the sanc­tion, or, if deemed nec­es­sary, the par­tic­i­pa­tion of the occu­pier or invader.
Art. 7.

Mar­tial Law extends to prop­erty, and to per­sons, whether they are sub­jects of the enemy or aliens to that gov­ern­ment.
Art. 8.

Con­suls, among Amer­i­can and Euro­pean nations, are not diplo­matic agents. Nev­er­the­less, their offices and per­sons will be sub­jected to Mar­tial Law in cases of urgent neces­sity only: their prop­erty and busi­ness are not exempted. Any delin­quency they com­mit against the estab­lished mil­i­tary rule may be pun­ished as in the case of any other inhab­i­tant, and such pun­ish­ment fur­nishes no rea­son­able ground for inter­na­tional com­plaint.
Art. 9.

The func­tions of Ambas­sadors, Min­is­ters, or other diplo­matic agents accred­ited by neu­tral pow­ers to the hos­tile gov­ern­ment, cease, so far as regards the dis­placed gov­ern­ment; but the con­quer­ing or occu­py­ing power usu­ally rec­og­nizes them as tem­porar­ily accred­ited to itself.
Art. 10.

Mar­tial Law affects chiefly the police and col­lec­tion of pub­lic rev­enue and taxes, whether imposed by the expelled gov­ern­ment or by the invader, and refers mainly to the sup­port and effi­ciency of the army, its safety, and the safety of its oper­a­tions.
Art. 11.

The law of war does not only dis­claim all cru­elty and bad faith con­cern­ing engage­ments con­cluded with the enemy dur­ing the war, but also the break­ing of stip­u­la­tions solemnly con­tracted by the bel­liger­ents in time of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in force in case of war between the con­tract­ing pow­ers.

It dis­claims all extor­tions and other trans­ac­tions for indi­vid­ual gain; all acts of pri­vate revenge, or con­nivance at such acts.

Offenses to the con­trary shall be severely pun­ished, and espe­cially so if com­mit­ted by offi­cers.
Art. 12.

When­ever fea­si­ble, Mar­tial Law is car­ried out in cases of indi­vid­ual offend­ers by Mil­i­tary Courts; but sen­tences of death shall be exe­cuted only with the approval of the chief exec­u­tive, pro­vided the urgency of the case does not require a speed­ier exe­cu­tion, and then only with the approval of the chief com­man­der.
Art. 13.

Mil­i­tary juris­dic­tion is of two kinds: First, that which is con­ferred and defined by statute; sec­ond, that which is derived from the com­mon law of war. Mil­i­tary offenses under the statute law must be tried in the man­ner therein directed; but mil­i­tary offenses which do not come within the statute must be tried and pun­ished under the com­mon law of war. The char­ac­ter of the courts which exer­cise these juris­dic­tions depends upon the local laws of each par­tic­u­lar coun­try.

In the armies of the United States the first is exer­cised by courts-​martial, while cases which do not come within the “Rules and Arti­cles of War,” or the juris­dic­tion con­ferred by statute on courts-​martial, are tried by mil­i­tary com­mis­sions.
Art. 14.

Mil­i­tary neces­sity, as under­stood by mod­ern civ­i­lized nations, con­sists in the neces­sity of those mea­sures which are indis­pens­able for secur­ing the ends of the war, and which are law­ful accord­ing to the mod­ern law and usages of war.
Art. 15.

Mil­i­tary neces­sity admits of all direct destruc­tion of life or limb of armed ene­mies, and of other per­sons whose destruc­tion is inci­den­tally unavoid­able in the armed con­tests of the war; it allows of the cap­tur­ing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of impor­tance to the hos­tile gov­ern­ment, or of pecu­liar dan­ger to the cap­tor; it allows of all destruc­tion of prop­erty, and obstruc­tion of the ways and chan­nels of traf­fic, travel, or com­mu­ni­ca­tion, and of all with­hold­ing of sus­te­nance or means of life from the enemy; of the appro­pri­a­tion of what­ever an enemy’s coun­try affords nec­es­sary for the sub­sis­tence and safety of the army, and of such decep­tion as does not involve the break­ing of good faith either pos­i­tively pledged, regard­ing agree­ments entered into dur­ing the war, or sup­posed by the mod­ern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in pub­lic war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, respon­si­ble to one another and to God.
Art. 16.

Mil­i­tary neces­sity does not admit of cru­elty — that is, the inflic­tion of suf­fer­ing for the sake of suf­fer­ing or for revenge, nor of maim­ing or wound­ing except in fight, nor of tor­ture to extort con­fes­sions. It does not admit of the use of poi­son in any way, nor of the wan­ton dev­as­ta­tion of a dis­trict. It admits of decep­tion, but dis­claims acts of per­fidy; and, in gen­eral, mil­i­tary neces­sity does not include any act of hos­til­ity which makes the return to peace unnec­es­sar­ily dif­fi­cult.
Art. 17.

War is not car­ried on by arms alone. It is law­ful to starve the hos­tile bel­liger­ent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speed­ier sub­jec­tion of the enemy.
Art. 18.

When a com­man­der of a besieged place expels the non­com­bat­ants, in order to lessen the num­ber of those who con­sume his stock of pro­vi­sions, it is law­ful, though an extreme mea­sure, to drive them back, so as to has­ten on the sur­ren­der.
Art. 19.

Com­man­ders, when­ever admis­si­ble, inform the enemy of their inten­tion to bom­bard a place, so that the non­com­bat­ants, and espe­cially the women and chil­dren, may be removed before the bom­bard­ment com­mences. But it is no infrac­tion of the com­mon law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy. Sur­prise may be a neces­sity.
Art. 20.

Pub­lic war is a state of armed hos­til­ity between sov­er­eign nations or gov­ern­ments. It is a law and req­ui­site of civ­i­lized exis­tence that men live in polit­i­cal, con­tin­u­ous soci­eties, form­ing orga­nized units, called states or nations, whose con­stituents bear, enjoy, suf­fer, advance and ret­ro­grade together, in peace and in war.
Art. 21.

The cit­i­zen or native of a hos­tile coun­try is thus an enemy, as one of the con­stituents of the hos­tile state or nation, and as such is sub­jected to the hard­ships of the war.
Art. 22.

Nev­er­the­less, as civ­i­liza­tion has advanced dur­ing the last cen­turies, so has like­wise steadily advanced, espe­cially in war on land, the dis­tinc­tion between the pri­vate indi­vid­ual belong­ing to a hos­tile coun­try and the hos­tile coun­try itself, with its men in arms. The prin­ci­ple has been more and more acknowl­edged that the unarmed cit­i­zen is to be spared in per­son, prop­erty, and honor as much as the exi­gen­cies of war will admit.
Art. 23.

Pri­vate cit­i­zens are no longer mur­dered, enslaved, or car­ried off to dis­tant parts, and the inof­fen­sive indi­vid­ual is as lit­tle dis­turbed in his pri­vate rela­tions as the com­man­der of the hos­tile troops can afford to grant in the over­rul­ing demands of a vig­or­ous war.
Art. 24.

The almost uni­ver­sal rule in remote times was, and con­tin­ues to be with bar­barous armies, that the pri­vate indi­vid­ual of the hos­tile coun­try is des­tined to suf­fer every pri­va­tion of lib­erty and pro­tec­tion, and every dis­rup­tion of fam­ily ties. Pro­tec­tion was, and still is with unciv­i­lized peo­ple, the excep­tion.
Art. 25.

In mod­ern reg­u­lar wars of the Euro­peans, and their descen­dants in other por­tions of the globe, pro­tec­tion of the inof­fen­sive cit­i­zen of the hos­tile coun­try is the rule; pri­va­tion and dis­tur­bance of pri­vate rela­tions are the excep­tions.
Art. 26.

Com­mand­ing gen­er­als may cause the mag­is­trates and civil offi­cers of the hos­tile coun­try to take the oath of tem­po­rary alle­giance or an oath of fidelity to their own vic­to­ri­ous gov­ern­ment or rulers, and they may expel every­one who declines to do so. But whether they do so or not, the peo­ple and their civil offi­cers owe strict obe­di­ence to them as long as they hold sway over the dis­trict or coun­try, at the peril of their lives.
Art. 27.

The law of war can no more wholly dis­pense with retal­i­a­tion than can the law of nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civ­i­lized nations acknowl­edge retal­i­a­tion as the sternest fea­ture of war. A reck­less enemy often leaves to his oppo­nent no other means of secur­ing him­self against the rep­e­ti­tion of bar­barous out­rage
Art. 28.

Retal­i­a­tion will, there­fore, never be resorted to as a mea­sure of mere revenge, but only as a means of pro­tec­tive ret­ri­bu­tion, and more­over, cau­tiously and unavoid­ably; that is to say, retal­i­a­tion shall only be resorted to after care­ful inquiry into the real occur­rence, and the char­ac­ter of the mis­deeds that may demand ret­ri­bu­tion.

Unjust or incon­sid­er­ate retal­i­a­tion removes the bel­liger­ents far­ther and far­ther from the mit­i­gat­ing rules of reg­u­lar war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of sav­ages.
Art. 29.

Mod­ern times are dis­tin­guished from ear­lier ages by the exis­tence, at one and the same time, of many nations and great gov­ern­ments related to one another in close inter­course.

Peace is their nor­mal con­di­tion; war is the excep­tion. The ulti­mate object of all mod­ern war is a renewed state of peace.

The more vig­or­ously wars are pur­sued, the bet­ter it is for human­ity. Sharp wars are brief.
Art. 30.

Ever since the for­ma­tion and coex­is­tence of mod­ern nations, and ever since wars have become great national wars, war has come to be acknowl­edged not to be its own end, but the means to obtain great ends of state, or to con­sist in defense against wrong; and no con­ven­tional restric­tion of the modes adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admit­ted; but the law of war imposes many lim­i­ta­tions and restric­tions on prin­ci­ples of jus­tice, faith, and honor.
Pub­lic and pri­vate prop­erty of the enemy — Pro­tec­tion of per­sons, and espe­cially of women, of reli­gion, the arts and sci­ences — Pun­ish­ment of crimes against the inhab­i­tants of hos­tile coun­tries.
Art. 31.

A vic­to­ri­ous army appro­pri­ates all pub­lic money, seizes all pub­lic mov­able prop­erty until fur­ther direc­tion by its gov­ern­ment, and sequesters for its own ben­e­fit or of that of its gov­ern­ment all the rev­enues of real prop­erty belong­ing to the hos­tile gov­ern­ment or nation. The title to such real prop­erty remains in abeyance dur­ing mil­i­tary occu­pa­tion, and until the con­quest is made com­plete.
Art. 32.

A vic­to­ri­ous army, by the mar­tial power inher­ent in the same, may sus­pend, change, or abol­ish, as far as the mar­tial power extends, the rela­tions which arise from the ser­vices due, accord­ing to the exist­ing laws of the invaded coun­try, from one cit­i­zen, sub­ject, or native of the same to another.

The com­man­der of the army must leave it to the ulti­mate treaty of peace to set­tle the per­ma­nency of this change.
Art. 33.

It is no longer con­sid­ered law­ful — on the con­trary, it is held to be a seri­ous breach of the law of war — to force the sub­jects of the enemy into the ser­vice of the vic­to­ri­ous gov­ern­ment, except the lat­ter should pro­claim, after a fair and com­plete con­quest of the hos­tile coun­try or dis­trict, that it is resolved to keep the coun­try, dis­trict, or place per­ma­nently as its own and make it a por­tion of its own coun­try.
Art. 34.

As a gen­eral rule, the prop­erty belong­ing to churches, to hos­pi­tals, or other estab­lish­ments of an exclu­sively char­i­ta­ble char­ac­ter, to estab­lish­ments of edu­ca­tion, or foun­da­tions for the pro­mo­tion of knowl­edge, whether pub­lic schools, uni­ver­si­ties, acad­e­mies of learn­ing or obser­va­to­ries, muse­ums of the fine arts, or of a sci­en­tific char­ac­ter such prop­erty is not to be con­sid­ered pub­lic prop­erty in the sense of para­graph 31; but it may be taxed or used when the pub­lic ser­vice may require it.
Art. 35.

Clas­si­cal works of art, libraries, sci­en­tific col­lec­tions, or pre­cious instru­ments, such as astro­nom­i­cal tele­scopes, as well as hos­pi­tals, must be secured against all avoid­able injury, even when they are con­tained in for­ti­fied places whilst besieged or bom­barded.
Art. 36.

If such works of art, libraries, col­lec­tions, or instru­ments belong­ing to a hos­tile nation or gov­ern­ment, can be removed with­out injury, the ruler of the con­quer­ing state or nation may order them to be seized and removed for the ben­e­fit of the said nation. The ulti­mate own­er­ship is to be set­tled by the ensu­ing treaty of peace.

In no case shall they be sold or given away, if cap­tured by the armies of the United States, nor shall they ever be pri­vately appro­pri­ated, or wan­tonly destroyed or injured.
Art. 37.

The United States acknowl­edge and pro­tect, in hos­tile coun­tries occu­pied by them, reli­gion and moral­ity; strictly pri­vate prop­erty; the per­sons of the inhab­i­tants, espe­cially those of women: and the sacred­ness of domes­tic rela­tions. Offenses to the con­trary shall be rig­or­ously pun­ished.

This rule does not inter­fere with the right of the vic­to­ri­ous invader to tax the peo­ple or their prop­erty, to levy forced loans, to bil­let sol­diers, or to appro­pri­ate prop­erty, espe­cially houses, lands, boats or ships, and churches, for tem­po­rary and mil­i­tary uses
Art. 38.

Pri­vate prop­erty, unless for­feited by crimes or by offenses of the owner, can be seized only by way of mil­i­tary neces­sity, for the sup­port or other ben­e­fit of the army or of the United States.

If the owner has not fled, the com­mand­ing offi­cer will cause receipts to be given, which may serve the spo­li­ated owner to obtain indem­nity.
Art. 39.

The salaries of civil offi­cers of the hos­tile gov­ern­ment who remain in the invaded ter­ri­tory, and con­tinue the work of their office, and can con­tinue it accord­ing to the cir­cum­stances aris­ing out of the war — such as judges, admin­is­tra­tive or police offi­cers, offi­cers

of city or com­mu­nal gov­ern­ments — are paid from the pub­lic rev­enue of the invaded ter­ri­tory, until the mil­i­tary gov­ern­ment has rea­son wholly or par­tially to dis­con­tinue it. Salaries or incomes con­nected with purely hon­orary titles are always stopped.
Art. 40.

There exists no law or body of author­i­ta­tive rules of action between hos­tile armies, except that branch of the law of nature and nations which is called the law and usages of war on land.
Art. 41.

All munic­i­pal law of the ground on which the armies stand, or of the coun­tries to which they belong, is silent and of no effect between armies in the field.
Art. 42.

Slav­ery, com­pli­cat­ing and con­found­ing the ideas of prop­erty, (that is of a thing,) and of per­son­al­ity, (that is of human­ity,) exists accord­ing to munic­i­pal or local law only. The law of nature and nations has never acknowl­edged it. The digest of the Roman law enacts the early dic­tum of the pagan jurist, that “so far as the law of nature is con­cerned, all men are equal.” Fugi­tives escap­ing from a coun­try in which they were slaves, vil­lains, or serfs, into another coun­try, have, for cen­turies past, been held free and acknowl­edged free by judi­cial deci­sions of Euro­pean coun­tries, even though the munic­i­pal law of the coun­try in which the slave had taken refuge acknowl­edged slav­ery within its own domin­ions.
Art. 43.

There­fore, in a war between the United States and a bel­liger­ent which admits of slav­ery, if a per­son held in bondage by that bel­liger­ent be cap­tured by or come as a fugi­tive under the pro­tec­tion of the mil­i­tary forces of the United States, such per­son is imme­di­ately enti­tled to the rights and priv­i­leges of a free­man To return such per­son into slav­ery would amount to enslav­ing a free per­son, and nei­ther the United States nor any offi­cer under their author­ity can enslave any human being. More­over, a per­son so made free by the law of war is under the shield of the law of nations, and the for­mer owner or State can have, by the law of postliminy, no bel­liger­ent lien or claim of ser­vice.
Art. 44.

All wan­ton vio­lence com­mit­ted against per­sons in the invaded coun­try, all destruc­tion of prop­erty not com­manded by the autho­rized offi­cer, all rob­bery, all pil­lage or sack­ing, even after tak­ing a place by main force, all rape, wound­ing, maim­ing, or killing of such inhab­i­tants, are pro­hib­ited under the penalty of death, or such other severe pun­ish­ment as may seem ade­quate for the grav­ity of the offense.

A sol­dier, offi­cer or pri­vate, in the act of com­mit­ting such vio­lence, and dis­obey­ing a supe­rior order­ing him to abstain from it, may be law­fully killed on the spot by such supe­rior.
Art. 45.

All cap­tures and booty belong, accord­ing to the mod­ern law of war, pri­mar­ily to the gov­ern­ment of the cap­tor.

Prize money, whether on sea or land, can now only be claimed under local law.
Art. 46.

Nei­ther offi­cers nor sol­diers are allowed to make use of their posi­tion or power in the hos­tile coun­try for pri­vate gain, not even for com­mer­cial trans­ac­tions oth­er­wise legit­i­mate. Offenses to the con­trary com­mit­ted by com­mis­sioned offi­cers will be pun­ished with cashier­ing or such other pun­ish­ment as the nature of the offense may require; if by sol­diers, they shall be pun­ished accord­ing to the nature of the offense.
Art. 47.

Crimes pun­ish­able by all penal codes, such as arson, mur­der, maim­ing, assaults, high­way rob­bery, theft, bur­glary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if com­mit­ted by an Amer­i­can sol­dier in a hos­tile coun­try against its inhab­i­tants, are not only pun­ish­able as at home, but in all cases in which death is not inflicted, the sev­erer pun­ish­ment shall be pre­ferred.
Desert­ers — Pris­on­ers of war — Hostages — Booty on the battle-​field.
Art. 48.

Desert­ers from the Amer­i­can Army, hav­ing entered the ser­vice of the enemy, suf­fer death if they fall again into the hands of the United States, whether by cap­ture, or being deliv­ered up to the Amer­i­can Army; and if a deserter from the enemy, hav­ing taken ser­vice in the Army of the United States, is cap­tured by the enemy, and pun­ished by them with death or oth­er­wise, it is not a breach against the law and usages of war, requir­ing redress or retal­i­a­tion.
Art. 49.

A pris­oner of war is a pub­lic enemy armed or attached to the hos­tile army for active aid, who has fallen into the hands of the cap­tor, either fight­ing or wounded, on the field or in the hos­pi­tal, by indi­vid­ual sur­ren­der or by capit­u­la­tion.

All sol­diers, of what­ever species of arms; all men who belong to the ris­ing en masse of the hos­tile coun­try; all those who are attached to the army for its effi­ciency and pro­mote directly the object of the war, except such as are here­inafter pro­vided for; all dis­abled men or offi­cers on the field or else­where, if cap­tured; all ene­mies who have thrown away their arms and ask for quar­ter, are pris­on­ers of war, and as such exposed to the incon­ve­niences as well as enti­tled to the priv­i­leges of a pris­oner of war.
Art. 50.

More­over, cit­i­zens who accom­pany an army for what­ever pur­pose, such as sut­lers, edi­tors, or reporters of jour­nals, or con­trac­tors, if cap­tured, may be made pris­on­ers of war, and be detained as such.

The monarch and mem­bers of the hos­tile reign­ing fam­ily, male or female, the chief, and chief offi­cers of the hos­tile gov­ern­ment, its diplo­matic agents, and all per­sons who are of par­tic­u­lar and sin­gu­lar use and ben­e­fit to the hos­tile army or its gov­ern­ment, are, if cap­tured on bel­liger­ent ground, and if unpro­vided with a safe con­duct granted by the captor’s gov­ern­ment, pris­on­ers of war.
Art. 51.

If the peo­ple of that por­tion of an invaded coun­try which is not yet occu­pied by the enemy, or of the whole coun­try, at the approach of a hos­tile army, rise, under a duly autho­rized levy en masse to resist the invader, they are now treated as pub­lic ene­mies, and, if cap­tured, are pris­on­ers of war.
Art. 52.

No bel­liger­ent has the right to declare that he will treat every cap­tured man in arms of a levy en masse as a brig­and or ban­dit. If, how­ever, the peo­ple of a coun­try, or any por­tion of the same, already occu­pied by an army, rise against it, they are vio­la­tors of the laws of war, and are not enti­tled to their pro­tec­tion.
Art. 53.

The enemy’s chap­lains, offi­cers of the med­ical staff, apothe­caries, hos­pi­tal nurses and ser­vants, if they fall into the hands of the Amer­i­can Army, are not pris­on­ers of war, unless the com­man­der has rea­sons to retain them. In this lat­ter case; or if, at their own desire, they are allowed to remain with their cap­tured com­pan­ions, they are treated as pris­on­ers of war, and may be exchanged if the com­man­der sees fit.
Art. 54

A hostage is a per­son accepted as a pledge for the ful­fill­ment of an agree­ment con­cluded between bel­liger­ents dur­ing the war, or in con­se­quence of a war. Hostages are rare in the present age.
Art. 55.

If a hostage is accepted, he is treated like a pris­oner of war, accord­ing to rank and con­di­tion, as cir­cum­stances may admit.
Art. 56.

A pris­oner of war is sub­ject to no pun­ish­ment for being a pub­lic enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the inten­tional inflic­tion of any suf­fer­ing, or dis­grace, by cruel impris­on­ment, want of food, by muti­la­tion, death, or any other bar­bar­ity.
Art. 57.

So soon as a man is armed by a sov­er­eign gov­ern­ment and takes the soldier’s oath of fidelity, he is a bel­liger­ent; his killing, wound­ing, or other war­like acts are not indi­vid­ual crimes or offenses. No bel­liger­ent has a right to declare that ene­mies of a cer­tain class, color, or con­di­tion, when prop­erly orga­nized as sol­diers, will not be treated by him as pub­lic ene­mies.
Art. 58.

The law of nations knows of no dis­tinc­tion of color, and if an enemy of the United States should enslave and sell any cap­tured per­sons of their army, it would be a case for the sever­est retal­i­a­tion, if not redressed upon com­plaint.

The United States can­not retal­i­ate by enslave­ment; there­fore death must be the retal­i­a­tion for this crime against the law of nations.
Art. 59.

A pris­oner of war remains answer­able for his crimes com­mit­ted against the captor’s army or peo­ple, com­mit­ted before he was cap­tured, and for which he has not been pun­ished by his own author­i­ties.

All pris­on­ers of war are liable to the inflic­tion of retal­ia­tory mea­sures.
Art. 60.

It is against the usage of mod­ern war to resolve, in hatred and revenge, to give no quar­ter. No body of troops has the right to declare that it will not give, and there­fore will not expect, quar­ter; but a com­man­der is per­mit­ted to direct his troops to give no quar­ter, in great straits, when his own sal­va­tion makes it impos­si­ble to cum­ber him­self with pris­on­ers.
Art. 61.

Troops that give no quar­ter have no right to kill ene­mies already dis­abled on the ground, or pris­on­ers cap­tured by other troops.
Art. 62.

All troops of the enemy known or dis­cov­ered to give no quar­ter in gen­eral, or to any por­tion of the army, receive none.
Art. 63.

Troops who fight in the uni­form of their ene­mies, with­out any plain, strik­ing, and uni­form mark of dis­tinc­tion of their own, can expect no quar­ter.
Art. 64.

If Amer­i­can troops cap­ture a train con­tain­ing uni­forms of the enemy, and the com­man­der con­sid­ers it advis­able to dis­trib­ute them for use among his men, some strik­ing mark or sign must be adopted to dis­tin­guish the Amer­i­can sol­dier from the enemy.
Art. 65.

The use of the enemy’s national stan­dard, flag, or other emblem of nation­al­ity, for the pur­pose of deceiv­ing the enemy in bat­tle, is an act of per­fidy by which they lose all claim to the pro­tec­tion of the laws of war.
Art. 66.

Quar­ter hav­ing been given to an enemy by Amer­i­can troops, under a mis­ap­pre­hen­sion of his true char­ac­ter, he may, nev­er­the­less, be ordered to suf­fer death if, within three days after the bat­tle, it be dis­cov­ered that he belongs to a corps which gives no quar­ter.
Art. 67.

The law of nations allows every sov­er­eign gov­ern­ment to make war upon another sov­er­eign state, and, there­fore, admits of no rules or laws dif­fer­ent from those of reg­u­lar war­fare, regard­ing the treat­ment of pris­on­ers of war, although they may belong to the army of a gov­ern­ment which the cap­tor may con­sider as a wan­ton and unjust assailant.
Art. 68.

Mod­ern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the enemy is the object. The destruc­tion of the enemy in mod­ern war, and, indeed, mod­ern war itself, are means to obtain that object of the bel­liger­ent which lies beyond the war.

Unnec­es­sary or revenge­ful destruc­tion of life is not law­ful.
Art. 69.

Out­posts, sen­tinels, or pick­ets are not to be fired upon, except to drive them in, or when a pos­i­tive order, spe­cial or gen­eral, has been issued to that effect.
Art. 70.

The use of poi­son in any man­ner, be it to poi­son wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from mod­ern war­fare. He that uses it puts him­self out of the pale of the law and usages of war.

Who­ever inten­tion­ally inflicts addi­tional wounds on an enemy already wholly dis­abled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encour­ages sol­diers to do so, shall suf­fer death, if duly con­victed, whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy cap­tured after hav­ing com­mit­ted his mis­deed.
Art. 72.

Money and other valu­ables on the per­son of a pris­oner, such as watches or jew­elry, as well as extra cloth­ing, are regarded by the Amer­i­can Army as the pri­vate prop­erty of the pris­oner, and the appro­pri­a­tion of such valu­ables or money is con­sid­ered dis­hon­or­able, and is pro­hib­ited. Nev­er­the­less, if large sums are found upon the per­sons of pris­on­ers, or in their pos­ses­sion, they shall be taken from them, and the sur­plus, after pro­vid­ing for their own sup­port, appro­pri­ated for the use of the army, under the direc­tion of the com­man­der, unless oth­er­wise ordered by the gov­ern­ment. Nor can pris­on­ers claim, as pri­vate prop­erty, large sums found and cap­tured in their train, although they have been placed in the pri­vate lug­gage of the pris­on­ers.
Art. 73.

All offi­cers, when cap­tured, must sur­ren­der their side arms to the cap­tor. They may be restored to the pris­oner in marked cases, by the com­man­der, to sig­nal­ize admi­ra­tion of his dis­tin­guished brav­ery or appro­ba­tion of his humane treat­ment of pris­on­ers before his cap­ture. The cap­tured offi­cer to whom they may be restored can not wear them dur­ing cap­tiv­ity.
Art. 74.

A pris­oner of war, being a pub­lic enemy, is the pris­oner of the gov­ern­ment, and not of the cap­tor. No ran­som can be paid by a pris­oner of war to his indi­vid­ual cap­tor or to any offi­cer in com­mand. The gov­ern­ment alone releases cap­tives, accord­ing to rules pre­scribed by itself.
Art. 75.

Pris­on­ers of war are sub­ject to con­fine­ment or impris­on­ment such as may be deemed nec­es­sary on account of safety, but they are to be sub­jected to no other inten­tional suf­fer­ing or indig­nity. The con­fine­ment and mode of treat­ing a pris­oner may be var­ied dur­ing his cap­tiv­ity accord­ing to the demands of safety.
Art. 76.

Pris­on­ers of war shall be fed upon plain and whole­some food, when­ever prac­ti­ca­ble, and treated with human­ity.

They may be required to work for the ben­e­fit of the captor’s gov­ern­ment, accord­ing to their rank and con­di­tion.
Art. 77.

A pris­oner of war who escapes may be shot or oth­er­wise killed in his flight; but nei­ther death nor any other pun­ish­ment shall be inflicted upon him sim­ply for his attempt to escape, which the law of war does not con­sider a crime. Stricter means of secu­rity shall be used after an unsuc­cess­ful attempt at escape.

If, how­ever, a con­spir­acy is dis­cov­ered, the pur­pose of which is a united or gen­eral escape, the con­spir­a­tors may be rig­or­ously pun­ished, even with death; and cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment may also be inflicted upon pris­on­ers of war dis­cov­ered to have plot­ted rebel­lion against the author­i­ties of the cap­tors, whether in union with fel­low pris­on­ers or other per­sons.
Art. 78.

If pris­on­ers of war, hav­ing given no pledge nor made any promise on their honor, forcibly or oth­er­wise escape, and are cap­tured again in bat­tle after hav­ing rejoined their own army, they shall not be pun­ished for their escape, but shall be treated as sim­ple pris­on­ers of war, although they will be sub­jected to stricter con­fine­ment.
Art. 79.

Every cap­tured wounded enemy shall be med­ically treated, accord­ing to the abil­ity of the med­ical staff.
Art. 80.

Hon­or­able men, when cap­tured, will abstain from giv­ing to the enemy infor­ma­tion con­cern­ing their own army, and the mod­ern law of war per­mits no longer the use of any vio­lence against pris­on­ers in order to extort the desired infor­ma­tion or to pun­ish them for hav­ing given false infor­ma­tion.
Par­ti­sans — Armed ene­mies not belong­ing to the hos­tile army — Scouts — Armed prowlers — War-​rebels
Art. 81.

Par­ti­sans are sol­diers armed and wear­ing the uni­form of their army, but belong­ing to a corps which acts detached from the main body for the pur­pose of mak­ing inroads into the ter­ri­tory occu­pied by the enemy. If cap­tured, they are enti­tled to all the priv­i­leges of the pris­oner of war.
Art. 82.

Men, or squads of men, who com­mit hos­til­i­ties, whether by fight­ing, or inroads for destruc­tion or plun­der, or by raids of any kind, with­out com­mis­sion, with­out being part and por­tion of the orga­nized hos­tile army, and with­out shar­ing con­tin­u­ously in the war, but who do so with inter­mit­ting returns to their homes and avo­ca­tions, or with the occa­sional assump­tion of the sem­blance of peace­ful pur­suits, divest­ing them­selves of the char­ac­ter or appear­ance of sol­diers — such men, or squads of men, are not pub­lic ene­mies, and, there­fore, if cap­tured, are not enti­tled to the priv­i­leges of pris­on­ers of war, but shall be treated sum­mar­ily as high­way rob­bers or pirates.
Art. 83.

Scouts, or sin­gle sol­diers, if dis­guised in the dress of the coun­try or in the uni­form of the army hos­tile to their own, employed in obtain­ing infor­ma­tion, if found within or lurk­ing about the lines of the cap­tor, are treated as spies, and suf­fer death.
Art. 84.

Armed prowlers, by what­ever names they may be called, or per­sons of the enemy’s ter­ri­tory, who steal within the lines of the hos­tile army for the pur­pose of rob­bing, killing, or of destroy­ing bridges, roads or canals, or of rob­bing or destroy­ing the mail, or of cut­ting the tele­graph wires, are not enti­tled to the priv­i­leges of the pris­oner of war.
Art. 85.

War-​rebels are per­sons within an occu­pied ter­ri­tory who rise in arms against the occu­py­ing or con­quer­ing army, or against the author­i­ties estab­lished by the same. If cap­tured, they may suf­fer death, whether they rise singly, in small or large bands, and whether called upon to do so by their own, but expelled, gov­ern­ment or not. They are not pris­on­ers of war; nor are they if dis­cov­ered and secured before their con­spir­acy has matured to an actual ris­ing or armed vio­lence.
Safe-​conduct — Spies — War-​traitors — Cap­tured mes­sen­gers — Abuse of the flag of truce
Art. 86.

All inter­course between the ter­ri­to­ries occu­pied by bel­liger­ent armies, whether by traf­fic, by let­ter, by travel, or in any other way, ceases. This is the gen­eral rule, to be observed with­out spe­cial procla­ma­tion.

Excep­tions to this rule, whether by safe-​conduct, or per­mis­sion to trade on a small or large scale, or by exchang­ing mails, or by travel from one ter­ri­tory into the other, can take place only accord­ing to agree­ment approved by the gov­ern­ment, or by the high­est mil­i­tary author­ity.

Con­tra­ven­tions of this rule are highly pun­ish­able.
Art. 87.

Ambas­sadors, and all other diplo­matic agents of neu­tral pow­ers, accred­ited to the enemy, may receive safe-​conducts through the ter­ri­to­ries occu­pied by the bel­liger­ents, unless there are mil­i­tary rea­sons to the con­trary, and unless they may reach the place of their des­ti­na­tion con­ve­niently by another route. It implies no inter­na­tional affront if the safe-​conduct is declined. Such passes are usu­ally given by the supreme author­ity of the State, and not by sub­or­di­nate offi­cers.
Art. 88.

A spy is a per­son who secretly, in dis­guise or under false pre­tense, seeks infor­ma­tion with the inten­tion of com­mu­ni­cat­ing it to the enemy.

The spy is pun­ish­able with death by hang­ing by the neck, whether or not he suc­ceed in obtain­ing the infor­ma­tion or in con­vey­ing it to the enemy.
Art. 89.

If a cit­i­zen of the United States obtains infor­ma­tion in a legit­i­mate man­ner, and betrays it to the enemy, be he a mil­i­tary or civil offi­cer, or a pri­vate cit­i­zen, he shall suf­fer death.
Art. 90.

A trai­tor under the law of war, or a war-​traitor, is a per­son in a place or dis­trict under Mar­tial Law who, unau­tho­rized by the mil­i­tary com­man­der, gives infor­ma­tion of any kind to the enemy, or holds inter­course with him.

The war-​traitor is always severely pun­ished. If his offense con­sists in betray­ing to the enemy any­thing con­cern­ing the con­di­tion, safety, oper­a­tions, or plans of the troops hold­ing or occu­py­ing the place or dis­trict, his pun­ish­ment is death.
Art. 92.

If the cit­i­zen or sub­ject of a coun­try or place invaded or con­quered gives infor­ma­tion to his own gov­ern­ment, from which he is sep­a­rated by the hos­tile army, or to the army of his gov­ern­ment, he is a war-​traitor, and death is the penalty of his offense.
Art. 93.

All armies in the field stand in need of guides, and impress them if they can­not obtain them oth­er­wise.
Art. 94.

No per­son hav­ing been forced by the enemy to serve as guide is pun­ish­able for hav­ing done so.
Art. 95.

If a cit­i­zen of a hos­tile and invaded dis­trict vol­un­tar­ily serves as a guide to the enemy, or offers to do so, he is deemed a war-​traitor, and shall suf­fer death.
Art. 96.

A cit­i­zen serv­ing vol­un­tar­ily as a guide against his own coun­try com­mits trea­son, and will be dealt with accord­ing to the law of his coun­try.
Art. 97.

Guides, when it is clearly proved that they have mis­led inten­tion­ally, may be put to death.
Art. 98.

An unau­tho­rized or secret com­mu­ni­ca­tion with the enemy is con­sid­ered trea­son­able by the law of war.

For­eign res­i­dents in an invaded or occu­pied ter­ri­tory, or for­eign vis­i­tors in the same, can claim no immu­nity from this law. They may com­mu­ni­cate with for­eign parts, or with the inhab­i­tants of the hos­tile coun­try, so far as the mil­i­tary author­ity per­mits, but no fur­ther. Instant expul­sion from the occu­pied ter­ri­tory would be the very least pun­ish­ment for the infrac­tion of this rule.
Art. 99.

A mes­sen­ger car­ry­ing writ­ten dis­patches or ver­bal mes­sages from one por­tion of the army, or from a besieged place, to another por­tion of the same army, or its gov­ern­ment, if armed, and in the uni­form of his army, and if cap­tured, while doing so, in the ter­ri­tory occu­pied by the enemy, is treated by the cap­tor as a pris­oner of war. If not in uni­form, nor a sol­dier, the cir­cum­stances con­nected with his cap­ture must deter­mine the dis­po­si­tion that shall be made of him.
Art. 100.

A mes­sen­ger or agent who attempts to steal through the ter­ri­tory occu­pied by the enemy, to fur­ther, in any man­ner, the inter­ests of the enemy, if cap­tured, is not enti­tled to the priv­i­leges of the pris­oner of war, and may be dealt with accord­ing to the cir­cum­stances of the case.
Art. 101.

While decep­tion in war is admit­ted as a just and nec­es­sary means of hos­til­ity, and is con­sis­tent with hon­or­able war­fare, the com­mon law of war allows even cap­i­tal pun­ish­ment for clan­des­tine or treach­er­ous attempts to injure an enemy, because they are so dan­ger­ous, and it is dif­fi­cult to guard against them.
Art. 102.

The law of war, like the crim­i­nal law regard­ing other offenses, makes no dif­fer­ence on account of the dif­fer­ence of sexes, con­cern­ing the spy, the war-​traitor, or the war-​rebel.
Art. 103.

Spies, war-​traitors, and war-​rebels are not exchanged accord­ing to the com­mon law of war. The exchange of such per­sons would require a spe­cial car­tel, autho­rized by the gov­ern­ment, or, at a great dis­tance from it, by the chief com­man­der of the army in the field.
Art. 104.

A suc­cess­ful spy or war-​traitor, safely returned to his own army, and after­wards cap­tured as an enemy, is not sub­ject to pun­ish­ment for his acts as a spy or war-​traitor, but he may be held in closer cus­tody as a per­son indi­vid­u­ally dan­ger­ous.
Exchange of pris­on­ers — Flags of truce — Flags of pro­tec­tion
Art. 105.

Exchanges of pris­on­ers take place — num­ber for num­ber — rank for rank wounded for wounded — with added con­di­tion for added con­di­tion — such, for instance, as not to serve for a cer­tain period.
Art. 106.

In exchang­ing pris­on­ers of war, such num­bers of per­sons of infe­rior rank may be sub­sti­tuted as an equiv­a­lent for one of supe­rior rank as may be agreed upon by car­tel, which requires the sanc­tion of the gov­ern­ment, or of the com­man­der of the army in the field.
Art. 107.

A pris­oner of war is in honor bound truly to state to the cap­tor his rank; and he is not to assume a lower rank than belongs to him, in order to cause a more advan­ta­geous exchange, nor a higher rank, for the pur­pose of obtain­ing bet­ter treat­ment.

Offenses to the con­trary have been justly pun­ished by the com­man­ders of released pris­on­ers, and may be good cause for refus­ing to release such pris­on­ers.
Art. 108.

The sur­plus num­ber of pris­on­ers of war remain­ing after an exchange has taken place is some­times released either for the pay­ment of a stip­u­lated sum of money, or, in urgent cases, of pro­vi­sion, cloth­ing, or other nec­es­saries.

Such arrange­ment, how­ever, requires the sanc­tion of the high­est author­ity.
Art. 109.

The exchange of pris­on­ers of war is an act of con­ve­nience to both bel­liger­ents. If no gen­eral car­tel has been con­cluded, it can­not be demanded by either of them. No bel­liger­ent is obliged to exchange pris­on­ers of war.

A car­tel is void­able as soon as either party has vio­lated it.
Art. 110.

No exchange of pris­on­ers shall be made except after com­plete cap­ture, and after an accu­rate account of them, and a list of the cap­tured offi­cers, has been taken.
Art. 111.

The bearer of a flag of truce can­not insist upon being admit­ted. He must always be admit­ted with great cau­tion. Unnec­es­sary fre­quency is care­fully to be avoided.
Art. 112.

If the bearer of a flag of truce offer him­self dur­ing an engage­ment, he can be admit­ted as a very rare excep­tion only. It is no breach of good faith to retain such flag of truce, if admit­ted dur­ing the engage­ment. Fir­ing is not required to cease on the appear­ance of a flag of truce in bat­tle.
Art. 113.

If the bearer of a flag of truce, pre­sent­ing him­self dur­ing an engage­ment, is killed or wounded, it fur­nishes no ground of com­plaint what­ever.
Art. 114.

If it be dis­cov­ered, and fairly proved, that a flag of truce has been abused for sur­rep­ti­tiously obtain­ing mil­i­tary knowl­edge, the bearer of the flag thus abus­ing his sacred char­ac­ter is deemed a spy.

So sacred is the char­ac­ter of a flag of truce, and so nec­es­sary is its sacred­ness, that while its abuse is an espe­cially heinous offense, great cau­tion is req­ui­site, on the other hand, in con­vict­ing the bearer of a flag of truce as a spy.
Art. 115.

It is cus­tom­ary to des­ig­nate by cer­tain flags (usu­ally yel­low) the hos­pi­tals in places which are shelled, so that the besieg­ing enemy may avoid fir­ing on them. The same has been done in bat­tles, when hos­pi­tals are sit­u­ated within the field of the engage­ment.
Art. 116.

Hon­or­able bel­liger­ents often request that the hos­pi­tals within the ter­ri­tory of the enemy may be des­ig­nated, so that they may be spared. An hon­or­able bel­liger­ent allows him­self to be guided by flags or sig­nals of pro­tec­tion as much as the con­tin­gen­cies and the neces­si­ties of the fight will per­mit.
Art. 117.

It is justly con­sid­ered an act of bad faith, of infamy or fiendish­ness, to deceive the enemy by flags of pro­tec­tion. Such act of bad faith may be good cause for refus­ing to respect such flags.
Art. 118.

The besieg­ing bel­liger­ent has some­times requested the besieged to des­ig­nate the build­ings con­tain­ing col­lec­tions of works of art, sci­en­tific muse­ums, astro­nom­i­cal obser­va­to­ries, or pre­cious libraries, so that their destruc­tion may be avoided as much as pos­si­ble.
Art. 119.

Pris­on­ers of war may be released from cap­tiv­ity by exchange, and, under cer­tain cir­cum­stances, also by parole.
Art. 120.

The term Parole des­ig­nates the pledge of indi­vid­ual good faith and honor to do, or to omit doing, cer­tain acts after he who gives his parole shall have been dis­missed, wholly or par­tially, from the power of the cap­tor.
Art. 121.

The pledge of the parole is always an indi­vid­ual, but not a pri­vate act.
Art. 122.

The parole applies chiefly to pris­on­ers of war whom the cap­tor allows to return to their coun­try, or to live in greater free­dom within the captor’s coun­try or ter­ri­tory, on con­di­tions stated in the parole.
Art. 123.

Release of pris­on­ers of war by exchange is the gen­eral rule; release by parole is the excep­tion.
Art. 124.

Break­ing the parole is pun­ished with death when the per­son break­ing the parole is cap­tured again.

Accu­rate lists, there­fore, of the paroled per­sons must be kept by the bel­liger­ents.
Art. 125.

When paroles are given and received there must be an exchange of two writ­ten doc­u­ments, in which the name and rank of the paroled indi­vid­u­als are accu­rately and truth­fully stated.
Art. 126.

Com­mis­sioned offi­cers only are allowed to give their parole, and they can give it only with the per­mis­sion of their supe­rior, as long as a supe­rior in rank is within reach.
Art. 127.

No non­com­mis­sioned offi­cer or pri­vate can give his parole except through an offi­cer. Indi­vid­ual paroles not given through an offi­cer are not only void, but sub­ject the indi­vid­u­als giv­ing them to the pun­ish­ment of death as desert­ers. The only admis­si­ble excep­tion is where indi­vid­u­als, prop­erly sep­a­rated from their com­mands, have suf­fered long con­fine­ment with­out the pos­si­bil­ity of being paroled through an offi­cer.
Art. 128.

No parol­ing on the bat­tle­field; no parol­ing of entire bod­ies of troops after a bat­tle; and no dis­missal of large num­bers of pris­on­ers, with a gen­eral dec­la­ra­tion that they are paroled, is per­mit­ted, or of any value. Art. 129. In capit­u­la­tions for the sur­ren­der of strong places or for­ti­fied camps the com­mand­ing offi­cer, in cases of urgent neces­sity, may agree that the troops under his com­mand shall not fight again dur­ing the war, unless exchanged.
Art. 130.

The usual pledge given in the parole is not to serve dur­ing the exist­ing war, unless exchanged.

This pledge refers only to the active ser­vice in the field, against the parol­ing bel­liger­ent or his allies actively engaged in the same war. These cases of break­ing the parole are patent acts, and can be vis­ited with the pun­ish­ment of death; but the pledge does not refer to inter­nal ser­vice, such as recruit­ing or drilling the recruits, for­ti­fy­ing places not besieged, quelling civil com­mo­tions, fight­ing against bel­liger­ents uncon­nected with the parol­ing bel­liger­ents, or to civil or diplo­matic ser­vice for which the paroled offi­cer may be employed.
Art. 131.

If the gov­ern­ment does not approve of the parole, the paroled offi­cer must return into cap­tiv­ity, and should the enemy refuse to receive him, he is free of his parole.
Art. 132.

A bel­liger­ent gov­ern­ment may declare, by a gen­eral order, whether it will allow parol­ing, and on what con­di­tions it will allow it. Such order is com­mu­ni­cated to the enemy.
Art. 133.

No pris­oner of war can be forced by the hos­tile gov­ern­ment to parole him­self, and no gov­ern­ment is obliged to parole pris­on­ers of war, or to parole all cap­tured offi­cers, if it paroles any. As the pledg­ing of the parole is an indi­vid­ual act, so is parol­ing, on the other hand, an act of choice on the part of the bel­liger­ent.
Art. 134.

The com­man­der of an occu­py­ing army may require of the civil offi­cers of the enemy, and of its cit­i­zens, any pledge he may con­sider nec­es­sary for the safety or secu­rity of his army, and upon their fail­ure to give it he may arrest, con­fine, or detain them.
Armistice — Capit­u­la­tion
Art. 135.

An armistice is the ces­sa­tion of active hos­til­i­ties for a period agreed between bel­liger­ents. It must be agreed upon in writ­ing, and duly rat­i­fied by the high­est author­i­ties of the con­tend­ing par­ties.
Art. 136.

If an armistice be declared, with­out con­di­tions, it extends no fur­ther than to require a total ces­sa­tion of hos­til­i­ties along the front of both bel­liger­ents.

If con­di­tions be agreed upon, they should be clearly expressed, and must be rigidly adhered to by both par­ties. If either party vio­lates any express con­di­tion, the armistice may be declared null and void by the other.
Art. 137.

An armistice may be gen­eral, and valid for all points and lines of the bel­liger­ents, or spe­cial, that is, refer­ring to cer­tain troops or cer­tain local­i­ties only.

An armistice may be con­cluded for a def­i­nite time; or for an indef­i­nite time, dur­ing which either bel­liger­ent may resume hos­til­i­ties on giv­ing the notice agreed upon to the other.
Art. 138.

The motives which induce the one or the other bel­liger­ent to con­clude an armistice, whether it be expected to be pre­lim­i­nary to a treaty of peace, or to pre­pare dur­ing the armistice for a more vig­or­ous pros­e­cu­tion of the war, does in no way affect the char­ac­ter of the armistice itself.
Art. 139.

An armistice is bind­ing upon the bel­liger­ents from the day of the agreed com­mence­ment; but the offi­cers of the armies are respon­si­ble from the day only when they receive offi­cial infor­ma­tion of its exis­tence.
Art. 140.

Com­mand­ing offi­cers have the right to con­clude armistices bind­ing on the dis­trict over which their com­mand extends, but such armistice is sub­ject to the rat­i­fi­ca­tion of the supe­rior author­ity, and ceases so soon as it is made known to the enemy that the armistice is not rat­i­fied, even if a cer­tain time for the elaps­ing between giv­ing notice of ces­sa­tion and the resump­tion of hos­til­i­ties should have been stip­u­lated for.
Art. 141.

It is incum­bent upon the con­tract­ing par­ties of an armistice to stip­u­late what inter­course of per­sons or traf­fic between the inhab­i­tants of the ter­ri­to­ries occu­pied by the hos­tile armies shall be allowed, if any.

If noth­ing is stip­u­lated the inter­course remains sus­pended, as dur­ing actual hos­til­i­ties.
Art. 142.

An armistice is not a par­tial or a tem­po­rary peace; it is only the sus­pen­sion of mil­i­tary oper­a­tions to the extent agreed upon by the par­ties.
Art. 143.

When an armistice is con­cluded between a for­ti­fied place and the army besieg­ing it, it is agreed by all the author­i­ties on this sub­ject that the besieger must cease all exten­sion, per­fec­tion, or advance of his attack­ing works as much so as from attacks by main force.

But as there is a dif­fer­ence of opin­ion among mar­tial jurists, whether the besieged have the right to repair breaches or to erect new works of defense within the place dur­ing an armistice, this point should be deter­mined by express agree­ment between the par­ties.
Art. 144.

So soon as a capit­u­la­tion is signed, the capit­u­la­tor has no right to demol­ish, destroy, or injure the works, arms, stores, or ammu­ni­tion, in his pos­ses­sion, dur­ing the time which elapses between the sign­ing and the exe­cu­tion of the capit­u­la­tion, unless oth­er­wise stip­u­lated in the same.
Art. 145.

When an armistice is clearly bro­ken by one of the par­ties, the other party is released from all oblig­a­tion to observe it.
Art. 146.

Pris­on­ers taken in the act of break­ing an armistice must be treated as pris­on­ers of war, the offi­cer alone being respon­si­ble who gives the order for such a vio­la­tion of an armistice. The high­est author­ity of the bel­liger­ent aggrieved may demand redress for the infrac­tion of an armistice.
Art. 147.

Bel­liger­ents some­times con­clude an armistice while their plenipo­ten­tiaries are met to dis­cuss the con­di­tions of a treaty of peace; but plenipo­ten­tiaries may meet with­out a pre­lim­i­nary armistice; in the lat­ter case, the war is car­ried on with­out any abate­ment.
Art. 148.

The law of war does not allow pro­claim­ing either an indi­vid­ual belong­ing to the hos­tile army, or a cit­i­zen, or a sub­ject of the hos­tile gov­ern­ment, an out­law, who may be slain with­out trial by any cap­tor, any more than the mod­ern law of peace allows such inten­tional out­lawry; on the con­trary, it abhors such out­rage. The sternest retal­i­a­tion should fol­low the mur­der com­mit­ted in con­se­quence of such procla­ma­tion, made by what­ever author­ity. Civ­i­lized nations look with hor­ror upon offers of rewards for the assas­si­na­tion of ene­mies as relapses into bar­barism.
Insur­rec­tion — Civil War — Rebel­lion
Art. 149.

Insur­rec­tion is the ris­ing of peo­ple in arms against their gov­ern­ment, or a por­tion of it, or against one or more of its laws, or against an offi­cer or offi­cers of the gov­ern­ment. It may be con­fined to mere armed resis­tance, or it may have greater ends in view.
Art. 150.

Civil war is war between two or more por­tions of a coun­try or state, each con­tend­ing for the mas­tery of the whole, and each claim­ing to be the legit­i­mate gov­ern­ment. The term is also some­times applied to war of rebel­lion, when the rebel­lious provinces or por­tions of the state are con­tigu­ous to those con­tain­ing the seat of gov­ern­ment.
Art. 151.

The term rebel­lion is applied to an insur­rec­tion of large extent, and is usu­ally a war between the legit­i­mate gov­ern­ment of a coun­try and por­tions of provinces of the same who seek to throw off their alle­giance to it and set up a gov­ern­ment of their own.
Art. 152.

When human­ity induces the adop­tion of the rules of reg­u­lar war to ward rebels, whether the adop­tion is par­tial or entire, it does in no way what­ever imply a par­tial or com­plete acknowl­edge­ment of their gov­ern­ment, if they have set up one, or of them, as an inde­pen­dent and sov­er­eign power. Neu­trals have no right to make the adop­tion of the rules of war by the assailed gov­ern­ment toward rebels the ground of their own acknowl­edg­ment of the revolted peo­ple as an inde­pen­dent power.
Art. 153.

Treat­ing cap­tured rebels as pris­on­ers of war, exchang­ing them, con­clud­ing of car­tels, capit­u­la­tions, or other war­like agree­ments with them; address­ing offi­cers of a rebel army by the rank they may have in the same; accept­ing flags of truce; or, on the other hand, pro­claim­ing Mar­tial Law in their ter­ri­tory, or levy­ing war-​taxes or forced loans, or doing any other act sanc­tioned or demanded by the law and usages of pub­lic war between sov­er­eign bel­liger­ents, nei­ther proves nor estab­lishes an acknowl­edg­ment of the rebel­lious peo­ple, or of the gov­ern­ment which they may have erected, as a pub­lic or sov­er­eign power. Nor does the adop­tion of the rules of war toward rebels imply an engage­ment with them extend­ing beyond the lim­its of these rules. It is vic­tory in the field that ends the strife and set­tles the future rela­tions between the con­tend­ing par­ties.
Art. 154.

Treat­ing, in the field, the rebel­lious enemy accord­ing to the law and usages of war has never pre­vented the legit­i­mate gov­ern­ment from try­ing the lead­ers of the rebel­lion or chief rebels for high trea­son, and from treat­ing them accord­ingly, unless they are included in a gen­eral amnesty.
Art. 155.

All ene­mies in reg­u­lar war are divided into two gen­eral classes — that is to say, into com­bat­ants and non­com­bat­ants, or unarmed cit­i­zens of the hos­tile gov­ern­ment.

The mil­i­tary com­man­der of the legit­i­mate gov­ern­ment, in a war of rebel­lion, dis­tin­guishes between the loyal cit­i­zen in the revolted por­tion of the coun­try and the dis­loyal cit­i­zen. The dis­loyal cit­i­zens may fur­ther be clas­si­fied into those cit­i­zens known to sym­pa­thize with the rebel­lion with­out pos­i­tively aid­ing it, and those who, with­out tak­ing up arms, give pos­i­tive aid and com­fort to the rebel­lious enemy with­out being bod­ily forced thereto.
Art. 156.

Com­mon jus­tice and plain expe­di­ency require that the mil­i­tary com­man­der pro­tect the man­i­festly loyal cit­i­zens, in revolted ter­ri­to­ries, against the hard­ships of the war as much as the com­mon mis­for­tune of all war admits.

The com­man­der will throw the bur­den of the war, as much as lies within his power, on the dis­loyal cit­i­zens, of the revolted por­tion or province, sub­ject­ing them to a stricter police than the non­com­bat­ant ene­mies have to suf­fer in reg­u­lar war; and if he deems it appro­pri­ate, or if his gov­ern­ment demands of him that every cit­i­zen shall, by an oath of alle­giance, or by some other man­i­fest act, declare his fidelity to the legit­i­mate gov­ern­ment, he may expel, trans­fer, imprison, or fine the revolted cit­i­zens who refuse to pledge them­selves anew as cit­i­zens obe­di­ent to the law and loyal to the gov­ern­ment.

Whether it is expe­di­ent to do so, and whether reliance can be placed upon such oaths, the com­man­der or his gov­ern­ment have the right to decide.
Art. 157.

Armed or unarmed resis­tance by cit­i­zens of the United States against the law­ful move­ments of their troops is levy­ing war against the United States, and is there­fore treason.

{jcom­ments on}



Current State

Who Dat ?

We have 143 guests and no members online



Today Is A Killer!

And It's Gone

Did you miss this?